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Collaborating elite of Kalabagh and patterns of control in colonial Punjab, 1849–1939

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ABSTRACT

This article discusses the local dynamics of control by the rural elite in colonial Punjab over agricultural land, the informal credit market and labour supply. I argue, the landed elite in collaboration with bureaucratic patronage, developed linkages between indigenous institutions and imperial ideology, controlled and manipulated the means of power and wealth. This led to a one-dimensional flow of capital and profit, towards elite and state, causing a serious check on social mobility and economic development. In a local study of a rural town, Kalabagh, in the north-west of Pakistani Punjab, the article brings forward an understudied aspect of colonial policies which followed a different trajectory from the rest of the Punjab. The colonial state, instead of development, maintained the structure of society under feudal setup. Rais, the ruling elite of the town, as colonial collaborator, managed the moneylending system in his estate and trapped the wage labourers in complex debt bondage, perpetuating *jajmani* type relationship in the twentieth century. At one level this arrangement invigorated hierarchical differentiation and dispossession of rural proletariat, at another level, the social differentiation acted as an instrument to mobilize the community for collective action towards nationalist discourse.

KEYWORDS

collaboration; jajmani; debt bondage; rais; punchayat; Kalabagh

Introduction

Following the annexation of the Punjab in 1849, the British had created well-established systems of political governance financed by an efficient land revenue administration. Political stability along with agricultural development was crucial for the Punjab's potential as a model agricultural province. The period of British rule in the Punjab was dominated by three major themes, political entrenchment, revenue extraction, and military requirements. The Punjab's vulnerability to threats from the expanding Russian empire in Central Asia and its loyalty during 1857 revolt had strengthened its strategic importance and the nexus between landholders and military recruitment, ideologically underpinned in the martial castes theory.¹

The British established an administrative apparatus that relied heavily upon the support of the province's powerful landed elite as collaborators.² These local elites as tribal chiefs, landowners, traders, and businessmen were tied to the colonial power structure by webs of patronage, grants and designations. In return, the local elites secured law and order and assisted the administration. British rule had introduced large irrigation projects in the central districts of west Punjab, the so-called canal colony developments which brought prosperity in the province at the expense of the rural poor.³ The construction of framework for control and extraction took place by giving the collaborating elite the proprietary rights of land.⁴ The underlying aim to bestow permanent

proprietary rights of land was to convert elite into landlords who would transform agriculture by bringing wastelands into cultivation, building irrigation works and generally enhancing the value of landed property.⁵ Scholars argue, the colonial economic policies and inelastic revenue demand developed a network of moneylending systems. This hastened the scale of differentiation, indebtedness and large scale alienation of land by sale or mortgage.⁶ In the late nineteenth century the British administrators developed the system of classification and categories that defined and justified the hierarchies on which the imperial edifice rested. Land was a central element in legitimizing the status of local leaders as intermediary in rural Punjab.⁷ In Kalabagh⁸ also, the colonial state bolstered the power of the local elite called the Rais by granting revenue-free perpetual *jagir* (landed property), as a reward for their loyal services which they rendered to the British in the Uprising of 1857. It was unlike the pattern in other parts of the Punjab where the grants were subject to the pleasure of the British government and could be revoked.⁹

Kalabagh was home to generations of the local clan of Maliks who belonged to the Awan caste. As opposed to the rest of the Punjab, the head of this family was known as 'Rais' in this town. I use the term 'Rais' in the sense in which Chris Bayly used it. The term 'Rais' has an Arabic origin which means 'patron' or 'magnate'; it was applied here to a landlord who was a lineage head and an intermediary of the colonial state.¹⁰ He was able to mediate with higher authority to control the webs of patronage. The Rais controlled the rural credit mechanism and the flow of wealth, lent money to cloth dealers, peasants, and traders, keeping them in a subordinate position.

Kalabagh is an ancient town of Mianwali, a north-western district of west Pakistani Punjab. As a tribal region on the periphery of the Punjab, lying along the Salt Range tract, Mianwali was agriculturally disadvantaged, and therefore the Punjabi Muslims found an easy outlet to seek future in the army. The agricultural prospects were not compatible with the colonial ideology which believed that investment must yield economic benefits; subsequently, it remained out of bound for the colonial agricultural ventures. The colonial state identified the district with a pre-dominantly Pathan population, essentially for military recruitment. In the colonial system of governance, the collaboration of indigenous elites played an instrumental role in the extraction of revenue and enlistment of military recruits.

This article explores the nexus between local landed elites and the colonial state. It foregrounds a grassroots perspective through a local-level study of Kalabagh, an underdeveloped town. The study focuses on the colonial state's appropriation of the tribal structure and traditions and its use of them to extract and accumulate resources and capital. It explores the mechanisms used, to perpetuate this arrangement thus preserving the status quo over time, by the collaborative nexus forged by the state and the landed elite.

Colonial sources on the economy of the Punjab paint a picture of the province as inhabited by a contented peasantry that deserved progressive policies culminating in economic growth. Scholarship, however, increasingly contested this line of argument. Mridula Mukherjee, Mustafa Kamal Pasha, Irfan Habib, Satish Mishra, Himadri Banerjee, Indu Banga, Tomlinson and Ambirajan have highlighted the disruptive effects of colonial economic policies. They argue that in the colonial period in India, the basic trend in the economy was in the direction of the development of under development through forced commercialization and stagnation in per-capita agricultural output, accompanied by pre-capitalist arrangements.¹¹ A fairly widely held view about the Punjab was that it did not fit into this all-India picture due to its prosperity. This impression was based on colonial official studies which commanded credibility, particularly Tupper's volumes on Punjab Customary Law, and Calvert and Malcolm Darling's classic studies.¹² The official work gives an impression that the Punjab was a favourite province of the Raj and gained an extraordinary favour from the British. Historians like Imran Ali, Ian Talbot and David Gilmartin however contested that view and asserted that the significant growth was conjoined with continued backwardness in the Punjab.¹³ They argued, colonial rule transformed this region into one of the most important areas of commercial farming in Asia. Canal colonization released vast resources and provided an opportunity for economic development in the Punjab.

However, despite significant economic growth, the Punjab remained an underdeveloped region, and its failure to overcome economic backwardness had political implications. The canal colonies were financially profitable to the state. Colony land was allotted predominantly to landholding groups which strengthened the hold of the dominant classes over the lower rungs of the society.

Another dimension of this relationship is captured by Barrier and Puri. Both highlight such policies and decisions of the colonial state that generated resistance from the regime's allies which then resulted in the revision of the same colonial policies. C.A Bayly's scholarly works on Allahabad and T.R. Metcalf's work on the taluqadars of Awadh examine colonial governance premised upon the cooptation of local elites through patronage politics.¹⁴ While these studies do not focus specifically on the Punjab, they do highlight the changing political and economic imperatives and the effects they rendered on the structure of local politics. Sarah Ansari, Gilmartin, and Talbot have elaborated the concept of collaboration.¹⁵ Talbot stresses the collaborating role of the elites of Shahpur, Gilmartin focused on the patronage the colonial government extended to specific biradari networks and landowning religious allies, while Ansari discusses pirs (spiritual guides) and sufis (Islamic mystics) as colonial collaborators in Sindh. Tahir Mahmood identified intra-elite competition in the process of collaboration as a two way process, in which local elites manipulated the state to their advantage.¹⁶ Indu Agnihotri, Sanjay Kumar, Renu Bala and B.S Saini argue socio-economic changes and networks of moneylending hastened the scale of differentiation and indebtedness which eventually caused poverty.¹⁷

This study adds to the historiography of the Punjab by arguing that the colonial state, particularly in the canal colony districts instituted a policy framework that facilitated progress and paternalism simultaneously. However, the colonial policies followed a different trajectory in the north-western agriculturally backward districts, and particularly in the town under study. The British consolidated the tribal/feudal pattern of leadership in Kalabagh, marked by kinship ties and networks of dependence, to adapt the 'tribe' to their hierarchical political purposes. This study also sheds light on the unique role of collaborating elites as moneylenders, who ensnared the rural poor in debt by controlling economic transactions, capital, sale and mortgage of land, perpetuating *jajmani*¹⁸ type relationships. The poverty and underdevelopment in this town was not merely an outcome of colonial economic policies but a collaborative nexus of elite and state that preserved political control and social stagnation.

The account in this article is based on the original detailed colonial record of the Jagir of Rais of Kalabagh. The documents include the Financial Commissioner's report on the collection from Jagir income out of alum, salt, taxes on grazing land and gold washing etc. The letters of the Commissioner and the Superintendent Dera Jat division show the value of perpetual jagirs and the sanctions of revenue-free grants. World War I services record of Mianwali District provide information about the contribution of the local elite into various war funds. These historical documents are available in the Deputy Commissioner Record Office of Mianwali, which have never been utilized.

Patronage and British colonial rule in Kalabagh

As a commercial town, Kalabagh existed on a main trading route between the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Punjab. Situated on the hill-side, the town was a halting place and a route to India for caravans and armies in the olden times. It owes its existence to the celebrated salt quarries and the extensive alum works. The terrain was flat and delta like, the soil was fertile. The area was rich in mineral resources, dotted with salt deposits in the rock layers with a large quantity of rock oil (petroleum) at Jaba in Massan village, and producing six hundred gallons per annum.¹⁹ Band Ali, grand-son of Shaikh Adu, the first Awan settler, took possession of the salt-mines three centuries ago and established himself as chief. The control over ferry, levying taxes on salt and alum, and taking tribute from the Bhangi Khel, a Khatak tribe occupying the hills north of Kalabagh, became his sources of extraction.²⁰ Band Ali declared his allegiance by paying an annual tribute to the

Maharaja with two-thirds of the salt tax and two-fifths of the revenues of cis-Indus lands.²¹ Kalabagh was a typical feudal society, marked by ties of kinship, and networks of dependence extended from the top to the bottom of the social scale.²²

With the annexation of the Punjab in 1849, the British colonial government penetrated society with a greater infrastructural, logistical reach and modern bureaucracy that closely regulated and controlled agricultural production, revenue and society in the province. Iftikhar Malik describes that, following a policy of cooption, biradari-based chieftains like the Mazaris, Legharis, Noons, Maliks, Khattars, Qureshis, Gilanis, Daultanas, Gurmanis and Tiwanas, were all tempted to offer their allegiance to the Raj.²³ Some of the more powerful chiefs were given jagirs, and later on were invested with magisterial powers in their respective estates. The Rais of Kalabagh gained the overriding authority to control the administration and credit mechanism of the town under the same policy of cooption.²⁴ The cooperation between the large landholders and the colonial state was primarily motivated by the Punjab's emergence as the sword arm of India. This development was itself partly rooted in the rural elites' response to the Indian uprising in 1857. Local allies in the Punjab, possessed both economic and social power through their access to land and high rank within traditional networks of kinship. They enjoyed influential positions as revenue collectors, military contractors, zaildars and honorary magistrates to enforce law and order. Thus, they controlled local society in exchange for colonial patronage.²⁵ The British richly rewarded those who had stood by them in their darkest hour.

Kalabagh's Rais were one such example of local elite whom the British rule had enriched. However, their military services to the British were lesser, compared to the other west Punjab chiefs of Multan, Jhang and particularly the Tiwanas of Shahpur. Talbot maintained in his biography on Khizar Tiwana that the Tiwanas accrued power and wealth as a result of their military prowess over a number of centuries.²⁶ The Rais's response to the East India Company's crises during the second Sikh War (1848–49) and the 1857 uprising significantly influenced his family's fortunes during the Raj. Rais Allah Yar provided useful service to the British Army in Bannu and his son Muzaffar Khan raised a hundred followers to serve under the command of Herbert Edwardes in Peshawar in 1857. The British rewarded Muzaffar Khan with grants of lands and declared his jagir as hereditary and perpetual.²⁷ After the annexation of the Punjab, John Lawrence embarked upon a policy that provided limited recognition to extant jagirdars, allowing them to retain their jagirs, with a view to avoid resistance from them and also their extended biradari networks.²⁸ According to the letter of the Financial Commissioner Punjab, the Board of Administration decided to grant the Rais the hereditary revenue-free grants and recognized their proprietary rights over two villages, Nikki and Massan. The Board also remitted the tribute taken by the Sikhs to the Rais along with the government share of proceeds from the Kalabagh mines.²⁹ The jagir (landholding) now extended from Bhangi Khel in the north of Indus to Massan in the south east and Isakhel in the west with Kalabagh being the principal seat.³⁰ The Rais derived incomes of Rs 200 from revenue free land in Isakhel tehsil, Kalabagh, Kotchandana and Jalalpur, Rs 4726 from village Massan in perpetuity, self-grown grass on salt mountain, Rs 34 from grazing tax of Kalabagh, Rs 3223 was derived from duty on alum of Kalabagh and tax on earth yielding alum which was exported to all of India till 1854. The records of jagir income show a considerable reduction in income until 1865 to Rs 12,000 as alum was now produced in other parts of India causing the demand and price to drastically fall.³¹ An income of Rs 245 was gained from the washing of gold mixed with the sand in the Indus bed.³² Bhangi Khel had a mountainous terrain mostly inhabited by the Khattak tribe who provided a good number of recruits into the military. The government continued an allowance of ten percent on the revenue of Bhangi Khel to Muzaffar Khan and later his descendants, Yar Muhammad Khan and Allahyar Khan, as a reward for providing recruits.³³ Khan carefully managed his jagir and maintained a large stud of excellent horses and mules. Another notification of revenue free land in Kalabagh, Kotchandana, Jalalpur and Nikki was issued for Yar Muhammad in 1903.³⁴ He lived until 1908 and was succeeded by his only son Ata Muhammad Khan (d.1924) who became the lineage head.³⁵ He was a leading recruiting agent of the colonial government in the district. The First World

War increased the state's demands for men, money, and resources on its collaborators in the Punjab, the military labour market.³⁶ Mianwali district with a pre-dominantly Pathan population was ideally fit for such recruitment. Rais Ata Muhammad generated as considerable a number of army recruits as were 'voluntarily' raised by the elites in Shahpur district and other canal colony districts in the Punjab.³⁷ The Rais, using his proprietary rights in the Bhangi Khel circle, provided one hundred recruits for the colonial army.³⁸ In the First War loan of 1917, Rais Ata Muhammad Khan contributed one lakh and paid 35,000 for the purchase of 30 horses for British Cavalry Remounts.³⁹ In the second War Loan of 1918 he donated Rs 50,000 and then Rs 75,000 to the aeroplane fund.⁴⁰ As a reward, he received the high distinction of Nawab and grants. The British by allotting land grants, created a new loyal class of landed gentry.

The British co-opted the 'natural leaders' of rural society into their administrative system by means of the semi-official post of the *zaildar*. The role of *zaildar* was unique to the Punjab's local administration. The *zaildar* was responsible for a circle of villages, at one level, supervising their headmen and aiding the implementation of government policy, and at another level, representing their interests to the colonial administration. It was endowed both as a reward for loyalty and as a recognition of local power. Tribal chiefs and landowners were also tied to the administrative system by appointing them as honorary magistrates and members of the *darbar*. Rais Ata Muhammad Khan was appointed as *zaildar* of Massan and ThameyWali *zail* in tehsil Mianwali and Kalabagh *zail* in tehsil Isa Khel of his estate.⁴¹ Later he succeeded to his father's seat as a Provincial *Darbari*, and as an honorary magistrate to exercise 2nd class powers to enforce law and order.⁴² This enabled the reinforcement of his bargain with the colonial state.⁴³ The possession of land helped to bolster the authority to maintain control over economic resources and society which in return ensured order and accumulation for the colonial state.⁴⁴

Kalabagh was linked with nearby villages and towns through riverine trade and later through the railways. The rural population was divided up horizontally among different village communities. These were artisans and agricultural tenants and menials (*Kamin*) who had grown to service the lineage aristocracy.⁴⁵ Its commerce entailed rural commodity producing crafts such as boat-making, traditional small-scale and cottage industries, spinning, weaving, and handloom for narrow local markets and also for extra-regional markets in Bannu, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan. Other artisanal sidelines included pottery, basket, mat making and manufacturing iron instruments. By the time of the First World War, there were 6805 weavers in the town, the total number of persons dependent on industry were 16,421. The earnings ranged from four to twelve annas a day.⁴⁶ A few weavers worked with their own capital but the majority borrowed on credit, and resultantly artisans faced fiscal exploitation connected with the feudal and money-lending system. The Rais did not maintain charitable institutions for people, they rather overburdened the existing local handlooms and cottage industries by levying taxes on rural artisans. The apparent paternalistic image of *mai baap* (parents), as people called the Rais, was marked by fear rather than benevolence.⁴⁷ Feudal exploitation of the crafts was manifested in local taxes on the construction of houses, looms, boats and ferries which struck more directly and extensively on the economic activities, housing and settlement patterns of the poor.⁴⁸ The taxes were levied under bureaucratic patronage. Kalabagh ferries across the Indus worked under the control of the Deputy Commissioner and the lease was auctioned annually.⁴⁹

New agrarian frontier and extraction

Between 1885 and 1926, the British government in the Punjab embarked upon an ambitious plan of agricultural expansion and established nine new 'canal colonies' between the five western rivers of the province. A major incentive behind the new canal colonization in the Punjab was to bring structural changes in social relations to level out hierarchies that existed between the local populace and government. The aim was also to dislodge those who were in the forefront of rural leadership and were a potential threat to colonial rule. The investment in the tough terrain of Kalabagh, in

north-west Punjab was not an economically viable option for colonial state. C.L.Tupper maintained that a class of intermediary with proprietary rights, was crucial in the British plan to irrigate and settle the Punjab's wastes.⁵⁰ The colonial state by maintaining the indigenous tribal structure of Kalabagh relied upon the local elite to generate revenue and taxes by using their authority and power. The entire agricultural area in Kalabagh town was part of the estate (jagir) of the Rais, the rest of the area consisted of grazing land and salt hills, with a limited land mass for agriculture. In addition to the Rais, the other strata of agrarian society included the artisanal biradaris engaged in petty commodity production and service provision at the local level and a class of landless wage labourers. Banerjee has remarked, 'these landless elements of the agrarian order were directly dependent on landowners for their economic well-being and were subordinate to them in the agrarian social and political hierarchy'.⁵¹ The Rais had complete proprietary rights over land he owned, cultivated by tenants or labour. The only resistance he confronted was, when his proprietary rights to Massan village were disputed by hereditary peasant cultivators in 1862. The occupancy tenants complained of exactions and petitioned for the fixation of a rent amount by the court. However, the Rais went on to strengthen his hold over the land.⁵² After the first regular settlement in 1878, some of the cultivators were entitled to occupancy rights with restrictive conditions,⁵³ but there is no evidence of the presence of any other occupancy tenants or peasant proprietors in the primary sources on the town. The arrangement created unequal administrative, economic and political rights in favour of elite landowners or village proprietors.⁵⁴ This ensured that the state never permeated down to the village or town level. Instead, it interfaced with the local people through the privileged colonial intermediaries.⁵⁵

The estate of Kalabagh was divided into two sections, one part was called 'patti', divided in two zails, zail A called Nikki and zail B, noted as Massan, both run by the Rais himself as zaildar. The other section of the estate was on the outskirts of Kalabagh, the riverine tract of Katcha.⁵⁶ The most common cultivation in Patti was of wheat, gram, jawar (sorghum), bajra (pearl millet), jammaun, tara mira (Jamba oil). Lying on the fringe of the Indus, Katcha which was a low lying land, flat and intersected by creeks usually flooded during the monsoon. The uneven tract in the estate along the Salt Range, was called Khudri and the hilly tract at the extreme north on the North West Frontier border was known as Bhangi Khel. Some of the soil in Bhangi Khel circle was stiff, hardened by flooding from hill torrents. The Rais carefully treated the land to bring it under cultivation with the help of manpower available in the form of the sturdy Khattaks of Bani Afghanistan, a small cis-Indus settlement in Bhangi Khel circle.

When the Rais took possession of this arable land, a group of Jat families including groups such as Hirayahs, Bhambhs, Chinas, Jakors and Anotras were the only settlers.⁵⁷ With primitive and irregular methods of cultivation, the Rais engaged the tenants and agricultural labour in the cultivation of land, largely dependent on moisture received from the river, assisted by wells and jhallars (a kind of well, dug in areas near rivers to store water to irrigate land).⁵⁸ The district gazetteer reported, wells continuously needed to replenish their water sources through river water coming naturally by overflow, or brought through artificial channels onto the land.⁵⁹ The slopes of hills were broken up for cultivation. Embankments or bunds controlled the water coming from the hill through hill torrents, brought down to the adjoining fields and diverted to flat pieces of land through dams called 'ghandi' in local language.⁶⁰

With the Opening of Kalabagh-Bannu railway in 1913, the riverine trade declined, and with this the old trade routes and trading towns like Bhakkar and Isakhel lost their commercial significance. As a result, the manufacturing in the local boat making industry was drastically reduced to twelve boats annually. Kalabagh now emerged as an entrepot for agricultural produce and a marketing centre of export with a railway station, as a small centre of export. The railway brought the town in the reach of larger markets and fluctuating price movements. The two important railway stations, Massan and Mari railway station were part of Kalabagh estate. They drew all the grain from Khudri circle, an uneven and ravine eaten area, and salt and grain from Kalabagh's salt pits, under the supervision of Rais Ata Muhammad and later Ameer Muhammad as the zaildar of Massan zail.⁶¹

Railways stimulated commercialization of agriculture and the development of markets in the Punjab. The major effect was the rise in agricultural prices and the wages of labour.⁶² Mukherjee maintains that the rise in prices in the Punjab only benefited the zamindars who owned large holdings.⁶³ In a comparison of Sialkot and Shahpur districts between 1900 and 1920, Mukherjee argued that due to increased expenditure on wages, the periodic revisions in the water rates and the land revenue assessment, self-cultivating peasants with small holdings could not gain any advantage from high prices, which were rather availed by the tenants and labourers.⁶⁴ Similar conditions sustained in Mianwali district. However, in Kalabagh, the Rais who was clearly the beneficiary in this process, changed the payment of the marginal tenants and agricultural labourers from cash into kind. Thereafter to meet their non-food requirements, these people had to borrow from the Rais, which trapped them in bonded labour as they could not return the debt. According to the first regular settlement of 1908, there was a rise in the wages of labour in the district and the Province at large between 1905 and 1915, due to increasing demand for labour in the irrigation at canal colony districts and railway works.⁶⁵ Mukherjee argued, 'wages of labor and prices of agricultural produce increased because of extensive cultivation and growth of rich peasantry.'⁶⁶ The estate of the Rais was least touched by these district and provincial changes. The cultivation increased but wages of labour remained exploitatively low in the estate.⁶⁷ The batai rates (kind rent) increased with the increase in prices of land and commodities in other parts of the district and province at large, but the Rais paid the batai rate (kind rent) which was fixed at 3/2, three parts to tenants and two parts for estate.⁶⁸ The Rent rate in each village in the estate depended on custom and relations between the Rais and the tenants. For example, barani rent in the Khudri circle was 1/3, but the Rais asserted his feudal rights by adding a fictitious plough of his own to those of the tenants, and at the time of division of produce, made an addition of one plough to four to his rent. This resulted in an addition of 1/5th to the ordinary rent of 1/3rd on account of his supposed plough. In local terms this was called 'moa jora' (dead plough).⁶⁹ The wide grazing land in the town generated handsome revenue which people largely paid from the sale of ghi (clarified butter) and wool. Those who owned cattle had to pay the Rais the grazing tax after every six months which was four annas (pence) on goats and one rupee on cows and buffaloes.

As village proprietor, the colonial bureaucratic institutions gave the Rais powerful customary rights of control over labourers and menials who were legally denied property ownership. According to a tradition in Kalabagh, a new settler, in order to purchase a plot of land for cultivation, had to pay an entrance fee under the title of 'jhuri' and an annual payment of *malikana*. He would then get a status of 'adna maalik' (inferior owner), though he was the actual owner of the land. The payment of *malikana* was burdensome and varied. If a new settler did not have the capacity to pay the 'Jhuri' fee, a superior proprietor would mark off a plot for him to cultivate on annual payment of the *malikana* with no proprietary rights over land. This class was called the 'butimar' tenants.⁷⁰ They were mostly found in the low alluvial land areas, like Katcha. They cleared land and built embankments. Captain Mackenzie in his classification of tenure in the first Summary Settlement described 'Jhuri' as a distinguishing point between the 'adna maalik' and 'butimar' tenant.⁷¹ It is instructive to understand that this practice existed since pre-colonial days and it was further protected under the colonial legal system.⁷² Irfan Habib and Himadri Banerjee argue that unequal agrarian relations between zamindar and tenants implied social stratification which segmented the rural society into two divisions-landlords and the landless.⁷³ In Kalabagh, the hierarchy of landownership created a clear divide between two extremes, the Rais and the tenant, which further strengthened the position of the Rais in the land and credit markets.⁷⁴

From 1930s onwards, the dynamic of loyalism to colonial power worked more as a pragmatic alliance in which the patron and client were both bound in a symbiotic relationship. The Punjabi countryside was badly hit by the agricultural slump caused by the world economic depression in early 1930s. The *Majlis-i-Ahrar and Khudai Khidmatgar*⁷⁵ took advantage of economic unrest and launched an anti-recruitment campaign in 1938, which had its strong resonance in Kalabagh.⁷⁶ This was a first organized and sustained anti-imperialist movement in this town. Ameer Muhammad

Khan (1910–1967) the English educated son of the late Rais Ata Muhammad Khan (d.1924) established a more crucial connection between the colonial state and society. In the face of potential opposition from various quarters, Ameer Muhammad became an indispensable collaborator for the colonial state in ruthlessly suppressing any dissent with the support of British officials. Ameer Muhammad's minority was spent under British supervision. The estate had passed under the court of wards which was managed by the Deputy Commissioner of the district from 1924 to 1932 until Ameer Muhammad returned from Britain.⁷⁷ The bureaucratic patronage greatly enhanced the estate's resources. During the years of economic depression, in many areas like Shahpur and Multan, the landlords were forced to take less than their share, or scale down cash rents because tenants simply could not pay.⁷⁸ As opposed to this, in Kalabagh the estate of the Rais flourished, whereas wages in kind once again made the tenants and labourers, a victim of the falling prices.

Rural class structure and debt bondage

During the agricultural depression in 1930s, there had been tension between landlords and tenants in parts of India particularly U.P and Bihar where labourers refused to do bonded labour. In West Punjab landlords responded to the crisis by granting remission of rent.⁷⁹ In Kalabagh, the class system⁸⁰ was comprised of the Rais, the agricultural labouring classes and their interrelations. Social and economic relations depended on their mutual positions in the segmented and hierarchical class structure. Power was exercised through the local structure of credit and debt, controlled by the Rais. Organization of production and marketing were closely connected with credit. Surplus funds from agriculture were entirely transferred to the Rais who used them to underwrite their own resources. Accumulation of wealth in the hands of the Rais reinforced economic inequalities.⁸¹

The groups of wage labourers and village menials had to face starvation particularly in case of low produce and crop failure. Most gravely lacked capital and resources to meet their immediate contingencies and the day to day business of agricultural operations, and the cultivating tenants and labourers borrowed from the Rais, as moneylenders barely existed in the estate. The transaction between the Rais and his debtors was mostly in kind.⁸² The Land Alienation Act 1900 seriously checked sales and mortgages to moneylenders in the Punjab, and after 1900 the bulk of usufructuary mortgage debt had passed into the hands of agriculturist moneylenders. Half of the total agricultural debt of the Punjab owed to them. Outside the Punjab, in Madras, Delhi, Bombay, Bihar, Orissa and NWFP, the number of agriculturist moneylenders had been increasing.⁸³ In Mianwali district, the proportion of landlords capable of acquiring land by purchase or mortgage had been large and lands were redeemed as freely as they were mortgaged.⁸⁴ More cultivated land was mortgaged to landed elite than to saukars (moneylender).⁸⁵ In Kalabagh, the indebted poor was forced to work on the Rais's farms as bonded labourer. The Rais acted as the patrons of these labouring classes. In local terms it was called 'begaar' (forced labour). As Ranajit Guha remarked, 'armed with this doctrine, he played "maharaj" to his tenants in extracting begaar from them or setting his lathi-wielding myrmidons on them if they refused to oblige.'⁸⁶ The agricultural labour that worked on the Rais's farms, also included members of the menial and artisan classes who were engaged to perform certain services in the estate at dairy and poultry farms and fisheries.

The menials were classified according to their occupations. The principal menials were lohar (blacksmith), tarkhan (carpenter), kumhar (potter), mohana (boatman) and kasha (field labourer watering the irrigated canal). These non-landholding castes helped in agricultural work at peak seasons like harvesting. The mode of payment of labour had traditionally been determined in kind, out of the common heap before the Rais and tenants divided the produce on the threshing floor.⁸⁷ The amount of kind varied in different assessment circles in terms of the relevance and need of a specific menial in a particular terrain. For instance, mirasi (bard) and nai (barber) were high wagers as they provided personal services to the Rais. In Bhangi Khel circle, mochi (cobbler) was an important menial due to the urgent necessity of tough shoes in that hilly tract. He was paid seven ozas out of bajra (pearl millet) and seven ozas sheaf out of wheat per plough.⁸⁸ Kutana (sweeper)

were underpaid and had the most inferior status. Artisans and weavers relied on agricultural labour as their traditional occupations suffered decline. However, these supplementary sources of income did not offer encouraging prospects and reduced them to becoming a part of the rural proletariat.⁸⁹ This not only breached the boundaries of caste and occupation but also created a vertical stratification within castes by placing certain castes at the lowest stratum of Punjabi society.⁹⁰

Moneylending became a source of social power and commercial control for the Rais.⁹¹ The menials were trapped in a complex system of credit and debt which led to a jajmani type relationship between the Rais and the rural poor. The agricultural labourers were forcibly engaged in other wage labour employment like transporting goods, carrying wood from the jungle and hay and wheat from granaries, whereas female menials were engaged in the household at the Rais fort.⁹² On some rare occasions, the estate added its contribution into their usual wage amounts. The carpenter who earned seven rupees was given an added amount of Rs 3.50. The ordinary labourer's wage was 2.50, estate added Rs 1.50.⁹³

This jajmani system stood in the way of social mobility in the town, resulted in lowering the economic standards of the kamin (menial caste). The hereditary nature of the jajmani system precluded all possibilities of changing occupations for a better living. The social disparity of the kamins marked by their low status added to their economic exploitation, and as opposed to this, the social power of the Rais was continually enhanced. These coercive practices of the Rais underpinned the existing socio-economic structures of the region. The rural poor hardly had any share in the selected and limited commercialization of agriculture. It was the Rais who unobtrusively acquired a dominant role in the political economy, with a parasitical presence on the development scene.

Dynamism and enervation: the Rais's palace market

Agricultural performance in the interwar period (1918–1939) was dismal throughout India. To give a stimulus to the rural economy, the 'grow more food' campaign was launched in favour of extensive and intensive cultivation in the Punjab. Consequently, total cropped area of the Punjab rose from thirty million acres in 1939–40 to nearly thirty five million acres in 1942–43.⁹⁴

The Rais also embarked on expanding his agrarian frontier under the same policy. An alternative method of irrigation was adopted, by using human and animal labour, the water was blocked up by throwing dams (bund) upon streams.⁹⁵ A fort was built on the bank of the Indus which was divided into two main portions. One being the residential quarters of the Rais's family, called Borh Bungla (Bungalow) and Pepal Bungla, the other, was the open court where guests and visitors were received. The compound displayed Victorian furniture along with historical relics ranging from cannons to hunting trophies, and Scotland-manufactured girders supporting the roof were noticeable. Wells were built to supply water to the fort. For the transportation of goods from the farms to the market, hundred camels and ten bulls were purchased, new stables, stud farm, fish farm and granaries were constructed.⁹⁶

A vast array of administrative functionaries were maintained, ranging from the head man of the estate (Kardar), the manager, jamadar (assistant headman), the key administrator of the estate, maldar (revenue officials and accountants) and numbardar to undertake various functions at the estate and to disseminate the important messages to the village people. All the officials received their salaries from the estate and were provided horses for their official duties. The maldar was deputed at Massan railway station to monitor and maintain the grain warehouse of the estate.⁹⁷ Harvesting was done under the strict supervision of attendants called 'karaway' in local parlance. The harvested crop was filled in exclusively made sacks of lamb wool called 'jaati', sealed with the estate's stamp and transported to granaries, built at entrepot points, such as, at Massan railway station. The estate's share was reserved in granaries and the rest was sold to grain dealers through auction at the railway station.⁹⁸ The Rais' control over social and economic order can therefore be understood in terms of the interplay between his traits of personalized authority and the stratified politics and economy of the town.

Power and control within the town was also exercised through the regulation of marketing, commercial arrangements and the control of labour. The Rais extended market-oriented agriculture, with a focus on agricultural markets and commercial distributors in the Punjab and India at large. He founded his 'palace markets,'⁹⁹ in which capital, labour and commodities were interspersed and accumulated in his hands. He controlled the credit mechanism in such a manner that it converted all economic resources to his advantage and trapped the local tradesmen, the lower agricultural classes and wage labourers in debt bondage. These coercive powers perpetuated *jajmani*-type relationships in the twentieth century.

Local elites were an essential prop of the structures of colonial government. Their function was not without positive relevance to the functioning of economy for the state. The Rais invested a part of his income in infrastructure, motivated by colonial administrative imperatives. The first was in 'horticulture.' He developed an extravagant fruit farm and cultivated a variety of fruits such as mango, grapes, grape fruits, strawberry, oranges, banana, sugar-cane, papaya, cardamon and almonds. Tapan Ray Chaudhry maintains, 'the growth of a variety of fruits adopted from Central Asia, Iran and the New World owed much to this aristocratic enterprise.'¹⁰⁰ In his dairy farm he reared Montgomery Buffaloes, Australian Freezian cows, Angora and Ambeley goats. Local institutional assistance and official resources of livestock, agriculture, dairy farming and forest departments were fully utilized in these projects.¹⁰¹ The second economic activity was the Rais' involvement in commerce. At one level, it helped channel a part of the resources, siphoned off agriculture and manufacture into trade and export. Grains were sold in the local market, sugar-cane was supplied to Darya Khan and Norung sugar mills, barley was exported to Murree Brewery. Fruits, strawberry jam manufactured at local farms and fresh honey extracted from beehives were sold in other parts of India which stimulated the production of export goods.¹⁰²

This economic activity however had a negative implication for local trade and manufacture, as the Rais used his authority to corner the market. The town's market which was the centre of all commercial activities was saturated with his farm products, such as, grains, milk from his dairy farm, vegetables, fruits and dry wood of his jungle for fuel. The local market was run on a single principle that it could not sell the products of external markets, as long as the former contained the estate's produce. The imposition of such monopolies disrupted the normal flow of local exchange activities. The capital, labour and commodity markets were interlinked in the town since availability of land, credit and employment was concentrated in the Rais' hands.¹⁰³ In this mechanism of control, economic enterprise led to the one way flow of resources from the town to the Rais's estate and thereon to the colonial state.

By controlling all the means, the Rais changed the existing market arrangements by integrating manufacturing, sales and distribution with the securing of raw material supply to small rural industries. This explains why profit and capital carried through agriculture, did not lead to investment in the processes of production and development. Instead, the profit was sustained by exploitation of labour employed at very low rates of productivity.¹⁰⁴ David Washbrook has argued, 'it is economically rational to sustain accumulation through coercion rather than taking a risk of investment.'¹⁰⁵ The Rais accumulated the advantages arising out of an exclusive control over the town's marketing mechanism, control over means of production, land, credit, and labour through his social control. The benefit of development was monopolized and further impoverished the poor. This contests the larger argument in the case of the Punjab that the prosperity and benefits caused by commercialization of agriculture were equally shared by rich and poor.

Power from command posts

Towards the end of the 19th Century, the paternalist model of colonial governance in the Punjab included the creation of quasi-bureaucratic space by institutionalizing some informal sources of power. In particular, the Punjab Village Panchayat Act of 1912 extended official recognition to the panchayats which existed within the Punjab's villages as mechanisms of dispute resolution. The act

gave legal sanction to the panchayats' decisions and the authority to arbitrate both minor civil suits and criminal cases. The colonial administration relied on these panchayats, based on the customary law of the Punjab.¹⁰⁶ British official C.L.Tupper described it a state-supported legal system, which tied the British legal system to an indigenous 'tribal' foundation.¹⁰⁷ The incorporation of landed elite within the state, facilitated the mechanism through which the bargaining power of these groups with the state was enhanced. The power of the Rais was located and exercised through a formal structure of administrative and bureaucratic setup and informal structures of panchayat, built on a hierarchical and segmental social substratum.¹⁰⁸ His panchayat was built on the pattern of the tribal Jirga which was different from the liberal and benevolent character of Punjabi panchayat. Through his legally protected status as honorary magistrate, he exercised his arbitrary powers with the support of local institutions, the bureaucracy, patwari, forest officials, station master and police. At times he transcended his powers and interfered in official investigative processes in minor criminal and revenue cases.¹⁰⁹

Central to all indigenous notions of power and dominance in the words of Ranajit Guha was 'Danda' or force, exercised through informal structures of power.¹¹⁰ The private security force of the Rais composed of tribal Khattaks, the territorial court governed by his authority, threats of bonded labour 'begaar', the partial entitlement to civilian and criminal jurisdiction over the tenant in the matter of collection of taxes, corporal punishment and fine in case of theft, embezzlement of funds, violation of laws of estate, punitive measures taken against women for disobeying patriarchal moral codes were all instances of coercion in the idiom of 'Danda'. Like all colonial elites, the Rais also believed that he alone possessed the impartiality and the sense of 'fair play' to run the administration of the town smoothly. Punitive sanctions were imposed on women for disregarding a code of sexual morality.¹¹¹ Two women rumoured to be indulging in prostitution were exiled from the town. The Rais justified such actions in the name of maintaining the moral order and emphasized force and fear as a fundamental principle of politics and control in the town.

Conclusion

The colonial state protected and consolidated tribal structures underpinned by the kinship networks in Punjab's countryside. The leaders of the tribes were colonial intermediaries whose interests were tied up with the imperial system. Tribes were being overseen by the district administration in Mianwali. Most of the landed elite of the region, like anywhere else in the Punjab, were members of the Unionist party. The British had introduced policies including land settlement, irrigation schemes, demographic relocation, military recruitment, expansion of educational and communication facilities which most notably were confined to the canal colony districts. For the province's economic and political development and prosperous peasantry, the abolition of 'parasitic' landlordism was considered essential, particularly in the central Punjab. The Potwar region¹¹² remained different from central Punjab. The colonial state did not evolve a framework for the development of the economy in this region, specifically for the district and town, and instead the extraction of revenue and military recruitment had been its priority.¹¹³ The barani region, where land was rain fed, was markedly different from the colony districts particularly in its economic profile. The people from this region generally opted for soldiery. Considering this region as marginal to the interests of the colonial state for its lack of agricultural prospects and socio political underdevelopment, the British left it to the arbitrary control of local elites. The use of electoral politics, bureaucratic interventions, and legislation had been the means for the landed elite and the state to consolidate their administrative control and to maintain the institutional status quo. In this structural arrangement, landed interests got entrenched within the networks of authority so as to secure their share of the economic resources and engage in a coordinated pursuit of class interests. Despite the political affiliation of local elites with the Unionist party whose prime objective was to check exploitation of the economically backward classes by the economically dominant, more land was alienated and mortgaged to the landed elite in Kalabagh town than to the moneylenders. The

lack of positive stimulus to development led to a paradoxical fallout. The control over capital and means of production linked the rural economy with the urban markets; however, the profit it generated had a one dimensional flow towards the Rais and the colonial state. Vicious cycles of low wages, under employment of labour, absence of alternative employment opportunities restricted social mobility. This alliance between the feudal classes and the colonial state perpetuated the gulf between the rural rich and poor.

Towards the third decade of the twentieth century, nationalist ideologies expressed themselves through the *Majlis-i-Ahrar* in the Punjab. *Ahrar's* unitary nationalism (freedom from the British) and socialist agenda mobilized the rural poor against the existing social and economic patterns of dominance in Kalabagh town. *Ahrar* and its allies faced strong resistance from the colonial collaborators. *Ahrar's* use of religious and nationalist rhetoric led to the development of Muslim ethno-religious identities which exacerbated communal tendencies in local politics.

Notes

1. Yong, *The Garrison State*, 19–20; and Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*; Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*.
2. The concept of collaboration is defined by the Cambridge historian Ronald Robinson that the British identified indigenous elite groups to secure their support in running the Indian empire with meagre resources. See Robinson, “Non-European foundation of European imperialism,” 117–142; and Metcalf, *The new Cambridge History of India*.
3. Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism*, 34.
4. Habib, *Indian Economy*; and Chaudhri and Habib, *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, 170–1.
5. Guha, *A Rule of Property for Bengal*, 1–3.
6. Habib, *Essays in Indian History*; Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism*; Mukherjee, *Colonializing Agriculture*; Hotri, “Agrarian Change in the Canal Colonies”; Kumar, “Colonialism and Rural Society in Punjab”; Bala, “Society and culture of the Punjab”.
7. Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*; and Talbot, *Khizr Tiwana*.
8. Kalabagh, a town and union council of Mianwali, a north-western district of Punjab province of Pakistan. The town is situated in the north-west of Rawalpindi division. It is part of Isakhel Tehsil, located on the western bank of Indus River. It is famous for its red hills of the salt range and the scenic view of the Indus River traversing through the hills
9. Report of Commissioner Dera jat .
10. Bayly, “Local control in Indian Towns,” 292.
11. Habib, *Indian Economy*; Mukherjee, *Colonializing Agriculture*; Mishra “Commercialisation, peasant differentiation,” 20–27, 45–48; Tomlinson, *The Economy of Modern India*; Ambirajan, *Classical Political Economy*; Banerjee, *Agrarian society of the Punjab*, 78; Banga, “Ecology and Land Rights in the Punjab”.
12. Tupper, *Punjab Customary Law*; Darling, *The Punjab Peasant In Prosperity And Debt*; Calvert, *Wealth and welfare of the Punjab*; Thornburn, *Musalman and Money-Lenders*, 45; Mahmood, “Socio-Economic Engineering”; and Islam, *Irrigation Agriculture and the Raj*, 89.
13. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*; Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*; Gilmartin, *Empire and Islam*, 178; Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism*, 176.
14. Bayly, “Local Control in Indian Towns”; Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism*; Metcalf, *Land, Landlords and the British Raj*; and Washbrook, “Law, State, and Agrarian Society,” 650–65.
15. Ansari, *Sufi Saints and State Power*.
16. Mahmood, “Collaboration and British Military Recruitment,” 13.
17. Saini, *The Social & Economic History of the Punjab*; Hotri, “Agrarian Change in the Canal Colonies”; Kumar, “Colonialism and Rural Society in Punjab”; Bala, “Society and culture of the Punjab late eighteenth-early nineteenth century”.
18. The Jajmani system was an economic arrangement between families of different castes through which one family of lower castes such as barber, carpenter, cobbler exclusively performed services for the high caste patron family, such as providing agricultural labour in return for protection and employment. The payment was normally a fixed share in the harvest rather than cash. See Bayly, “Local Control in Indian Towns,” 290.
19. *Gazeteer Mianwali District*, 138.
20. *Ibid.*, 66–69.
21. *Ibid.*, For economic policies of Sikhs, see Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*; Banga, *Agrarian systems of the Sikhs*; Grewal, *The Sikhs Of The Punjab*.

22. Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 107.
23. Malik, "Identity Formation and Muslim Party Politics," 302.
24. See Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*.
25. Frykenberg, *Land Control and Social Structure*.
26. Talbot, *Khizar Tiwana*, 39; and Talbot, "The Punjab under Colonialism," 14.
27. Messy, *Chiefs and Families of Note in the Punjab*.
28. Nijjar, *Punjab under the British Rule*, 21–22.
29. Letter to Commissioner Office Derajat Division.
30. Comparative statement of Derajat Division.
31. Letter from Esquire to Col. Commaney.
32. Letter from Financial Commissioner Punjab.
33. Letter from Supdt Dera Jat Division, 1886.
34. Copy of Notification for free-grants, 1903.
35. Letter from Commissioner Dera Jat Division, 1886.
36. Yong, *The Garrison State*.
37. Esquire, *Record of the War Services of Mianwali*, 4.
38. *Ibid.*, 5.
39. Leigh, *The Punjab and the War*, 122
40. Esquire, *Record of the War Services*, 7.
41. *Gazetteer Mianwali District 1915*, 66–68
42. *Ibid.* Also see Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism*; Rothermund, *An Economic History of India*.
43. *Ibid.*, 1968.
44. Bayly also maintains about India that old class of notables were able to manipulate the intentions of the new state and protect their power effectively'. Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World*, 10–11.
45. Shah, *Nawab of Kalabagh*, 82. For forced agricultural labour See Chaudhri and Habib, *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, 247
46. *Gazeteer Mianwali District*, 138–140
47. For details about elite control of society see, Dogan, *Elite Configurations at the Apex of Power*, 78.
48. Sumbal, "Sufism and Islamic Reformist Movements".
49. *Ibid.*
50. Tupper, *Punjab Customary Law*. Also see Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism*, also see Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism*, 89. Chandra, "Colonialism, Stages of Colonialism".
51. Banerjee, *Agrarian society of the Punjab*, 67
52. *Gazetteer District Mianwali*, 129.
53. *First Regular Settlement*, Mianwali, 1878.
54. Roy, "Landed Property and Credit in Colonial India," 20. Gopal. *British Policy in India*, 67; Kumar, "Colonialism and rural society in Punjab".
55. Cheema, Mohmand, Patnam, "Colonial Proprietary Elites and Institutions," 8; and Banga, "Ecology and Land Rights," 11.
56. *Gazetteer District Mianwali*, 56.
57. *First Regular Settlement*, Mianwali.
58. Niazi, *Tarikh-e-Mianwali*, 67.
59. *Gazeteer District Mianwali*, 104.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*
62. For commercialization of agriculture, see Iyer. *Some Economic Aspects of British Rule*; Chandra, "Colonialism, Stages of Colonialism"; and Chandra, *History of Modern India*.
63. Mukherjee, *Colonializing Agriculture*, 56.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Gazeteer District Mianwali*, 129
66. Mukherjee, *Colonializing Agriculture*, 98. also see, Iyer. *Some Economic Aspects of British Rule*, 143–146. Also see Calvert, *Wealth and welfare of the Punjab*, 217.
67. *Gazetteer Mianwali District*, 48.
68. *Ibid.*, 137.
69. *Ist Regular Settlement Report, Mianwali*, 13.
70. *Gazetteer Mianwali District*, p.161.
71. *First Regular Settlement Mianwali District*.
72. *Ibid.*
73. Habib, *Indian Economy*, 7.
74. Rokhri, *Main Aur Mera Pakistan*, 115.

75. *Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam* was founded in 1929 in Lahore, ideologically influenced by socialist ideal, reconciling the Islamic reformist message with radical anti-British and anti-capitalist. The central leadership of Ahrar belonged to Deobandi denomination. The *Ahrar* were professedly anti-colonial and anti-feudal. It mainly grew among men who were dissident Punjabi section of khilafatists, influenced by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. See Awan, *Political Islam in Colonial Punjab*. Khudai Khidmatgar emerged in 1920s as a political force in North West frontier Province by Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. They developed their nexus with Pan-Islamist and reformist elements. In NWFP the ethnic, religious and political identities intersected and reinforced each other. This tripolar relationship linked Pushtoon ethno-regionalism with Muslim nationalism. See Shah, *Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism*.
76. Awan, *Political Islam in Colonial Punjab*, 103.
77. Farooq, *Muhammad Gulsher Shaheed*, 78.
78. Mukherjee, *Colonializing Agriculture*, 45.
79. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 106.
80. By class I mean a category of persons occupying a specific position in the system of production. See Beteille, *Caste, Class and Power*.
81. For details on economic discontinuities, see Puri, *Political Elite and Society*; Singh, "Canal colonies: Social and economic impact"; Agha, "Contribution of Muslim Landed Elite".
82. For details on economic transaction in agrarian economy, See Charlesworth, *Peasant and Imperial Rule*, 82.
83. Rai, *Legislative politics and freedom struggle*, 15. also see Darling, *The Punjab Peasant*, 199.
84. *Gazetteer Mianwali*, 113.
85. *Ibid.*
86. Guha. *Dominance without Hegemony*, 30.
87. To study village communities, see Powel. *The Origin and Growth of Village Communities*, 10.
88. *Gazetteer District*, 127.
89. *Punjab Banking enquiry report*, 79–81. For artisanal activity, see Roy, *Traditional industry*.
90. Ali, *The Punjab under Imperialism*, 94; Hamid, "Dispossession and differentiation," 65.
91. See Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, 32.
92. For details See Parthasarathi, *The Transition to a Colonial Economy*.
93. Shah, *Nawab of Kalabagh*, 89.
94. Talbot, *Punjab and the Raj*, 144; also see Chandra, *The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism*.
95. Wolf, *Peasant*, 18.
96. Shah, *Nawab of Kalabagh*, 81.
97. Niazi, *Main Aur Mera Pakistan*, 61.
98. Shah, *Nawab of Kalabagh*, 76.
99. Bayly, "Local Control in Indian Towns," 290.
100. Chaudhry and Habib, ed., *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, 228.
101. Shah, *Nawab of Kalabagh*, 81.
102. *Ibid.* After the British annexation of the Punjab in 1849, to meet the beer requirements of British personnel (mainly army), the Murree Brewery was established in 1860 and incorporated a year later at Ghora Galli, located in the Pir Punjal range of the Western Himalayas at an elevation of 6000 ft. above sea level, near the resort town of Murree in Pakistan. See www.murreebrewery.com
103. See Tomlinson, *The New Cambridge History of India*.
104. See Alavi and Harriss, ed., *Sociology of Developing Societies.*; Sarkar, *Modern India*; Chandra, *India's Struggle for Independence*.
105. Washbrook, "Progress" and Problems," 90.
106. British developed a system of personal law in Punjab which was tied to a system of customary law, or 'tribal customs'. British Officials compiled district records of 'tribal' customs and included in village records of rights or *wajib-ul-arz*. See, Tupper, *Punjab Customary Law*, 22, 135–137
107. Gilmartin, "Customary Law and Shariat in British Punjab," 47.
108. Mills, *The Power Elite*.
109. Shah, *Nawab of Kalabagh*, 38.
110. Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony*, 28.
111. Shah, *Nawab of Kalabagh*, 38.
112. Potwar is a plateau in north-eastern Pakistan, forming the northern part of Punjab
113. Malik, *Identity Formation and Muslim Party Politics*, 23.

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