

# Quarterly

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## From the Director's Desk: Demography, Technology and Public Policy

How are innovations in technology impacting the demography of states and societies, and reshaping policies?

Let me provide a snapshot overview, focusing on the case of Pakistan. July 11th is celebrated as World Population Day across the globe; this year it acquired a special significance as it marked 30 years of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD). In 1994, 179 countries met at Cairo and resolved to treat population as sustainable development and not as a mere family planning issue. They thus agreed on prioritizing programs and actions that would advance human rights, the empowerment of young girls and women, and reproductive rights. At this ICPD, Pakistan was represented by its first female prime-minister, Benazir Bhutto.....cont page 2

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CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY  
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While recognizing the constraints of colonial hangovers, lack of financial resources, ethnic tensions and religious militancy, she conveyed an optimistic note on improving demographic governance in Pakistan. She stated,

“I dream of a Pakistan, of a world where every pregnancy is planned and every child conceived is nurtured, loved, educated and supported... a Pakistan, of an Asia, not undermined by ethnic divisions brought about by population growth, starvation, crime and anarchy... a Pakistan, of a world, where we can commit our social resources to the development of human life and not to its destruction.”

In pursuit of this dream, she vouched for the empowerment of women and sought ‘global partnerships’ to improve the human condition. Ms. Bhutto committed to this goal by instructing Pakistan’s government and society to act together to achieve ‘population stabilization’ with ‘human dignity’.

However, when the ICPD resolution was adopted, the population of Pakistan was 126 million and the country was negotiating with the IMF for loans and structural reforms. Thirty years later, what has changed? Pakistan’s population is 240 million (a jump of over 100 million) and even today we are negotiating with the IMF for loans and structural reforms. Today, the global trend is that towards the industrial North inclusive of Asia, in countries such as Korea, Japan and to some extent China, population is shrinking. Yet in the Global South, including especially Pakistan, the population continues to rise. In this case, one should argue that this demographic explosion should be recognized as a core national issue. Population growth management is a critical governance concern; social and financial resources need to be generated to educate, provide healthcare and house a region now increasingly at climate related risks (floods, heavy rains & mountain and infrastructure collapses). We need to be working on policies that will build opportunities for the demographic dividend rather than despair.

We are constantly reminded that 60% of Pakistan’s population is under the age of 35. Based on this reality, consider three age cohorts of youth; Child, 1 to 8 years; Adolescents, 8 to 17; and Marriageable Age, 18-35. For the first two cohorts, against the prevailing trend of privatizing education at the elementary and secondary level, I propose, enforce Article 25 A: “The state shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age five to 16 year” and that the provincial and the federal govern-

ments need to invest in public sector education and reproductive health, including family welfare services. While at the Marriageable Age level, the governments, families and civil society need to develop communication strategies and policies that raise awareness on reproductive health, sex education and an agenda on cultural reforms that highlights the advantages of birth spacing and child rights. Educating children along with parents is equally important. Culturally in Pakistani society, marriage implies birth within a year and its family pressure and parental push that makes any family planning a cultural issue. Therefore, the culture of urgency of having a child in the first year or two of marriage, needs to change. Invest in imparting civic virtues, skills and vocational education. Target countries with shrinking population and equip Pakistan’s youth with cultural and linguistic background of these countries to make educated youth an exportable human resource.

Cellular, internet, satellite technologies and to mention Artificial Intelligence (AI) are not only transforming societies but also impacting the designing and formulation of public policies. Technology is socially and culturally intrusive. Consequently, governance frameworks for its management should promote and protect dissent, encourage civic virtues and facilitate civic engagement in social and political discourse. We also need to recognize that the newer generations are technology savvy, irrespective of their level of education, income or social class. To contextualize, let us start with the assumption that an illiterate child, either in an urban or rural setting is exposed to a cellular phone; they will acquire some exposure to digital games and social media. It is integral to study its impact, and there is a need to differentiate between dissent and hate-speech, between violence in cyber-space, and civic engagement. Curbing hate-speech and internet violence is a desirable policy goal, while encouraging dissent means deliberation, civic engagement, tolerance of the other, and celebration of diversity. The regulatory framework (PEM-RA,2002 & PECA,2016 & several subsequent laws, require amendments and reform) and laws must curb hate-speech and de-weaponize political discourse. Appropriate health, population, education and citizen welfare policies demand discussion, deliberation and that is invariably missing in our policy and governance frameworks.

At the CPPG, our effort is to create a policy community of scholars, experts and practitioners who can contextualize social, economic, political and cultural problems, and by stitching these through evidence-based linkages, provide appropriate policy choices and solutions.

## Making Pakistan's Auto-parts Sub-sector Competitive

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### Introduction

Auto-parts is an industry sub-sector that dominates the automotive industry of Pakistan<sup>1</sup>. Automobile parts and accessories are intricate components that make up all automobiles, allow them to run efficiently, and for a long time. The sub-sector constitutes approximately 2,000 Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) producing auto parts for the local industry out of which only 400 are in the formal sector<sup>2</sup>. The sector has shown positive development over the years with capital inflows and agreements with renowned equipment manufacturers for technology transfer<sup>3</sup>, which include components such as bumpers, radiators, mufflers, batteries, tyres, wheels, air-conditioners, wiring harnesses, instrument panels, steering wheels, sun visors, seats, carpets, interior panels, sheet metal, and plastic parts. These are produced locally by more than 400 vending companies, which employ nearly 2.2 million skilled workers directly or indirectly<sup>4</sup>.

The auto parts sub-sector is important because it has the potential to create backward linkages in the automotive industry, attract foreign direct investments (FDI) and domestic investments, create employment, and develop links with the service industry. Further, the auto parts sub-sector significantly promotes development in various affiliated industries<sup>5</sup>, primarily plastic, glass, fabrication,

steel, and iron as it needs to establish working relations and cooperative linkages with these industries. Lastly, as most of the SMEs operating in the automotive industry are related to auto-parts<sup>6,7</sup>, this sub-sector is critical for increasing the competitiveness of the overall automotive industry<sup>8</sup>.

In the case of Pakistan, the auto parts sub-sector has its own significance and dimensions. It provides an important opportunity for Pakistan to improve the competitiveness of its auto-industry, and boost exports by becoming a hub in the global auto-parts value chain, as auto parts manufacturing moves to low-cost countries<sup>9</sup>, and multinational corporations (MNCs) increasingly invest and outsource production to developing countries. Pakistan does have a presence of well-known industry brands such as Toyota, Honda, and Suzuki, and further Chinese and South Korean companies have also invested in joint ventures in the auto parts sub-sector to enhance export capability and import substitution<sup>10</sup>. This makes the auto-parts industry well placed both for employment generation and export earnings. However, this is dependent on the competitiveness of the domestic auto parts industry implying lower production costs and improved quality. This opportunity has been recognized by the government as it has launched two supportive policies for the sub-sector: the Automotive Development Policy of 2016-2021 and 2022-2026, and has set a \$1 billion export target for it by the year 2021.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mohammad Asif, "Diagnostic Study Autoparts Cluster Lahore - Pakistan," *Punjab Cluster Development*, June 2006, <https://www.cdi.psic.gov.pk/reports/autoparts/LUMS%20Auto-Sector-Report.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Zeenat Hisam, "Auto Workers," *DAWN*, November 26, 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1518887>.

<sup>3</sup> Usman Hanif, "Auto Sector Growth Linked to 'Make in Pakistan,'" *The Express Tribune* (The Express Tribune, November 26, 2021), <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2331258/auto-sector-growth-linked-to-make-in-pakistan>; Mansoor Ahmad, "How Pak Auto-Part Vendors Are Setting Global Standards," *TheNews*, 2019, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/420289-how-local-auto-part-vendors-are-setting-global-standards>.

<sup>4</sup> Pakbiz, "Auto Parts Manufacturers in Pakistan, Leading Exporters & Suppliers, Equipment Makers Companies," Accessed February 18, 2022, [https://pakbiz.com/Auto-Parts\\_SID16.html](https://pakbiz.com/Auto-Parts_SID16.html).

<sup>5</sup> Chen Caiyuan and Wang Long, "Research on Auto Parts Industry Upgrading Based on Internet of Things," *The Open Electrical & Electronic Engineering Journal*, 9, no. 1, (2015): 474–78, <https://doi.org/10.2174/1874129001509010474>.

<sup>6</sup> Mohd Rosli M, "Determinants of Small and Medium Enterprises Performance in the Malaysian Auto-Parts Industry," *African Journal of Business Management*, 5, no. 20, (2013): pp. 8235-8241, <https://doi.org/10.5897/ajbm11.889>;

<sup>7</sup> Richard F Doner, Gregory W. Noble, and John Ravenhill. "Industrial competitiveness of the auto parts industries in four large Asian countries: The role of government policy in a challenging international environment." *World Bank Publications*, Vol. 4106, 2006.

<sup>8</sup> John Humphrey and Hubert Schmitz, "How Does Insertion in Global Value Chains Affect Upgrading in Industrial Clusters?," *Regional Studies*, 36, no. 9, (2002): 1017–27, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0034340022000022198>.

<sup>9</sup> Teresa Poon, "Beyond the Global Production Networks: A Case of Further Upgrading of Taiwan's Information Technology Industry," *International Journal of Technology and Globalisation*, 1, no. 1 (2004): 130, <https://doi.org/10.1504/ijtg.2004.004555>.

<sup>10</sup> Usman Hanif, "Pakistan Sets \$1b Target for Export of Auto Parts over 5 Years," *The Express Tribune*, April 8, 2019, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1946266/pakistan-sets-1b-target-export-auto-parts-5-years>.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

Table 1: Snapshot of the Auto Parts Sub-sector

Year	2019	2020	2021
Estimated Capital Investment (PKR millions)	35,991	48,280	56,319
Import Value (USD millions)	514	263	405
Export Value (USD millions)	172	160	201

Source: PACRA 2021<sup>12</sup>

However, Table 1 indicates a low level of exports as compared to imports along with a mix trend in the direction of both imports and exports, raising questions about the competitiveness<sup>13</sup> of the industry, attested to by the Competition Commission of Pakistan (CCP) which deemed the sector uncompetitive in 2018.

Overall, Pakistan's auto parts sub-sector is important for the development of the domestic auto industry as well as for a positive impact on the long-run industrial development and growth of the country. The sector is labour intensive which can generate employment for skilled, unskilled, and semi-skilled workers, and can bring in more foreign exchange through its export potential. However, despite being provided with protection through various industrial policies along with the availability of keen investors, labour and other resources, the sub-sector has remained uncompetitive and underperforming.

### Research Objective & Methodology:

The research objective was to explore the nature of competitiveness and productivity of the auto-parts sub-sector so as to identify the causes of its un-competitiveness, and possible opportunities for sector development. A qualitative methodology involving cross-sectional research methods spanning in-depth interviews and focus group discussions was used to unearth explorative aspects, as limited literature was available for Pakistan's auto-parts sub-sector along with the non-availability of reliable and consistent data. Specifically, eighteen interviews of retailers, wholesalers, manufacturers, vendors, and service providers; three interviews of public sector leaders, and seven interviews of members of Pakistan Automobile Spare Part Importer & Dealer Association (PASPIDA) and Pakistan

Association of Automotive Parts & Accessories Manufacturers (PAAPAM) were conducted.

### Key Research Findings

#### Policy Evolution & Incoherence

The biggest policy weakness is that the auto-parts sub-sector has had minimal representation in the policy discourse which has instead been dominated by Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and importers, while domestic producers have not been given much leverage in the policies.

The previous policy of 2016–2021 encouraged new entrants in the auto parts sector and also the local assembly sector. As a result, growth was observed in both sectors, but there were high imports of auto parts as the policy offered concessionary rates on auto parts imports.<sup>14</sup>

By promoting value addition, localization, and the local vendor sector, the 2022–2026 auto parts policy hopes to draw in multinational corporations and create jobs. It aims to make the auto sector more competitive by focusing on regional suppliers and boosting exports. However, for this purpose, policy initiatives are also needed for the informal sector to improve overall productivity.

Further, the current state of the world market might change investment tendencies, and five years might not be long enough. The gestation period of the auto-parts industry is 10 to 12 years, while the policy spans five years only. For instance, auto fares are important as local manufacturers receive international orders through associated networking. The Trade Development Authority of

<sup>12</sup> [https://www.pacra.com/sector\\_research/Automotive%20Parts%20-%20PA](https://www.pacra.com/sector_research/Automotive%20Parts%20-%20PA)

<sup>13</sup> Final Report "The Automotive Sector of Pakistan", 2011; World Bank Policy Brief, 2015

<sup>14</sup> Usman Hanif, "Auto Sector Growth Linked to 'Make in Pakistan,'" The Express Tribune (The Express Tribune, November 26, 2021), <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2331258/auto-sector-growth-linked-to-make-in-pakistan>.

<sup>15</sup> Association Member-PAAPAM and APM, SBP on SME Financing, Meeting at Lahore Chamber of Commerce, Lahore, December 15, 2022

Pakistan picks and sends a different set of manufacturers from a list provided by the association, much like a lucky draw.<sup>15</sup> But, as a stakeholder suggests, even the participation in international fares needs to be consistent with the gestation period.

“For fares, the same manufacturer needs to attend for 10 to 12 years consecutively; only then can he attract customers. When the customer sees the same manufacturer in the fare for ten years, let’s say, trust will be built between the manufacturer and the customer, and this will be the point when the trade will begin. The previous governments sent about fifteen manufacturers; during PTI’s tenure, the number was reduced to two and nil for last year, and then two again for this year.

The other thing is the stall setting. I have seen stalls for other developing countries like India, which have better arrangement than ours; ours is like a civil hospital unfortunately. The government needs to understand that presentation and stall location impact the customers”<sup>16</sup>

### Protection

The protectionist policy in Pakistan is criticized for restricting growth in the local parts sector. With a 35% protection on parts and additional duties set aside, protection is primarily given to OEMs, with an established supply chain and no after-market. This has created hurdles for localization and worsened local manufacturing as the policy divides large and small firms into formal and informal sectors, where large firms are protected while small firms lack support even though the smaller firms outperform the large ones. Instead, the protected firms gain larger financial returns, leading to lower exports.

### Lack of Support to the SME Sector

Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are crucial for the growth and development of the sector. But the policies do not cater to them. The Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) are mainly provided to Large Scale Manufacturers and OEMs for importing raw materials and redeeming

duties. Similarly, some exporting companies get tax relief by showing their imports as inputs. However, the SME sector does not have this kind of policy support. These are mostly small-scale enterprises spanning the semi-formal or the informal sector. Instead, policies in China, Taiwan, Thailand, and Malaysia support the overall parts sector of the country. These countries support SMEs through various provisions such as the acquisition of raw material. Thus, even local buyers from Pakistan buy from these SMEs to offset their purchasing power barrier while large-scale manufacturing is limited to select brands.

The SMEs in auto-parts industry also do not get any financial support<sup>17</sup> which limits their growth.<sup>18</sup> Although the SME Policy of 2021 does promise support to SMEs,<sup>19</sup> still the auto-parts sub-sector has limited representation in the policy domain while support is usually provided to low value-added but export-generating sectors like textile.

### Inconsistent policies

There are high levels of inconsistency among subsequent policy regimes. As a policy is for five years against a gestation period of ten to twelve years for the auto-parts industry, its implementation is time-lagged; and it is heavily influenced by interest groups close to the ruling party who invariably change in the next political cycle. Thus, before the policy is fully implemented, a new policy is introduced which leaves the previous policy outcomes in the lurch along with no possibility of accountability for policymakers of the last policy. Instead, investors and entrepreneurs require a consistent policy regime for a much longer timeframe.

### Political Instability

Political instability is another barrier to the growth of the local industry. Political turmoil in the country leads to economic turmoil and instability in the market. Frequent changes in policy resulting from political instability in the country lead to the desertion of previous policies before they can produce results. As a consequence, the after-market segment is particularly adversely affected by these shifts.

<sup>15</sup> Association Member-PAAPAM and APM, SBP on SME Financing, Meeting at Lahore Chamber of Commerce, Lahore, December 15, 2022

<sup>16</sup> Association Member-PAAPAM, interview by author, PAAPAM office Lahore, December 20, 2022.

<sup>17</sup> Association Member-PAAPAM and APM, SBP on SME financing, conversation with author at Lahore Chamber of Commerce, Lahore, December 15, 2022

<sup>18</sup> Liu Xiangfeng, “SME Development in China: A Policy Perspective on SME Industrial Clustering,” 2008, [https://www.eria.org/SME%20Development%20in%20China\\_A%20Policy%20Perspective%20on%20SME%20Industrial%20Clustering.pdf](https://www.eria.org/SME%20Development%20in%20China_A%20Policy%20Perspective%20on%20SME%20Industrial%20Clustering.pdf).

<sup>19</sup> Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Economic Survey 2021-22*, 2021. [https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters\\_21/PES\\_2020\\_21.pdf](https://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_21/PES_2020_21.pdf)

### Policy Unawareness and Inadequate Representation

During fieldwork, it was discovered that many interviewees were unaware of the policy even though they were important stakeholders and members of associations. Either they had no idea or they claimed that the policy did not cater to them. The association members of both PAAPAM and PASPIDA claimed that they do send policy recommendations but never see these reflected in the policy<sup>20</sup>. PAAPAM is still working to make amendments to the current policy as it is not for the benefit of the auto parts manufacturers.

Instead, the policy council is a gazetted committee which does not represent the whole sector as small manufacturers have minimal representation and their concerns are not properly voiced. As an interviewee suggested:

“If they reach us (the SME sector), our recommendations will help as the entire SME sector is crucial for the local industry.”<sup>21</sup>

### Policy Exploitation and Under Invoicing:

Interviewees claimed that there are a lot of instances when the policy is exploited. An example is of engine localization. The OEMs enjoy duty waivers while earning large revenues through imports. For instance, a member of the PASPIDA stated that

“There is a policy for SMEs (Deletion) that takes the road towards localization. Like Suzuki, it happens in all countries and Pakistan that after some time, they move towards the localization-deletion program. When they launch a new model or car, if they launch it on 100 % import; in 3 to 4 years, they will move for localization of about 60%. But they don’t do that. They instead play a trick as they change the headlights after 6 months and launch a new model rather than going for the deletion program.

The auto companies have made subsidiaries, which

import for them and put in vehicles, even though these parts are available in the local industry. If these imports are banned then the local industry will improve to match the standards. The large-scale assemblers create hurdles by themselves. They have created a disguised monopoly, as each company has its subsidiaries abroad from whom they import. They can also buy from the local manufacturers which would reduce costs.”<sup>22</sup>

Another common phenomenon in the sector is the exploitation of Free Trade Agreements, as an interviewee suggests

“The manufacturers who import from China have a 5% duty but under FTA, what they do instead is to import (show or route it) from Sri Lanka to Pakistan at 3% duty (as the duty from Sri Lanka is 3%) and sell the part in the local market as a locally manufactured part.”<sup>23</sup>

The Afghan-Transit Trade is another example that hurts the local sector. Exports by the domestic sector come back to the country because of the country’s policies. For example, a truck that is exported (by Pakistan) comes back into the country in different pieces (mostly re-imported in parts), and these parts are mostly used for replacement,<sup>24</sup> (sold in Bara or black market) worsening the aftermarket.

The fieldwork also highlighted many instances of smuggling and under-invoicing affecting the local industry. The smuggled and under-invoiced products are much cheaper, which make it harder for the local manufacturer to survive in the after-market. Multiple vehicle parts, particularly gearboxes, are imported into Pakistan across the Wagah-Attari border.<sup>25</sup> The Afghan Transit Trade (ATT) route and Dubai are also utilized to bring Indian and other car parts to Pakistan.<sup>26</sup> Tyres, in particular, are handled informally via the ATT route, with an annual turnover of roughly \$243 million.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Service provider and Association members

<sup>21</sup> APM-3, interview by author, Lahore, October 11, 2022

<sup>22</sup> Association Member-PASPIDA, interview by author, PASPIDA-Lahore office, October 11, 2022.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Association Member-PAAPAM, interview by author, PAAPAM office Lahore, December 20, 2022

<sup>25</sup> Viqar Ahmed and Samavia Batool, “India–Pakistan Trade: Perspectives from the Automobile Sector in Pakistan,” in *India–Pakistan Trade Normalisation*, ed. Nisha Tanejal Taneja and Isha Dayal (Singapore: Springer Verlag, 2017), 129–69; Association Member-PAAPAM, interview by author, PAAPAM office Lahore, December 20, 2022

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.



### Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

The study concludes that the sector's uncompetitive is a result of an inadequate policy framework and the lack of proper implementation. Although the argument of infant industry has often been used for the auto sector, it has done much harm to both small and medium-scale manufacturing. OEMs have benefited from these policies as only low-value added parts have been localized, while the high-value parts continue to be imported. The overall sector remains uncompetitive in terms of cost, price, and technology which results in low exports. The auto-parts sub-sector remains an area whose optimal potential for Pakistan is yet to be tapped.

The study makes the following recommendations:

**Develop an Auto-parts Sub-sector Policy:** There is a need for a sub-sector specific policy as current policies focus on the overall automotive sector with minimal focus on the parts sub-sector. A sub-sector specific policy which voices the concerns of stakeholders, can address existing issues ranging from technology, investments, skills, productivity to creating a road map for the auto-parts sub-sector.

**Develop Strategy for Technology Up-gradation and Value Addition:** Technology is a major aspect for the future progress of the parts sub-sector in terms of fostering innovation and inducing value addition beyond the current production of low value-added volumes. But the sub-sector alone cannot acquire technology and utilize it. Public Private Partnerships can play a vital role in technology transfer and up-gradation of the domestic industry as localization thus far has been a result of this.

**Devise a Comprehensive Plan for Auto Fares Participation:** Auto fares are important for the export potential of the sector. Stalls range from \$1,500-\$3000 depending upon the size, in addition to transportation costs and other expenses. While large-scale manufacturers can bear this cost, SMEs do not have this capacity even if their products are up to the mark. Thus, the government needs to devise a comprehensive plan for sending local manufacturers to the fares that is consistent with the gestation period of the sub-sector.

**Develop Data Dashboard:** The auto-parts sub-sector requires data and statistics about the market size of a particular part, quality standards, and relevant manufacturer information. The associations and government need to collaboratively build an integrated and comprehensive database and dashboard for a better-informed policy, planning, research & development and skills needs.



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## Performing Arts Can Play a Crucial Role in Eradicating Patriarchal Violence

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### Introduction

Patriarchal violence, a pervasive issue in society, revolves around the exertion of power and control by men over women and marginalized genders.<sup>1</sup> This practice involves various forms of abuse like physical, sexual, emotional, and also economic coercion. Entrenched structurally and ideologically, 'patriarchal violence' is supported by societal institutions like religious and state laws. Such practices perpetuate gender inequality, and disparities in employment, political participation, and education, whilst normalizing violence against women.<sup>2</sup> The prevalence of patriarchal violence has normalized its existence, underscoring the importance of acknowledging its complexity and impact.

A potential tool that can break the patriarchal norm is art, particularly performing arts. Performing arts are an important medium that can influence culture to reinforce and counter patriarchy. Described as a 'meeting of the visual arts and theatre which grew out of mainstream theatre',<sup>3</sup> performing arts consist of the 'values traditionally attached to art' which helps establish a new order of nature and advocates for structuring positive changes in society.<sup>4</sup> Performing arts can change global narratives and foster activism through storytelling and aesthetics.<sup>5</sup> It integrates various art forms like music, theatre, dance, acting, and more, creating visually engaging experiences that enable the audience to connect with complex realities whilst fostering a physical and sensory connection to expression and perspectives.<sup>6</sup>

Having a rich history in the Indian subcontinent dating

back to the 1st century, performing arts were a medium that used storytelling and narrative formation. Let alone storytelling, performing arts also engaged in political and civic discourses for various protests and movements. Primarily seen as an entertainment channel, performing arts proved to be more than that, becoming a catalyst for change over time.

Initially, this medium started to play a role in the abolishment of patriarchy in the 19th century. In the late 1960s and early 1970s in the West, the first method used to demonstrate against the objectification of women was the deconstructive strategy.<sup>7</sup> In 1972, Faith Wilding's performance titled 'Waiting' featured her sitting on a chair, gently rocking, symbolizing her anticipation of advancing in age.<sup>8</sup> Through this act, she poetically conveyed her inner struggles, deconstructing the societal limitations that hindered her independence as a woman during her life. The exclusively female audience resonated deeply with this thought-provoking performance, as it illuminated the constraints they too experienced in their lives.

Theatre has the power to control an audience<sup>9</sup> and every routine or systematic reality has the power to trigger a person and awaken their conscience to possibly relate to a sequence that they witness. Studies have shown that humans preserve information better through visual stimuli and realize the importance of the natural environment better with performing or visual arts.<sup>10</sup>

Pakistan is among the countries where patriarchy persists as a prevailing societal framework, signifying a social structure where men wield authority and control over women.<sup>11</sup> According to the UN Women Global Database, violence against women in 2016 in Pakistan was recorded at 24.5% with relevance to Lifetime Physical and/or Sexual Intimate Partner Violence. In 2018, it rose to 28%.<sup>12</sup> During COVID-19, it rose even more. About 1,422 cases

<sup>1</sup> Gwen Hunnicutt, "Varieties of Patriarchy and Violence against Women: Resurrecting 'Patriarchy' as a Theoretical Tool." *Sage Journals*, (2009): 553-573.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> Colin Chambers, *The Continuum companion to twentieth century theatre*. A&C Black, 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Ann McCulloch, *Dance of the Nomad: A Study of the Selected Notebooks of A.D. Hope*. ANU press, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Harvard Political Review, "Performance Art as an Activist Tool." March 7, 2020. <https://harvardpolitics.com/performance-art-activism/>

<sup>6</sup> Olafur Eliasson, "Why art has the power to change the world." *World Economic Forum*, January 18, 2016. <https://www.weforum.org/>

<sup>7</sup> Deconstructive strategy refers to breaking the work into pieces to make the audience grasp the message better.

<sup>8</sup> Jeanie Forte, "Women's Performance Art: Feminism and Postmodernism." *Theatre Journal*, Vol 40, No.2, (1988): 217-235.

<sup>9</sup> John Brown, *What is Theatre? An Introduction and Exploration*, (Boston: Focal Press, 1997).

<sup>10</sup> Lauren Butler, "Dance and Mixed-Media Performance for Building Scientific Understanding and Environmental Respect." *Columbia University*, No. 19, (2018). <https://doi.org/10.7916/consilience.v0i19.3937>

<sup>11</sup> Asian Pacific Institute on Gender-based Violence, "Patriarchy & Power." <https://www.api-gbv.org/about-gbv/our-analysis/patriarchy-power/>

<sup>12</sup> Nida Kirmani, "The past few months have been harrowing for Pakistani women." *ALJAZEERA*, October 8, 2021. <https://www.aljazeera.com/>

of domestic violence and 9,000+ cases of violence against women were reported during the last six months of 2020.<sup>13</sup>

Despite patriarchal constraints, performing arts made its place in challenging these problematic norms in Pakistan. One artist who initiated using this tool is Salima Hashimi whose performance on PTV 'Anda ubalna' became popular as a comedy program. There are several feminist articulated performances that challenged patriarchy in the 1980s, when the military regime imposed censorship policies.<sup>14</sup> Dancers, activists, teachers, and performing artists like Sheema Kermani, Naheed Siddiqui, Lala Rukh, and Sameena Mansoor are a few names that went far in challenging patriarchal society through their art practice. Nusra Latif Qureshi, Masooma Syed, Aisha Khalid, and Farida Batool devised new forms and ways for the presentation of women in the media, defying existing patriarchal structures. Similarly, by redefining the female character and the ownership of their own body, stereotypical roles of women have been challenged by artists like Misha Janpawala and Shehzil Malik.<sup>15</sup>

Ajoka Theater, Alhamra Art Center, Tehrik-e-Niswaan, Punjab Lok RaHS, The Colony Lahore, Olomopolo Media, Sangat Theater, International Association of Theater for Children and Young People (ASSITEJ) are some of the theatre groups that continue to preserve and develop the performing arts tradition in Pakistan despite patriarchal constraints. Plays like Barri, Ek Thi Nani, Jhalli Kithay Javay, and Dhee Rani<sup>16</sup> by Ajoka Theater and Lok RaHS created awareness in the most challenging of times and are still relevant today, making Pakistani women realize how unaware they are of their social, civil, and political rights, in a society where men continue to hold status and power.

But despite the presence of such institutions, performing

arts in Pakistan lag significantly in progressive influence, with TV dramas, commercial theatre, and films being the dominant forms. Pakistani artists often overlook the profound impact performing arts can have on society.<sup>17</sup> Pakistani media often reinforces traditional gender stereotypes, depicting women as submissive and suffering, while sometimes romanticizing abusive marriages and violence, thus normalizing these phenomena among the audiences.<sup>18</sup> Punjabi commercial theatre encourages women performances for the sole purpose of entertaining males, subjecting women to sexism and vulgar jokes, and causing misconceptions about theatre art as a positive tool for change. Although empowered women are shown in some TV dramas like Udaari,<sup>19</sup> a drama on the subject of child rape; Baaghi, based on the dreadful practice of honour killings in Pakistan; Akhri Station and Yaqeen ka Safar,<sup>20</sup> still most dramas continue to reinforce existing patriarchal norms. Thus, while performing arts has the potential to raise awareness about patriarchal issues among the masses, the Pakistani drama industry, primarily driven by profit, does not prioritize women empowerment. Instead, smaller organizations like Ajoka Theater, Dastak, Lok RaHS, Sangat and others have taken on social problems, challenging the grip of patriarchy.<sup>21</sup>

### Research Objective and Methodology

Overall, patriarchy still exerts a significant influence in Pakistan, sustained through both formal institutions like the country's legal framework and informal customs rooted in religious or customary practices. This system directly contributes to violence against women by perpetuating the notion of woman's subordination to man. Within this societal context, performing arts have a historical legacy of challenging patriarchy and questioning the normalization of violence against women. However, in Pakistan, the impact of performing arts in addressing this issue has been limited. Mainstream forms of perform-

<sup>13</sup> ANI. "Domestic violence cases against Pakistani women increased during COVID-19 lockdown." *South Asia's Leading Multimedia News Agency*, May 27, 2024. <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/domestic-violence-cases-against-pakistani-women-increased-during-covid-19-lockdown20210513144906/>

<sup>14</sup> Naela Aamir, et al., "Expression of Feminist and Post-Feminist Sensibility in Pakistani." *Pakistan Social Sciences Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (2018): 295-311.

<sup>15</sup> DAWN. "This Pakistani artist is challenging gender inequality with her work." February 1, 2018. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1385989>

<sup>16</sup> Fawzia Afzal-Khan, "Street Theatre in Pakistani Punjab: The Case of Ajoka, Lok Rehas, and the Woman Question." *TDR* 41 (1997): 39.

<sup>17</sup> Shumaila Ahmed and Juliana Abdul Wahab, "Paradox of Women Empowerment: The Representations of Women in Television Dramas in Pakistan." *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences*, 9(10), (2019): 1-21.

<sup>18</sup> Aqsa Younus, "Pakistani TV Dramas And Women's Roles: How Screen And Real-Life Influence Each Other." *THE FRIDAY TIMES*, December 31, 2021. <https://thefridaytimes.com/31-Dec-2021/pakistani-tv-dramas-and-women-s-roles-how-screen-and-real-life-influence-each-other>

<sup>19</sup> Sadaf Haider, "In its finale, Udaari puts shame where it belongs — with the rapist." *IMAGES*, September 26 2016. <https://images.dawn.com/news/1176310>

<sup>20</sup> Dipanwita, "These Five Women Centric Pakistani Dramas Are A Must-Watch - Put them on Your List." *She The People*, February 16, 2021. <https://www.shethepeople.tv/film-theatre/best-pakistani-dramas-khudgarz-mujhay-jeene-do-yaqeen-ka-safar/>

<sup>21</sup> Taimur Kayani and Arbaayah Ali Termezi, "Transcultural Adaptation of Brecht's Work by Ajoka Theatre in Pakistan: A Critical Review." *PAKISTAN SOCIAL SCIENCES REVIEW*, Vol. 1, No.1, (2017): 76-89.

ing arts, such as TV dramas and commercial theatre, often reinforce established patriarchal norms, while the sector that has a history of actively challenging patriarchy, like parallel theatre, remains on the fringes, and struggles for recognition.

This research utilizes qualitative research methods to understand whether the social theatre currently being practiced in Pakistan counters patriarchal violence. It analyses the productions of three theatre groups: Ajoka Theatre, Olomopolo Media and Sangat, to understand what aspects of patriarchy are countered. Furthermore, it evaluates culture policy to understand its relationship with the marginality of social theatre in Pakistan.

The research suggests various recommendations for Pakistani artists and encourages the policymakers to: recognize the significance of effectively implementing culture policy, raising awareness for performing arts in the educational realms, encouraging women's participation, providing support to established cultural institutions, and more. Sustaining and developing culture could additionally reap major economic benefits. Ultimately, this paper aims to shed light on the potential of social theatre to contribute towards social change and cultural development in Pakistan.

### Findings: Countering Patriarchy Through Parallel Theatre in Pakistan

*Lappar* is a play by one of the oldest theatre groups of Pakistan, Ajoka Theater. Written by Shahid Nadeem, Director Ajoka, and directed by his wife, Madeeha Gauhar, the play exhibits the societal picture of women in Pakistan. 'Lappar', meaning slap, exposes the deeply rooted male-dominated system, illustrating the violence women endure on a day-to-day basis. It portrays how women's lives often revolve around violence, whereby society reinforces the idea that a 'slap' is their unfortunate fate. The play highlights factors like cultural, social, religious, and biological elements that perpetuate patriarchy in Pakistan, starting from gender-biased celebrations of male births as opposed to a female child, to violence against women. The play begins around the problematic understanding of gender biasness, women subordination and stigma against divorce which link women's fate to fortune, domestication and violence. Remarkably, it ends with the female

protagonist challenging the system by slapping her husband for his absurd reaction to her expecting a baby girl.

This play is pivotal in its essence as it is in Punjabi language and clearly spreads the message across to the audience. The fact that women from all classes can relate to 'lappar' as their fate signifies our deeply patriarchal society. The play informs and encourages women to educate themselves, be courageous enough to stand for what's right, and to call quits to abuse.

*Meenu*, a play produced by Olomopolo Media, a budding cultural institute based in Lahore. 'Meenu' revolves around a woman experiencing menopause. Indirectly addressing the violence women face due to entrenched patriarchal norms, this play portrays a lone taxi driver encountering past and future versions of herself, grappling with her present reality. The play dives into a taboo subject, revealing how the silence around women's bodies stems from cultural and historical patriarchal norms. It highlights the consequences of inadequate information and treatment for women, infringing upon their right to better health. The play symbolizes how 'shame' has been ingrained in women's sexuality by restricting awareness of their own physiological and biological processes. There is a clear message in the play that women need to educate themselves and know scientific facts about their body to be able to take care of it physically, mentally, and emotionally.

*Chough Kausambey Di*, a Punjabi poetic play is directed by Huma Safdar, the director of Sangat theatre group based in Lahore. Safdar clarifies that Sangat was established to adapt Punjabi literature and folk wisdom into theatre performances to familiarise contemporary audiences with their rich heritage. Critiquing patriarchy, *Chough Kausambey Di*, a 17th-century Punjabi poem by philosopher and Sufi poet Bulleh Shah, poetically highlights societal oppression rooted in cultural norms. The poem reveals how systemic violence often goes unnoticed in daily life, emphasizing the importance of speaking out against such mistreatment. Titled "Chough Kausambey Di", it portrays the exhaustion of women toiling in the fields, relentlessly picking safflower petals due to high demand from feudal lords, traders, and accountants. These women are exploited and not recognized for

their labour, receiving inadequate compensation for their valuable work.

The above listed theatre plays highlight the problematic cultural standards of society in Pakistan. In raising awareness and challenging cultural norms, they create hope for a better society though that requires theatre art to be promoted at a much larger scale in the country. Instead, there is a dearth of performing arts in the country because of different reasons inclusive of an identity crisis, religious constraints, and a lack of research, awareness and engagement. Further, commercial theatre has worked otherwise in reinforcing and sustaining patriarchy.

A fact to note is that the 1876 Dramatic Performance Act with vague provisions regarding scandalous, defamatory, or seditious content, still regulates theatre practices today, which means that theatre art is hardly given the needed attention to bloom. Instead of facilitating artists for theatre practices, the state bans, abandons or restricts small scale productions critical of cultural norms. Thus, non-profit and social sectors alone work for the sustenance of performing arts while the social theatre industry has done splendid work in promoting and preserving performing arts by itself. But for performing arts particularly theatre to have a larger impact on society, a joint investment by the state and non-profit sector is needed. Culture policy should thus consider potential actions by the state, non-profit sector and corporations for better institutional outcomes in the cultural domain.

### Evaluating Punjab's Culture Policy & Institutions

The first Culture Policy of Pakistan was drafted and partially implemented by Faiz Ahmad Faiz when he was appointed as head of the National Council of the Arts in 1972. However, the Zia military dictatorship which took over after the Bhutto government was hostile to regional cultures as it considered Pakistan's pre-Islamic cultural heritage as contrary to the Pakistani identity. Thus, the culture policy was revived only after a long struggle in the post Zia era. The most recent Punjab Culture Policy was developed in 2021 after extensive engagement with over

160 artists and educators. The document acknowledges the need for state's support for cultural activities as these promote diversity, collective identity, cohesion and citizenship, adding vibrancy to the nation. It lists hundreds of possible actions that can be taken in the cultural sphere. However, the crucial step lies in prioritizing these actions according to a well thought out strategy, and its effective implementation.

More importantly though, many countries have started prioritizing and investing in culture as an industry, realizing the creative sectors' possible economic impact in addition to considering culture as 'merit good' and a necessity, for the benefit of the public at large.<sup>22</sup> Direct or indirect public funding is one of the most convenient and readily available sources to support cultural initiatives. For example, The National Endowment Fund for Culture and the Arts (NEFCA), Philippines, is an agency specifically formed to implement culture and arts programs to align with the goals of the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan for Culture and the Arts.<sup>23</sup> Under this program, grants were given to seven arts and cultural organizations under the Innovation Grants Project 2020, to enhance art disciplines and generate art using advanced technologies.<sup>24</sup> Indirect funding, on the other hand, includes tax relief, voucher schemes or professional support by the government. For example, France provides tax incentives to the theatre community for enhanced and culturally articulated theatre through deconcentrated grants; tax credits to support artistic employment; creative assistance to improve theatrical scripts; guidance to young artistic teams via assistance for companionship; and opportunities to reach new audiences, etc.<sup>25</sup>

Additionally, states also encourage private funding for cultural sustenance. For example, Korea's Motae Fund was setup by the Cultural Ministry with defined priority areas for cultural investment. This followed appointed private venture companies to raise and combine private investments with Motae Fund investments to invest in priority areas. This institutional mechanism has been an important element in the rise of K-pop.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>22</sup> "Home." The Culture Fix : Creative People, Places and Industries | OECD iLibrary. Accessed October 14, 2022. <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/29f05369-en/index.html?itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fcomponent%2F29f05369-en>.

<sup>23</sup> User, Super. "Govph." The Official Website of Philippine Consulate General in Milan, Italy. Accessed July 29, 2022. <https://milanpcg.dfa.gov.ph/the-philippines/philippine-art-culture.html>.

<sup>24</sup> "7 Arts Companies Receive CCP Innovation Grants." Accessed July 28, 2022. <https://www.bworldonline.com/arts-and-leisure/2021/07/07/380511/7-arts-companies-receive-ccp-innovation-grants/>

<sup>25</sup> "Réglementation, Dispositifs d'aides." Ministère de la Culture. Accessed October 14, 2022. <https://www.culture.gouv.fr/fr/Thematiques/Theatre-spectacles/Pour-les>

Lastly, the promotion of more feminist plays or supporting gender neutral participation in the performing arts is dependent on the change in state ideology. Although dancers like Amna Mawaz, Fatima Amjed, Suhae Abro, and others have continued the tradition of female participation in the performing arts, both greater participation as well as gender equal participation require state and societal support. France through its “Les pas culture”<sup>27</sup> voucher scheme, and Ireland with initiatives like the ‘Six Point Gender Plan’ that aims for gender parity in Irish theatre production<sup>28</sup> are some examples that can guide policy makers in Punjab and Pakistan to tackle this challenge.

While state contributions worldwide are fostering the dialogue of creativity and cultural adaptation, parallel theatre in Pakistan is yet to be seen as a viable profession as it lacks public as well as private support, while the non-profit and social sectors alone sustain performing arts. For parallel theatre to prosper, state’s support is required. Thus, Punjab’s Culture Policy should support collaborative initiatives by the state, non-profit, corporations and private cultural institutions for better cultural outcomes.

### Conclusions & Recommendations

This study highlights how patriarchal structures in Pakistan lead to violence against women and suggests that performing arts, particularly theatre, can be a potent tool for challenging patriarchy. But despite historical significance, social theatre in Pakistan faces limitations, with commercial theatre often reinforcing patriarchy. While the state recognizes theatre’s potential for change, it falls short of providing the necessary support. Various factors contribute to the lack of performing arts to challenge the status quo, including limited resources, conservative influence, and societal resistance. Addressing these challenges is essential for leveraging the transformative power of performing arts in combating patriarchy in Pakistan. This requires state facilitation, collective efforts, and awareness raising among the general public to utilise the potential of performing arts to address gender inequality in the country. The study recommends following measures:

**Promote Cultural Integration in Education:** Include performing arts within the education curriculum to foster creativity and cultural appreciation among students, which will lay the foundation for a more culturally enriched society. Further, teaching regional languages in schools will preserve linguistic and cultural diversity while connecting the younger generation to their cultural heritage, and developing their sense of belonging.

**Support Artists, Cultural Institutions & Festivals:** Provide financial assistance and social protection to artists to ensure sustainable artistic livelihoods while encouraging them to contribute to the nation’s cultural landscape. Establishing a transparent funding framework will ensure equitable distribution of resources, supporting both individual artists and cultural institutions in their endeavours. Similarly, public sector facilitation of cultural festivals will raise community awareness regarding culture & arts, while developing pride in one’s cultural heritage.

**Ensure Security and Balance Censorship:** To promote culture, the state has to guarantee security for cultural performances, particularly in areas prone to extremist threats rather than shutting down cultural activities owing to security threats. Similarly, a much more balanced censorship policy is needed for the freedom of expression while maintaining cultural sensitivities.

**Facilitate Collaborations & Gender Inclusivity:** By encouraging global participation and hosting international workshops, Pakistan’s culture industry can broaden its artistic horizons through cultural exchange while elevating Pakistan’s cultural profile internationally. This is also dependent on women’s participation in the arts through the promotion of women-centric theatre for instance, which can challenge existing stereotypes and contribute to a more inclusive cultural narrative.

<sup>26</sup> Hye-Kyung Lee, “Supporting the cultural industries using venture capital: a policy experiment from South Korea” *Cultural Trends*, 31:1, (2021): 47-67.

<sup>27</sup> OECD, “The Culture Fix. *Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED)*” June 3, 2022.

Le pas Culture was born from the desire, affirmed during the 2017 presidential campaign, to provide 18-year-olds with a new system promoting access to culture in order to strengthen and diversify cultural practices, by revealing the cultural richness of the territories. First tested in 19 French departments, the pass Culture is now accessible at the national level since May 21, 2021.

<sup>28</sup> Kelsey Moore, “Irish Theaters Implement Gender Equality Policies.” *Women And Hollywood*, July 11, 2018. <https://womenandhollywood.com/>.





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## Muhajir and Pashtun of Katti Pahari: Socio-Psychological Barriers to Peace

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### Introduction

Karachi, like many other mega-cities, is laden with political, social, and even criminal fault lines, many of which seem to culminate around ethnicity. For the inhabitants of the city, the locality of 'Katti Pahari' (the cut mountain) comprising primarily of the Pashtun and Muhajir communities seems to embody the ethnic fault line.

One of the bloodiest "ethnic" riots, mainly between the Muhajir and Pashtun happened in 1985, when Bushra Zaidi, a young college girl was killed in a road accident involving "yellow devil", a bloody nickname for Karachi buses.<sup>1</sup> Whereas the level of conflict fluctuated over the following decades, still the incidents of violence between these ethnic groups continued. While the level of violence has decreased since the government commissioned the Rangers' operation in 2013, still signs of animosity and a latent conflict between these ethnic communities remain. In other words, there exists a form of 'Negative Peace'<sup>2</sup>, with the possibility of violence as soon as the security forces recede.

This paper attempts to understand the phenomenon of latent conflict by exploring conflict and peace narratives of the Muhajir and Pashtuns living in adjacent neighborhoods of Aligarh Colony, Qasba Colony, Banaras Colony, and Nusrat Bhutto Colony, formed as a result of the protracted conflict. These neighborhoods are located in the shadow of Katti Pahari (also known as Khasa Hill), at the edge of Orangi, Karachi's largest and one of the biggest katchi abadis (squatter settlements) in the world. The paper specifically explores how people of Muhajir and Pashtun backgrounds conceptualize peace and violence, and how this conceptualization is influenced by their re-

spective ethnic, historical, and cultural backgrounds, and social reality.

### Conceptual Framework

Laurent Guyer in his book 'Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City' maintains that initially, the violent confrontation between the Muhajir and Pashtun had little to do with ethnicity and was primarily related to heroin trade profits being invested in the transport and the unofficial real estate sector. As intercultural frictions and economic contestation spiraled into aggression, violent and political entrepreneurs reframed this confrontation as an 'ethnic' conflict.<sup>3</sup> Whatever may be the underlying reasons for the conflict, this research suggests that the conflict between the Muhajir and Pashtun communities in Karachi may be characterized as intractable because it includes the four necessary features: being protracted, violent, perceived as irresolvable (by the local ethnic groups involved), and demands extensive material and psychological investments to cope successfully with the situation.<sup>4</sup>

Why it has become intractable requires exploration. Ervin Staub suggests that violent conflicts cause physically and mentally painful experiences for the people and groups involved. Thus, attaining basic psychological needs, for example the feeling of safety and positive identity becomes a challenge, while stress and fear become a norm, with the urge to win the conflict or at least not to lose it.<sup>5</sup>

In such protracted conflicts, societies develop a socio-psychological infrastructure to cope with these challenges. Daniel Bar-Tal suggests that three mutually interrelated elements: collective memories, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientation constitute this infrastructure. In this cognitive-affective repertoire, societal beliefs are the basic components of collective memories and define the ethos of the conflict.<sup>6</sup> These beliefs are frequently on the public agenda, are discussed by members of society, serve as relevant references in decisions made by the lead-

<sup>1</sup> Stanley J. Tambiah, *Levelling Crowds: Ethnonationalist conflicts and collective violence in South Asia*. Vol. 10 (California: University of California Press, 1997), 186.

<sup>2</sup> Negative Peace: Discussed in detail by Johan Galtung, this term refers to the absence of violence, where, for example, a ceasefire is enacted, a negative peace will ensue. Where as Positive peace includes positive content such as restoration of relationships, creation of social systems that serve the needs of the whole population and the constructive resolution of conflict. As cited/quoted in Johan Galtung, *Peace by peaceful means: Peace and conflict, development and civilization* (Sage, 1996).

<sup>3</sup> Laurent Guyer, *Karachi: Ordered disorder and the struggle for the city* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

<sup>4</sup> Louis Kriesberg, "Intractable Conflicts" in *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, ed. E. Weiner (New York: Continuum, 1998), 332-342. As cited in Bar-Tal, "Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts," 1430-1453.

<sup>5</sup> Ervin Staub "Notes on cultures of violence, cultures of caring and peace, and the fulfillment of basic human needs," *Political psychology* 24, no. 1 (2003): 1-21.

<sup>6</sup> Daniel Bar-Tal, "Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts," *American Behavioral Scientist* 50, no. 11 (2007): 1430-1453.

ers, and thus influence chosen courses of action.<sup>7</sup> It is also through these collective beliefs or perceptions that groups form narratives about various social issues.

### Hypothesis & Methodology

It is hypothesized that Muhajir and Pashtuns of Katti Pahari have developed divergent socio-psychological infrastructures, which are reflected in each ethnic group's perceptions of peace and violence and fuel the cycle of animosity between them. To test this hypothesis, semi-structured interviews were conducted in one of the most densely populated areas of Karachi. Within District West, localities of two towns adjacent to Katti Pahari, namely SITE and Orangi, and in District Central, North Nazimabad Town adjacent to the northeast end of Katti Pahari were visited for interviews. Additionally, few interviews were conducted in squatter settlements situated on Khasa Hills, which has been cut to make a link road between Orangi Town and North Nazimabad Town, hence the name 'Katti Pahari', the cut mountain.

### Analysis

During the interviews, almost all the interviewees demonstrated the effects of the ongoing protracted conflict in their area and members of both ethnic groups talked about the same issues and concerns: the safety of life in their locality and city, and the security of 'rozee roti' (job and earning bread) for their family. Their thinking and memory, shared experiences, and perceptions of the other community were assessed according to the constituents of socio-psychological infrastructure.

The Qasba-Aligarh Massacre was part of larger Pashtun-Muhajir 'ethnic' riots, also known as 'The Karachi Riots' from December 12-17, 1986. These riots erupted in the wake of a military operation, codenamed 'Clean-up' at Sohrab Goth.<sup>8</sup> On December 12, army trucks surrounded the area and bulldozed houses to remove residents, to stop arms and drug dealing. Just before this operation, the police entered Orangi township, a predominantly Muhajir area, and seized arms and bombs.



1986 Karachi Riots<sup>9</sup>

On December 14, several hundred Pashtun men armed with Kalashnikovs attacked the Muhajir residential areas of Qasba, Aligarh, and Sector I-D. Hundreds of Muhajir were killed and their houses, businesses, and shops were burnt in what is remembered as the "Qasba Aligarh Massacre".<sup>10</sup>

### Collective Memory

Though the complexity of this conflict keeps the chain of events from falling into a simple cause-and-effect equation, the interviewees narrated recollections of the event in black and white. Among the interviewees, two particularly stand out because of their clear reminiscences of that specific day and also because their memories seemed closely related but dissimilar at the same time.

Fatima Bibi, a Muhajir age 65-75 remembered shifting to Aligarh some time before the 1986 attack. While sitting in her Aligarh home's veranda, she recalled the day of the attack:

"My husband had died, my son was young and there was no one to support us, so my daughters and I worked at a Pathan's (Pashtun Man's) Mill. We woke up that morning and went to work. While at work Hajji Bhai (Pashtun mill owner) came inside, slamming the door open with his scooter and dragging the vehicle indoors with him. We were all startled thinking why he had brought the scooter inside while normally he parked it

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Sohrab Goth: a suburb of Gadap Town in Karachi, notorious as an area sprawling with criminals and miscreants.

<sup>9</sup> Ali Chisti, "Qasba Aligarh Massacre: a forgotten story," Digital Image, *Blogspot*, July 8, 2009, accessed August 25, 2017, <http://akchishti.blogspot.nl/2009/07/qasba-aligarh-massacre-forgotten-story.html>.

<sup>10</sup> Charles H. Kennedy, "The politics of ethnicity in Sindh," *Asian survey* 31, no. 10 (1991): 948.

outside the door. He seemed to be in a hurry, and told us to sit down, and closed the door behind him. Our hearts sank and we said, ‘Hajji Bhai! Open the door’. When I opened the door, what I saw was a swarm of Pakhtuns (Pashtuns) while firing was going on. When we came towards our area, people said to us, ‘everyone is running, are you coming this way to die?’. When we reached home, we heard that Pathans have reached the nearby street. So, we ran back with the children. We came back home the second day. The situation was horrible. (hastily touching her ears in an inward gesture of pardon) ‘Tauba, tauba’ (roughly translated to ‘God forbid!’), So many were dead.”<sup>11</sup>

She expressed her mistrust towards the Pashtuns saying, “When one sees the Pashtun grandmothers and daughters, it doesn’t seem that they can harm you. But when something is about to happen, they leave for Banaras. And then I don’t know, they just assemble and attack. Wonder how they find out.”<sup>12</sup> Upon being asked, where she hid with her children after running from her house, she answered, “Where could have we gone, back there, at the Pathan’s place!”<sup>13</sup>

Sayed Samar, a Pashtun resident of Katti Pahari came to Karachi from Mingora, Swat around 1958-59 before Ayub Khan imposed Martial Law and lived in PIB (Pir Ilahi Buksh) Colony before shifting to Katti Pahari in 1990. He initially worked in a mill and then was employed by the army. He shared:

“In 1985, I was in PIB colony, and was listening to what was happening. There was an incident involving a girl (Bushra Zaidi), and then there was the Aligarh incident (in 1986). When the attack on Aligarh took place, what happened was that two Pashtun brothers (not literal brothers) were going their own way, when they were fired upon and killed by the Muhajir who had climbed up the mountain.

(You know), our Pashtun culture is such; there was an

announcement (from the mosque) in the area about the matter. I had a friend here, he also belonged to Mingora, he phoned me that ‘Samar Sahab, do me a favor, please come here’. He said ‘we want to attack Aligarh, see they killed our men without any reason’. So, I came from there, but before I reached here, the attack had started. Coming here was quite difficult (because of the blockade). I hired a taxi, came from PIB colony via Garden (Town), a longer route.”<sup>14</sup>

He did not elaborate any further on his role in the events that followed, but clearly, in his mind, the actions taken by the Pashtun that day were justified. Both Fatima Bibi and Sayed Samar presented a narrative of events that took place on 14th December 1986 in a way that indicated their unique side of the story and met their unique ethnic group’s prevalent needs.

Further, during both interviews, youngsters, the majority of whom were not present in 1986, were listening to the story. Five of Fatima Bibi’s grandchildren were present at her cramped-up Aligarh house while at the small school on Katti Pahari, young school teachers in their early to mid-twenties eagerly listened to the old Pashtun man’s story, known to them as the trusted Samar Baba. The discussion that followed with these younger members of Muhajir and Pashtun ethnic groups revealed how they had in fact inherited the biases from the older generation, thus suggesting that societal beliefs are based on collective memory as they are shared and treated by many members of the community as truthful and valid accounts of the past.

Cairns & Roe argue that in an intractable conflict, collective memory evolves to present the history of the conflict to societal members.<sup>15</sup> The narrative develops over time, and describes the conflict’s beginning and its course, providing a coherent and meaningful picture,<sup>16</sup> which is both black and white, and enables a thrifty, quick, unambiguous, and simple understanding of the history of the conflict.<sup>17</sup> Thus for Samar Baba, the events of Qasba-Aligarh

<sup>11</sup> Fatima Bibi, interview by author, Aligarh Colony, Karachi, December 10, 2016.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Sayed Samar, interview by author, Katti Pahari, Karachi, December 10, 2016.

<sup>15</sup> Ed Cairns and Micheal D. Roe, “Introduction: Why memories in conflict?” In *In The role of memory in ethnic conflict*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 3-8, seen in Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological foundations,” 1430-1453.

<sup>16</sup> Devine-Wright, “A theoretical overview of memory and conflict”, 9-33, seen in Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological foundations,” 1430-1453.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

were a straightforward retribution by the Pashtuns for the injustice against their community while for Fatima Bibi it was nothing but plain cruelty against her community.

### Ethos of Conflict

There is a sense of self-pity, and being on the right side of the conflict in each ethnic group living around Katti Pahari. In remembering the Qasba-Aligarh attack, Ghulam Rasool, an elderly Muhajir man working at a grocery store in Orangi Town, stated, “We lived in Bukhari Colony and saw Aligarh being looted in front of our eyes. Now there are all Pathans in Bukhari Colony.” When asked, “So you sold and left?” He exclaimed, “Sold! Sold what? We were forcefully handed over (nominal amount of) money and pushed out. Isn’t this cruelty? There is no one to protect us. Even the police do not protect us. The protection is only for them (Pashtuns). It is just wrong.”

Further, ethnicity seems to bind members with the feeling of brotherhood and unity while allowing for self-glorification. Haroon, a Pashtun polio worker and Union Council Communications Support Officer at the Polio Center situated to the north-east of Katti Pahari shared, “When we go to a Pashtun house, they ask us, why we are doing this work. I introduce myself that I am your Pashtun brother, I came from Swat. Look if polio drops were a bad thing, I wouldn’t have come to you. We give this to our own children as well, you should do the same. A Pathan respects a Pathan more” he said. “They see our dress, they say he is here for a purpose; respect him! Pathan has this quality, if a Pathan goes to a house as a guest, he is honored. They often say I am giving these drops to my children because of you; otherwise, I am not keen at all to do so.”<sup>18</sup>

Rashid, a Muhajir man in his early thirties exhibited a perfect example of self-glorification while stating, “Sometimes when the situation is unstable, people let others hide in their house until the situation boils down and it is safe for them to go home. Even a few Pashtuns have some humanity left in them and do the same. But we make sure that if a Pashtun brother is stuck in our area, we escort him

to safety. If we do the same as they do, that you killed two of ours we shall kill five or ten of yours, then there will be no solution to this problem.”<sup>19</sup>

Under a prolonged intractable conflict, societies develop a particular ‘ethos of conflict’ that generates a particular dominant orientation of society by providing a clear picture of the conflict as a point of reference supported by the direction, goals, conditions, requirements, and the images of both the in-group and the rival.<sup>20</sup> Both collective memory and the ethos of conflict complement each other and together constitute a solid and holistic narrative that societal members from each group share.<sup>21</sup>

### Collective Emotional Orientation

Along with societal beliefs, the socio-psychological infrastructure of a group in situations of intractable conflict includes a collective emotional orientation. Societies caught up in an intractable conflict tend to be dominated by a number of collective emotional orientations, the most explicit being fear but may also include hatred, anger, guilt, and pride.<sup>22</sup>

Fear was the most common theme encountered. Although everyone acknowledged that physical violence had receded (interviews were conducted in December 2016) mainly due to the efforts of the federal government and Rangers, many still feared this as temporary, and thus a form of ‘Negative Peace’. For example, while talking about ‘fear’, Fatima Bibi, an old Muhajir Lady from Aligarh Colony, talked about how she was anxious when her young grandsons went out for work<sup>23</sup> and she prayed to Allah for their safety as she mentioned that one of them was recently mugged at gunpoint. One of Fatima Bibi’s teenage granddaughters studying at an all-girls school also expressed her concern about safety, stating “People come and fire at the mosque! No place is safe”.<sup>24</sup>

The dynamics of fear limit mobility and force residents to rethink and reshape their lives and movement in the area. Hina, a young Pashtun teacher at a charitable school in

<sup>18</sup> M. Haroon Khan, interview by author, Nusrat Bhutto Colony, Karachi, December 14, 2016.

<sup>19</sup> Rashid, interview by author, Aligarh Colony, Karachi, December 10, 2016.

<sup>20</sup> Daniel Bar-Tal, *Shared beliefs in a society: Social psychological analysis* (Sage Publications, 2000), seen in Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological foundations,” 1430-1453.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> Fatima Bibi, interview by author, Aligarh Colony, Karachi, December 10, 2016.

<sup>24</sup> Fatima Bibi’s granddaughter, interview by author, Aligarh Colony, Karachi, December 10, 2016.

her early twenties, shared her emotions of anxiety saying that earlier the situation was very scary. “No one knew if a bullet would come from here or there. In the past, we did not go beyond the Qasba Modh (beyond Qasba Colony). Our elders at home stopped us from going out.”<sup>25</sup>

Haroon, a Pashtun polio worker and Union Council Communications Support Officer talked about the unrest of 2011 caused by political, ethnic, and religious violence in his locality. He stated that “A few years back things were so bad that I was not able to leave the house. In the place where I live in Qasba Colony, Muhajirs fired from the bottom (of the hill), and Pathans<sup>26</sup> (Pashtun) fired from the top, so we did not leave the house. We were isolated, could not even go out to buy ration, and ate whatever we had at home.” He further said, “I was working here (Local Government Clinic and Polio Center) at that time. I emailed and asked for leave as I wasn’t able to get out of the house. I told the administration that I would return as soon as the situation improved. My leave was approved. Everyone was aware of the conditions, there was no work, and all businesses were closed. Nobody could come or go. Everyone knew what was happening here. The Polio Campaign was also adversely affected.”<sup>27</sup> This indicates the linkages between the ‘fear for life’ and the ‘fear for livelihood’.

This fear also seems to inhibit youth energies for constructive and peace-oriented work. Yahya Khan, a young Pashtun government school teacher with an MA English degree stated that “the situation is dire, it saddens me. I was born here, and plan to spend my life here, however long or short it may be”. While “one can work a lot through politics, but I am not in politics of course. There are several risks involved in politics...” as “when I observe my surroundings, this wealth and happiness is short-lived and the end is horrible!”<sup>28</sup> In his view, working for peace through politics is dangerous and his fear is grounded in reality as thousands of political activists have been killed since the ethnopolitical rift between the Muhajir and Pashtun started in Karachi more than three decades ago.

The continued fear experienced by communities living around Katti Pahari seems to transcend gender, class, age group, and economic status. The fear of the possibility of actual ethnic violence erupting in the streets is a result of latent ethnic animosity and the general lack of justice in society. In essence, the expression of fear, for each group appeared to translate into trepidation, anger, and mistrust towards the opposite group, be it in terms of direct or indirect violence. Even when they talked about target killings, extortion, mugging, or broad-spectrum injustice, the implication was that the perpetrators belonged to the other group. This indicates the bias and some degree of hatred toward the opposing group, which can rekindle the conflict. Allport states that hate has behavioral implications as it is an “enduring organization of aggressive impulses toward a person or class of persons, since it is composed of habitual bitter feelings and accusatory thoughts, it constitutes a stubborn structure in the mental-emotional life of the individual”.<sup>29</sup>

### Conclusion & Policy Recommendations

The analysis suggests that the presence of socio-psychological infrastructures in both Muhajir and Pashtun communities residing in the Katti Pahari area of Karachi encompass a unique set of societal beliefs and perceptions of collective memory and ethos of conflict, as well as collective emotional orientations of fear, hatred, and anger of the other. As these infrastructures were institutionalized and dispersed, and with time, they became prisms through which members collected information and interpreted new experiences, fueling the cycle of violence and animosity.

But, in contrast to the hostility, mistrust, and contrasting narratives, the study also found instances or pockets of relative harmony like the cricket ground where young Pashtun and Muhajir played together, or the dedicated multi-ethnic staff at the Nusrat Bhutto Colony Government Clinic, who fulfilled their duty towards the community without bias even in times of conflict and violence. These examples can help picture the possibility of a more cohesive environment around Katti Pahari and help for-

<sup>25</sup> Hina, interview by author, Katti Pahari, Karachi, December 16, 2016.

<sup>26</sup> Haroon was the only Pashtun who referred to Pashtuns (including himself) as Pathan. Probably, due to his regular interaction with Muhajirs at his work place and in the field while administering polio drops. Muhajirs normally use the term ‘Pathan’ for Pashtuns, and many of the Pashtuns find it derogatory towards themselves.

<sup>27</sup> M. Haroon Khan, interview by author, Nusrat Bhutto Colony, Karachi, December 14, 2016.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Gordon W. Allport, *The nature of prejudice*, (Addison-Wesley, 1954), 63, seen in Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological foundations,” 1430-1453.



ulate a line of action for conflict transformation by de-constructing and transforming socio-psychological infrastructures in the long term.

The following are recommended for this purpose:

**Recondition a Collective Memory** that currently shows the whole opposite group in a bad light. Therefore, be factual and objective. Ensure that the immediate culprits are held to account and the whole ethnic community is not targeted.

**Challenge the Narratives** of each ethnic group that consider their own goals just, while reserving the virtues of their morality. This can be achieved through inter-community interactions such as collective training, working, and peace-building at the grassroots, middle-range, and top-level leadership.

**Build Civic Institutions** to meet basic human needs inclusive of basic goods and services for all regardless of ethnicity and political affiliation, while encouraging community participation for peacebuilding and sustainable development.



Sarah Wasti Ayub has contributed to an edited book by SBL Press and has volunteered for International Church of Copenhagen and Tværkulturelt Center. Currently she is on parental leave.

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:[Christopher Jaffrelot](#), a Senior Research Fellow at Science Po CERI and an Indologist specializing in South Asia, was invited to speak on [Modi's India; The Rise of Hindu Nationalism and Ethnic Democracy](#) on October 17, 2022.



Jaffrelot initiated his discussion by highlighting that India is presently witnessing the emergence of a distinctive form of national populism, characterized by elements of ethnic democracy or ethnic autocracy manifesting through electoral authoritarianism. The term national populism is a political term that combines both the elements of nationalism and populism emphasizing a nation's cultural, ethnic or religious identity as the bedrock of its political life. In India's context, this base is linked to the ethnicity of the majoritarian population, leading the country to shift from conservative democracy towards an ethnic democracy or even an ethnic autocracy. The majority community has become the nation itself while delegating a subordinate or second-class status to other minority communities. Modi's India, epitomizes ethno-religious nationalism, he said.

This brand of ethno-nationalism is not new. It was codified 100 years ago by V. D. Savarkar in his book, *Hindutva*. The essence of this ideology lies in the assertion that India primarily belongs to the Hindus, portraying them as the rightful inheritors of the land. In Savarkar's words, India is a country of Hindus as Hindus are the sons of the soil. They are a race, people descending from the Vedic fathers. In their veins, runs the blood of their fathers. They inhabit a sacred land. For him, this ethnic nationalism is

territorial given that Vedic India is connected to the sacred land where the holy rivers flow. Central to this narrative, Savarkar believes in the preservation of Sanskrit, a common language, a linguistic bedrock from which Hindi, and subsequently, the idea of a Hindu and Hindustan, emanates.

Jaffrelot further highlighted that this thinking is in alignment with the Zionist school of thought as it emphasizes the exclusivity and cultural superiority of the Hindu community like the 'chosen people.' Like Zionists are interested in the sacredness of the Jewish race and their 'Promised land', Hindu nationalists also signify ethnic, historical, and cultural traits of Hinduism rather than the spiritual element of religion. Quoting Savarkar, he shared that he himself has made this comparison stating that "No people in the world can justly claim to be recognized as a racial unit than the Hindus and perhaps the Jews." By endorsing Hindu nationalism, taking Hindus as a people and not as a community of believers, this ideology accepts Muslims as part of the nation only if they see India as a sacred land, marry Hindus and have children with them. Like Zionism, one cannot convert to Hinduism as it is a closed system that does not make conversion accessible and acceptable.

Jaffrelot argued that this ideology is depicted in Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)'s framework as RSS is deeply rooted in the ideology of Savarkar. It serves as the operational arm for propagating these beliefs. Through discipline and indoctrination, the RSS cultivates a sense of unity and physical robustness among its members, particularly focusing on the youth. It inculcates a sense of commitment and motivation in Hindus to resist Muslims, who were perceived as a threat by Savarkar.

Prime Minister Modi is a product of this ideology, organization, and his trajectory within this framework is notable. He has been associated with the RSS since he was seven years of age, was initiated into its rigorous organizational structure, later transitioning to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in his youthful years. This underscores his alignment with RSS's ideological underpinnings. Before Modi's ascendancy within the BJP, the party did not enjoy a popular position as it was considered an elitist party unpopular with the masses. However, Modi's asso-

ciation with the BJP heralded a populist shift, transforming it from a Brahmin-dominated entity into a mass-based political force. Hailing from Ganchi, a peripheral part of India, Modi was taken as somebody who came from the masses, which served a pivotal role in him gaining popularity amongst the masses. Further, Hindu nationalism, and his populist style, tone, and direct engagement with the masses, facilitated by social media and innovative communication strategies, amplified his appeal and persona.

“The majority community has become the nation itself while delegating a subordinate or second-class status to other minority communities.”

However, Jaffrelot remarked that this populist surge has been accompanied by regressive tendencies. It is exemplified by vigilante groups raising anti-“love jihad” campaigns, land restrictions and inspecting trucks for cows on highways. A Muslim in India cannot buy land in a Hindu area forcing them to opt for ghettos. Driven by a sense of cultural insecurity, these actions perpetuate the marginalization of minority communities, leading to de facto segregation and instances of forced conversion. Muslims in particular, are feeling the brunt of this discrimination as they are living in fear, compelled to change their names and alter their appearances to avoid persecution, which ghettoizes them. These actions paint a picture of an “ethnic democracy”, in which the largest minority group bears the brunt of marginalization. Discriminatory laws and practices further exacerbate the situation as religious identity has become a criterion for Indian citizenship. Inter-religious marriages are not allowed. Selling property in Gujarat to someone outside your community is practically impossible. Cow slaughter is equally challenging, with severe penalties in place, such as imprisonment for those found guilty. In Maharashtra, there is a paradox whereby consuming beef from outside the state is permissible, yet slaughtering a cow within provincial borders is prohibited.

Discussing India’s democratic shift towards electoral authoritarianism, Jaffrelot argued that the Indian system


incorporates traditional democratic aspects in the form of elections, through which populists acquire legitimacy by gaining a popular mandate. However, where elections should ideally serve as a forum for genuine debate and equitable participation, populists utilize excessive media coverage and financial influence from capitalists to increase their chances for favorable electoral outcomes. These disparities do not represent the essence of a true democratic system.

Concluding his talk, Jaffrelot stated that even institutions like the election commission and the judiciary also face erosion alongside the electoral process. The judiciary’s reputation in India has declined over the past five years for several reasons. Firstly, there’s an increasing ease in filing complaints against judges which undermines judiciary’s independence and integrity. Secondly, a growing influence of Hindutva ideology in the judiciary compromises the legal system’s secular principles. Thirdly, the practice of judges affiliating with political parties after retirement raises questions about their impartiality.

In response to a query regarding the distinction between authoritarianism and democracy, particularly in the context of ethnic democracy versus ethnic hegemony in India, Jaffrelot stated that India could be termed an ethnocracy, similar to Israel. However, India has moved beyond authoritarian rule by a single leader like Modi. Interestingly, “the new India” encompasses a broader societal transformation signifying an evolution in political ideologies and policies, shaped by the BJP.

Addressing the stance of major Indian political parties amidst these changes, Jaffrelot shared that the Indian National Congress was reverting back to its roots of a social movement-oriented organization in response to evolving political dynamics. It is trying to advocate for leftist policies and maintaining its ideological stance amidst the shifting political landscape. Regarding electoral strategies and perceptions of India’s Muslim population, Jaffrelot said that approximately six percent of the Muslim population supports the BJP owing to their lack of alignment with Islam, and economic factors that shape electoral dynamics.

:Dr. Akmal Hussain, founder of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Information Technology University (ITU) and co-chair of the Governing Board of South Asia Centre for Policy Studies, was invited for his book launch of *Pakistan, Institutional Instability & Underdevelopment: State, People, and Consciousness* on June 19, 2023. Raheem ul Haque, Assistant Professor CPPG, and Nazeef Ishtiaq, Lecturer of Economics, FCC were discussants at the book launch.



Hussain commenced his talk with a conceptual elaboration of institutions. Institutions are humanly devised formal and informal rules that enable the orderly conduct of society's political, social, cultural, and religious spheres. Rules are based on a particular understanding of human cognition, and devised through different agencies to induce certain kinds of human behavior. While the state dominated by the elite formulates formal rules, informal rules arise out of the lived experience of a community over a long period.

Referring to Douglas C. North, he argued that informal rules have complex origins as they are rooted in culture, and emerge through a historical process of human interaction with each other and with nature. This collective memory of a community, could either be part of the collective consciousness of the people or the collective unconsciousness in the form of symbols, myths, and leg-

ends.

He argued that it was pertinent to decode this collective memory for an understanding, formulation and observance of rules. Taking Pakistan as a case study, he suggested that the culture of the elite (formal rules) has imposed itself on the culture of the people (informal rules). The elite culture is different because the colonial encounter has left an indelible mark on the colonized elite and their sabotaged consciousness has been carried forward in the post-colonial period. The colonial project robbed the colonized elites of their own history, "divorcing them from their language, their modes of knowing themselves, and estranging them from the sources of defiance." This has alienated them from themselves and their people, exaggerated the difference between them and the people, and laid the bedrock for the construction of a post-colonial state. The persisting colonized consciousness of the country's ruling elite is reflected in the political choices and the design of public policy, while Pakistan's institutional instability is due to the tussle between different elite groups. This has indeed created a crisis of legitimacy of the ruling elite, as this rent-based power structure has not only constrained human potential, but has also hampered "equitable, sustained and environmentally protective economic growth."

Hussain advocated for the decolonization of consciousness of the ruling elite which would require them to reconnect with pre-colonial heritage, thereby allowing society to rediscover and embrace its cultural identity. Moreover, it needs an experience of self (Khudi) following the universal man of Iqbal, and reconnect with human solidarity in beauty, truth, and justice. Also, a comprehensive restructuring of the economy is eminent to ensure that it serves the interests of all citizens rather than perpetuating the dominance of the colonized elite class. This entails: one, moving away from a framework of dependence on developed nations and towards a model that prioritizes self-sufficiency and equitable distribution of resources; two, unlock the full potential of Pakistan's human capital by giving high-quality education and educational opportunities to all members of society, regardless of their socioeconomic status; three, build empowered institutions and empowered elected governments for all three tiers - federal, provincial, and local.

Hussain shared that Jinnah also considered decolonization as a prerequisite to materialize the shift from a hegemonic to a liberated nation, and as an integral part of nation-building. Quoting his address to the gazetted officers of Chittagong on 25th March 1948, "...you are now the servants of Pakistan. Servants can only do their duties and discharge their responsibilities by serving. Those days have gone when the country was ruled by the bureaucracy. It is the people's government, responsible to people." Jinnah further advocated the Islamic ideals of social justice, quality, and fraternity to liberate society from colonial rule while clarifying that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state. Hussain argued that Jinnah was in line with Iqbal's perspective on Islam that advocated for spiritual comprehension and in actualizing human potential, and it was this perspective that combined spirituality with free inquiry, which made Jinnah counterpose Islam to theocracy.

“...a comprehensive restructuring of the economy is eminent to ensure that it serves the interests of all citizens rather than perpetuating the dominance of the colonized elite class.”

However, this decolonization was not materialized. Instead, Zia's military dictatorship used militant extremist ideology both as an instrument of prosecuting the war against Soviet troops in Afghanistan and also to impose authoritarian rule within. This inculcated bigotry, intolerance, and hate, suspending the sensibility of love and reason embedded in the intellectual tradition of Jalal-uddin Rumi, Abd-Al-Karim Al-Jili, and Ibn Arabi. After the end of the war, the military establishment used militant extremist groups as instruments for pursuing its policy objectives in Afghanistan and India. These groups gradually formed their own strategic objectives, challenging the constitutional order and sovereignty of the state, and counterposing Sufi ideology, whose message was organic to the consciousness of the people, bringing major implications for institutional instability, state, and society in Pakistan.

Discussing the framework for economic growth, Hussain shared three principles, inspired by Jinnah's economic

vision. He argued that human well-being and social justice stand as the fundamental aims of economic policy. Moreover, industrialization should be seen within the perspective of human welfare, in creating employment opportunities for people and making them economically independent. Lastly, equal opportunities should be provided to all citizens, especially women. He examined the IMF programs in Pakistan and argued that these programs entailed reduced public spending, raised interest rates, trade openness, devaluation of rupee and privatization of state-owned enterprises. However, instead of economic progress, these programs led to an economic slowdown, increased poverty, current account deficits, and inflation. Further, despite aiming to integrate Pakistan into the global market, structural issues have hindered its growth. According to New Institutional Economics (NIE), underdeveloped economies struggle to maintain high per capita income due to limited export diversification. Pakistan's focus on low-value exports like rice and textiles is a significant challenge, ranking low in the Economic Complexity Index due to a lack of transition to knowledge-intensive products.



Discussing the book, Ishtiaq drew attention to the concept of consciousness and argued that Hussain's insights have prompted him to reconsider prevailing paradigms, particularly the understanding of human nature. For centuries, philosophical materialism has dominated, reducing humanity to a mere collection of molecules driven solely by self-preservation. This reductionist perspective permeates our economic and political theories, overlooking the interconnectedness of individuals within society. As we confront pressing issues such as Climate Change and inequality, it becomes evident that existing models fail to

account for the complexities of human consciousness and its implications for societal change. Hussain persuasively argues that meaningful societal transformation hinges on a fundamental shift in human consciousness, transcending selfish individualism towards a more holistic perspective. While the book primarily focuses on Pakistan, its insights possess broader relevance as it challenges conventional wisdom, urging us to reevaluate our societal structures and relationships, and adopt a paradigm that prioritizes human welfare and environmental sustainability.

The second discussant, Haque, stated that Hussain's perspective diverges significantly from prevailing economic narratives that focus solely on top-down economic development. Instead, Hussain's advocacy for "human economy" argues for a bottom-up approach that prioritizes the needs of the majority, and focuses on small farmers and micro-small-medium enterprises. This shift towards a more inclusive economic model, centered on empowering marginalized communities, represents a departure from traditional top-down strategies. Thus, in essence, his perspective challenges us to rethink established paradigms and embrace a more human-centric approach to economic and societal development. However, he argued that other than the colonized elite, a critical hurdle for decolonization was state subscribed religious nationalism, which ignored the colonial experience by instituting another colonized subject, the 'Hindu India', as the Other.

“...human well-being and social justice stand as the fundamental aims of economic policy.”

:Dr. Hasan H. Karrar, an Associate Professor at the Mush-taq Ahmad Gurmani School of Humanities and Social Science, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) was invited to speak on **The Geopolitics of Infrastructure and Securitization** on February 14, 2024.



Karrar began the discourse by highlighting the presence of a large number of checkpoints in Gilgit-Baltistan despite the area being seemingly stable as compared to Baluchistan. The region is situated amidst the Karakoram high mountains, and shares borders with Afghanistan, China, and India. Before 1948, there had been no road links between down-country Pakistan and the Karakoram. An all-weather road known as the Karakoram Highway, was built in the 1960s. Since then, this arterial road has enabled outmigration for education and employment, and has spurred new markets, commercialization and tourist industries. It has led to the influx of political ideas, forming sectarian identities; and has spawned social justice and conservation movements.

He argued that these developments occurred under intense geo-political pressure, namely due to Pakistan's simmering territorial dispute with India, and its foreign and security policy alignment with China. These relationships with India and China, reflect Pakistan's geopolitical anxiety expressed in the form of internal securitization. Securitization is a state project enabled through infrastructure with the construction of Karakoram highway as material embodiment of statecraft i.e. a presentation of governmental authority and power. It bypasses normative laws allowing the state to transgress normative legal



and administrative structures. Quoting Carl Schmitt, he shared that after 9/11, normative and administrative structures were deemed inadequate in the face of emergencies, thereby creating a need for specific places of exception where government could transgress its own laws. This has been evident during colonial empires as well as in colonial statecraft, which marked exceptions for people living in the frontiers, as they were seen as primitive and unruly. Karrar argued that this approach to statecraft is visible in the Karakoram as the state is employing violence against individuals who are seen as working against a singular homogenizing national project. Rather than in extraordinary circumstances, non-normative statecraft is apparent in everyday life and serves as a backdrop to everyday experiences, routine movement, use of public space, lawful assembly and protest. He thus linked securitization of frontier spaces in the post-colony (post-colonial state) to non-normative colonial practices rather than charting a different path in an independent state.

Discussing the role of Pakistani military in the securitization process, Karrar highlighted the developmental and modernizing role of the General Ayub Khan regime in the 1960s, focusing on building infrastructure, like roads, in remote areas like the Karakoram region. Before these roads were built, places like the Karakoram were difficult to access, with only mule tracks and risky flights. Building roads was seen as crucial both for strategic and economic imperatives, as it helped the military secure disputed territories and brought these regions into the fold of modern development. The military didn't just build roads; they instilled modern practices including hygiene among local populations, echoing colonial enterprises, and its involvement wasn't just about construction but also power and control. Further, with improved expertise in building and maintaining roads, an organization called the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) was formed to handle these tasks.

Karrar highlighted that Pakistan and China had deepened their ties by connecting roads in the mid-1960s. This included the extension of Indus Valley Road to Hunza Valley and linking it to the Chinese road network. This cooperation evolved amidst geopolitical shifts, such as Pakistan's alignment with Western alliances like the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), as well as its growing proximity

to China due to conflicts with India and the Sino-Soviet split. Despite the initial distance maintained by Pakistan's leadership from Beijing, events like the disclosure of Pakistan's opposition to American actions in Vietnam and China's tacit support to Pakistan during the 1965 war with India, the two nations came closer together. The construction and subsequent securitization of the Karakoram Highway depicts Pakistan's increasing reliance on China, particularly evident in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This interdependence has significantly shaped the geopolitical landscape of the region, impacting local livelihoods and everyday life along the highway, with security measures reflecting the complexities of transnational investment regimes and regional geopolitics.



He further stated that Pakistan's geopolitical anxieties regarding the Karakoram region and its integration into the national polity, were aggravated both by Gilgit-Baltistan's (GB) Shia majority status in a Sunni majority Pakistan, and social protest movements demanding a constitutional status for GB. Elaborating the sharpening of sectarian divisions and violence, he highlighted Zia's widespread Islamization and the return of Sunni militias during the Afghan conflict to the region, notably the 1988 massacre in Jalalabad Valley, Gilgit. The Karakoram Highway has since become a site of repeated sectarian violence, particularly in the early 2000s. State's use of anti-terrorism legislation against activists demanding equal rights adds another layer of complexity. This backdrop sets the stage for the entry of Chinese capital under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While China's past contributions, such as



building the Karakoram Highway and aiding in natural disasters, have earned appreciation and goodwill, questions arise regarding the tangible benefits of BRI investments for local communities. Instead, concerns about environmental impact, loss of land, and unequal distribution of benefits demand critical inquiry into the real costs of development.

In conclusion, Karrar argued that geopolitical tensions and securitization have led to the creation of divisions between those considered part of the nation and those seen as outsiders, which has resulted in the state being the main source of conflict and violence.

“...after 9/11, normative and administrative structures were deemed inadequate in the face of emergencies, thereby creating a need for specific places of exception where government could transgress its own laws.”

Answering a question regarding the difference between China and Pakistan in terms of the securitization of Karakoram Highway, Karrar argued that securitization manifests differently in China and Pakistan, as influenced by their unique geopolitical dynamics. Pakistan’s geopolitical anxiety lies in wanting to secure capital from China as seen through projects like the Diamer Bhasha Dam, which is heavily securitized due to regional tensions. Conversely, in China, securitization extends beyond economic considerations to encompass broader national security imperatives such as securing territorial integrity and maintaining stability.

Answering a question related to Climate Change in this region, Karrar remarked that Climate Change has increasingly become intertwined with local discourse and competition. However, it is essential to differentiate between genuine Climate Change impacts and other factors that may be misattributed to it as misinterpretations often obscure the true understanding of effects of Climate Change.

:Raheem ul Haque, Assistant Professor at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance, was invited for the book launch of *De-securitize, De-colonize, Industrialize: A Manifesto for Structural Reforms* on February 20, 2024.



Initiating the conversation, Haque stated that the objective for writing the book was to highlight that Pakistan is not simply going through an economic crisis but a polycrisis of state and society, and thus expecting that a ‘Charter of Economy’ would resolve the crisis is misplaced. Instead, he highlighted that Pakistan has been going a holistic decline since the 1980s. This decline spans all spheres of life including: education where we have both an out of school children crisis as well as an education quality crisis; sports where other than cricket, we were once internationally competitive in squash, field hockey and boxing; our cities have deteriorated as the largest cities are either the top most polluted city or the most unlive-able city in the world; in the cultural sphere, the country produces but a fraction of films that it produced in the 1970s and one rarely sees Pakistani cultural products on Netflix; our work ethic is such that there is no trust left in society; and the list goes on.

He pinpointed that this holistic decline was an outcome of five societal normalizations, aspects which no longer elicit a shock from the general public as these are now a part of our daily life. These include the normalization of: physical, political and economic insecurity whereby a bombing, or going to IMF are accepted as ordinary; a weak civil society as the lack of student or labour representation (unions) is generally not just accepted but also

justified; militant religious nationalism whereby lynching or persecution in the name of religion is no longer an extraordinary news; the negation of critical thinking, culture and the arts is defended in the name of patriotism, nationalism or religion; and lastly professional dishonesty is often restricted to the aspect of corruption.

“ In 1978-79, debt interest payments took 8% of the consolidated state spending which had increased to 27% in 2020-21, while the share of development spending had decreased from 38% to 13% in the same period. ”

Haque stated that these normalizations were an outcome of the strategic direction of the state which have stayed unchanged since the 1980s even as an army dictatorship gave way to electoral democracy and various political parties formed the government. Pakistan had adopted a strategic policy framework premised on the Security State, militant religious nationalism and neoliberalism inspired market-centric economic paradigm, and unless this framework was changed, the decline could not be arrested irrespective of who exercised power in the country. The book was an exercise in the development of a political, socio-cultural, economic and institutional critique of the existing policy framework, and proposes a political program to transform it, which adorns the title of the book, ‘De-securitize, De-colonize, Industrialize’. It instead proposes an alternative policy framework encompassing a Developmental State which adopts civic nationalism anchored in the people’s Indo-Islamic civilizational roots while espousing a production centric paradigm as its economic strategy, which could get the country out of its current predicament.

Haque then gave a brief overview of each of the three aspects. He argued that the Pakistani state fit all the criteria for a security state as defined by various scholars and shared his operational definition of Pakistan’s Security State as “a state that defines its core values based on military ethos, using enemy rhetoric to give primacy to traditional security against all other state responsibilities; it maintains its hegemony through a corpus of security-

oriented state laws, intimidation, greater share in public financial resources, commercial enterprises, and religious ideology & groups that collectively undermine substantive democracy constitutive of: the rule of law, civil liberties, a vibrant public sphere & civil society, and political stability”. State spending was a good indicator in judging the evolution of state’s character. In 1978-79, debt interest payments took 8% of the consolidated state spending which had increased to 27% in 2020-21, while the share of development spending had decreased from 38% to 13% in the same period. He further argued that the defence budget shared in the parliament understated the size of defense spending by about one trillion rupees as it did not include military pensions, paramilitary expenses and many other budgetary heads such as the Atomic Energy Commission. However, the implications of Pakistan’s Security State went far beyond the usual focus on the defense budget (fiscal deficit) to also include an adverse impact on sovereignty, nation building, international stature, rule of law, ‘physical, political and economic security’ and civil liberties. This was because the (unelected) leadership of the Security State was unaccountable while all non-security institutions of state were subservient to it. Thus, a change in the strategic policy direction of the state was not possible within the existing state structure, and so the only possible avenue for progress was to dismantle the Security State and transform it into a Developmental State focused on citizen welfare through the generation of employment and human capital development.

“ ...Pakistan is not simply going through an economic crisis but a polycrisis of state and society, and thus expecting that a ‘Charter of Economy’ would resolve the crisis is misplaced. ”

The second requirement for state transformation was decolonization of the post-colonial state which had evolved into a Security State. He argued that Pakistanis were still treated like ‘subjects’ by the state. To transform them into ‘citizens’ required improved governance through a political plan that gave primary importance to the local (government, planning, knowledge, language, economy) and thus people. However, the state’s subscribed religious

nationalism was a hurdle in this regard as it used another colonized subject (the Hindu India) as the other, precluding a discussion on entrenched colonial structures and Decoloniality. He suggested that two-nation theory had been an outcome of the early 20th century Indian politics under colonial rule, which helped Muslims of North India to democratically win a separate country. However, by sanctifying it as the ‘Ideology of Pakistan’ amounts to being stuck in the politics of century past. He argued that although two-nation theory had been articulated within the territorial boundary of the Indian Sub-continent, its transformation into pan-Islamism had negated the Indo-Islamic civilizational roots of our identity. The adoption of a religion based national identity particularly in Punjab had led to an identity crisis with religious extremism as an outcome. He thus advocated for adopting civic nationalism for Pakistan’s nation building project as it would better cater for Pakistan’s diverse citizenry.



Lastly, discussing the aspect of Industrialization, Haque argued that Pakistan’s twin fiscal and trade crises were linked to the country’s weak production capacity and capability. He suggested that since the Bhutto era, Pakistani leaders have not devised a long-term plan for the economy, and disagreed that visions or medium-term development frameworks could be categorized as long-term plans. Instead, he argued that economic governance in Pakistan had been projectized, and left to the will of the market and policy prescriptions of the IFIs. Thus, for example, it made little difference to all governments that domestic capital was flowing into real-estate (not construction industry) raising land prices beyond the reach of even the middle class while making urban design un-

sustainable. Instead, it took away investments from employment generating productive sectors of the economy which could both decrease imports and increase exports. Additionally, he argued that the economic crisis could not be understood without taking into account the country’s governance crisis, where the elite civil service was considered an institution rather than (most) government departments as these departments had no leadership of their own, no plan for institutional reforms, capacity building or leadership succession.

In conclusion, Haque suggested that Pakistan needed structural reforms to arrest its ongoing decline. Population pressure, education and employment needs owing to country’s youth bulge, and increasing risks from Climate Change make it amply clear that business as usual would no longer work.

“...the economic crisis could not be understood without taking into account the country’s governance crisis, where the elite civil service was considered an institution rather than government departments.”

:Dr. Saifullah Sumbal, Director Southwest Region, Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks of the Government of Ontario, Canada, was invited to speak on **Intergovernmental Relations in a Federation and the Role of Civil Service - A Canadian Perspective** on March 6, 2024.



Sumbal initiated his talk by sharing the importance of intergovernmental relations within a federation. He argued that these relations are more important in a federation than in any other form of government, mainly because the federating units need to define relationships in terms of providing services, protection, business opportunities and economic development to their residents. Canada operates as a decentralized federation in a multi-level governance system: two levels of government were established by the Constitution Act of 1857, later updated in 1982. It comprises a national government, ten provinces, and three territories which hold subordinate status in relation to the provinces. Each province maintains a robust local government system, with nearly all local governments created through provincial legislation. He further added that the federation initially formed with just two provinces, with additional territories joining over time through separate agreements outlining their powers, authority, and responsibilities with relations to the federal government.

The Canadian government would identify itself as a confederation, a loose decentralized federation where provinces hold significant authority and are regarded as co-sovereign under the constitution. The provincial governments hold considerable political authority, particularly in areas like social protection, whereas the federal government

focuses primarily on regulating banking, currency, and engaging in trade negotiations with international partners. Two key influences have shaped the confederal landscape in Canada over the last 30 to 40 years. Firstly, the constitution grants the federal government broad spending authority, allowing it to invest in provinces and territories for various purposes including social services. The federation has exercised this power from time to time, particularly in provinces not well aligned with the federal government, and while this power has been challenged in the Supreme Court, still it has stayed intact since 1857.

Second remarkable feature of the Canadian setup is executive federalism, characterized by intergovernmental negotiations primarily led by executives from various levels of government in the federal system. For instance, provincial premiers, equivalent to chief ministers in Pakistan, shape the national agenda through discussions on matters of shared concern in the Council of Federation. This is preceded by discussions among senior civil servants representing various provinces who engage in discussions on a range of socioeconomic issues, to help formulate an agenda for provincial leaders, shaping the national policy direction and programs.

Discussing transfers from the federal government to federating units, Sumbal focused on the Equalization Program for social services and social protection, which is not constitutionally mandated but instead based on consensus. Accordingly, every few years a benchmark for social services is set and provinces assess their ability to meet these benchmarks through taxation. Provinces with insufficient funds receive additional support from the federal pool based on their fiscal needs. The equalization formula undergoes periodic review, typically every six to seven years, ensuring the program’s relevance and responsiveness to evolving needs and circumstances. In comparison, the lack of comparable services is leading to several social issues in Pakistan, for example, the rising population of Lahore is due to the collapse of social services in smaller urban centers. He credited the Equalization Program for addressing separatist sentiments in Quebec, a French-speaking province, by providing substantial funding and promoting national cohesion.

Sumbal stated that Canada’s local government framework further complements these efforts as municipalities, while

under provincial jurisdiction, wield considerable autonomy and responsibility in policy implementation. Each province has a Ministry of Municipal Affairs which establishes the legislative framework governing municipalities and supports their capacity-building efforts. Its role is limited to ensuring compliance with broader provincial regulations, spanning areas such as environment, agriculture, economic development, and public health.



There is an arm's length distance between the provincial and local governments in all provinces, and almost 60 to 65 percent of provincial policies and programs are implemented by local governments. While big policy decisions fall within the purview of provincial government such as major programs like infrastructure development, and the structure, roles, responsibilities, and financial authority of local governments; smaller policy matters such as waste management, local housing and local roads fall under the jurisdiction of local government. In terms of financing, property taxation serves as the primary source of municipal finance, encompassing residential, commercial, institutional, and industrial properties. Under provincial legislation, local governments allocate these funds primarily towards local education and health services. While provincial governments set education policies, municipalities have autonomy in implementing these policies, including curriculum decisions and skill development. Lastly, unlike provincial and federal elections, local governments are party-less where a candidate ideologically aligns with a particular party, but does not contest elections based on party affiliation.

Larger municipalities often innovate by collaborating with academia, think tanks, and international entities to ad-

dress complex issues. The Ministry of Municipal Affairs documents successful case studies and organizes regular gatherings to share best practices among municipalities. They also assist smaller municipalities in navigating government systems and fostering partnerships. This support involves coordination between municipal, provincial, and sometimes federal bureaucrats to devise and implement solutions. Additionally, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) serves as a unified voice for the 444 municipalities, ensuring that major policy changes are discussed and agreed upon democratically before implementation. This process is formalized through a memorandum of understanding between the association and the provincial government, establishing a platform for constructive dialogue and collaboration. Through this democratic process, municipalities collectively shape decisions that affect them and their residents, underscoring the effectiveness of their advocacy efforts.

“ Each province has a Ministry of Municipal Affairs which establishes the legislative framework governing municipalities and supports their capacity-building efforts. Its role is limited to ensuring compliance with broader provincial regulations,.. ”

Similarly, at the federal level, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) unites approximately 2,000 municipalities nationwide to advocate both to the federal and provincial governments. This collaborative effort has established a consistent arrangement across Canada: major infrastructure projects, such as municipal highways, roads, hospitals, and water supply systems, which are costly due to their specific standards, are funded through a tripartite agreement. Under this agreement, the federal government contributes one-third of the funding, the province provides another one-third, and the remaining one-third is contributed by the relevant municipality. Consequently, projects are executed and maintained according to the desired standards set by both the federal and provincial authorities. This arrangement ensures a comparable level of service across different regions. Moreover, the federal government retains spending power, occasionally injecting funds directly into projects, albeit with conditions at-



tached, ensuring that the work meets predetermined criteria.

In conclusion, Sumbal suggested that while Canada does have its own challenges and Pakistan’s context is relatively distinct, still Pakistan can learn from the overall division of power, and policy formulation and implementation in a three-tiered governmental system.

When asked to compare the culture of civil service between Pakistan and Canada, Sumbal responded that the civil service in Canada operates within a distinct transparency and accountability framework. Government resources, such as vehicles, are strictly regulated to prevent personal use, with electronic logs monitoring usage for official purposes, and personal use, if any. Unlike in Pakistan, where patronage and informal networks often influence promotions, Canada emphasizes a competitive application process based on merit. Additionally, Canadian civil servants do not have to directly indulge in public speaking and media interactions, rather they focus on efficient service delivery and responsiveness to citizen concerns through formal channels.

“Government resources, such as vehicles, are strictly regulated to prevent personal use, with electronic logs monitoring usage for official purposes, and personal use, if any.”


On the question of difference between the Council of Federation and the Council of Common Interest (CCI), Sumbal stated that the Council of Federation comprises all provincial and territorial premiers and operates as an informal forum for collaboration and dialogue among these leaders. It serves to discuss shared interests, coordinate policies, and foster cooperation on issues of mutual concern across provincial and territorial boundaries. Thus, it plays a crucial role in facilitating interprovincial and interterritorial dialogue but lacks a formal constitutional basis within the Canadian legal framework. In comparison, the CCI was established under the Constitution of Pakistan and has a more formalized structure. It includes representation from both the federal and provincial governments (though lacks territories like Gilgit Baltistan and

Azad Jammu & Kashmir). The CCI’s mandate is specifically designed to address disputes, oversee agreements, and coordinate efforts on matters that are of common interest to both the federal and provincial jurisdictions such as financial arrangements, legislative powers, and other critical aspects of cooperative federalism. He suggested that the difference between the two countries primarily lay in the institutionalization of democratic culture.







“...every few years a benchmark for social services is set and provinces assess their ability to meet these benchmarks through taxation.”



## Recent Publications



## CPPG's Publications Monographs



## Faculty Research

Khoso, Abdullah. "Social Machinery and Violence in the Process of Pakistani Migrant Workers' Migration from Pakistan to Malaysia." In *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Social Problems*, pp. 1-23. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2024.

**POSITION PAPER**

**Improving Governance Reforming Provincial Civil Service in Punjab**

**Dr. Saeed Shafiqat**  
Professor and Faculty Director  
Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
Former Chairman CPPG

**Controversial Remuneration Reform**

Improving governance requires to be a recurring theme for the provincial governments in Pakistan. However, the focus has remained on the higher civil services, which is biased in concept and scope, under the pretext of the need to attract the best talent. This is not the case in Punjab. The provincial governments have not taken any steps to make the provincial civil service more attractive. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the provincial governments have not taken any steps to improve the status of the provincial civil service. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the provincial governments have not taken any steps to improve the status of the provincial civil service.

**POSITION PAPER**

**Changing Dynamics of China-India Relations: CPCC and Prospects for Pakistan**

**Dr. Saeed Shafiqat**  
Professor and Faculty Director  
Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
Former Chairman CPPG

**ABSTRACT**

In the last few years, Pakistan and International relations, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is to bridge the gap between the two nations and to improve the economic relations in South Asia. In the last few years, Pakistan and International relations, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is to bridge the gap between the two nations and to improve the economic relations in South Asia.

**POLICY BRIEF**

**Senate Elections 2015: An Assessment and the Way Forward**

**Dr. Saeed Shafiqat**  
Professor and Faculty Director  
Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
Former Chairman CPPG

**Executive Summary**

The Senate elections were held on March 17, 2015. These were the 17<sup>th</sup> Senate elections since the formation of Pakistan in 1973. The Senate is the upper house of the Parliament of Pakistan. It is a permanent body and its members are elected for a term of six years. The Senate is the upper house of the Parliament of Pakistan. It is a permanent body and its members are elected for a term of six years.

**DISCUSSION PAPER**

**Bridging the Gender and Digital Divide in Post COVID-19 Pakistan: Empowering Women Through ICT**

**Dr. Saeed Shafiqat**  
Professor and Faculty Director  
Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
Former Chairman CPPG

**ABSTRACT**

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the gender and digital divide in Pakistan. Women are more vulnerable to the economic impact of the pandemic. This is due to their limited access to digital technologies and their limited participation in the digital economy. This is due to their limited access to digital technologies and their limited participation in the digital economy.

**IALOGUE REPORT**

**State, Democracy, Governance and Leadership**

**Dr. Saeed Shafiqat**  
Professor and Faculty Director  
Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
Former Chairman CPPG

**Executive Summary**

The report discusses the state, democracy, governance and leadership in Pakistan. It highlights the challenges and opportunities in the current political environment. It highlights the challenges and opportunities in the current political environment.

**LAHORE VISION 2035**

**Dr. Saeed Shafiqat**  
Professor and Faculty Director  
Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
Former Chairman CPPG

**Executive Summary**

The report discusses the vision for Lahore in 2035. It outlines the key areas for development and the role of the government and private sector. It outlines the key areas for development and the role of the government and private sector.

**Anti-Terror Laws, Policing and the Criminal Justice System: A Case Study of Anti Terrorist Efforts in Punjab**

**Dr. Saeed Shafiqat**  
Professor and Faculty Director  
Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
Former Chairman CPPG

**Executive Summary**

The report discusses the anti-terror laws, policing and the criminal justice system in Punjab. It highlights the challenges and opportunities in the current political environment. It highlights the challenges and opportunities in the current political environment.

**Reforming the Energy Sector of Pakistan: The Case of Punjab**

**Dr. Saeed Shafiqat**  
Professor and Faculty Director  
Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
Former Chairman CPPG

**Executive Summary**

The report discusses the reforming the energy sector of Pakistan. It highlights the challenges and opportunities in the current political environment. It highlights the challenges and opportunities in the current political environment.

**Informal Sector and Urban Policy**

**Dr. Saeed Shafiqat**  
Professor and Faculty Director  
Centre for Public Policy and Governance  
Former Chairman CPPG

**Executive Summary**

The report discusses the informal sector and urban policy in Pakistan. It highlights the challenges and opportunities in the current political environment. It highlights the challenges and opportunities in the current political environment.

### Visitors & Activities

January 4, 2024

CPPG organized a webinar on **The tale of a quarter century of economic governance in Pakistan: Is it headed to an economic blind street?** with Dr. Shafi U Khan Niazi, Monash University Australia.

January 11, 2024

CPPG organized a seminar on **Child Protection Governance in Pakistan: Challenges, Gaps, and Policy Choices** with Dr. Abdullah Khoso, Asst. Professor, CPPG, FCC.

18th January, 2024

CPPG hosted a Policy Dialogue on the **Social Welfare Policy for Punjab** draft, in collaboration with the Social Welfare and Bait-ul-Maal Departments of Punjab and UNICEF.

14 February, 2024

CPPG organized a seminar on **The Geopolitics of Infrastructure and Securitization** with Dr. Hasan H. Karrar, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS).

February 20, 2024

CPPG organized the launch of **De-securitize, De-colonize, Industrialize: A Manifesto for Structural Reforms** with Raheem ul Haque, Asst. Professor, CPPG, FCC.

February 22, 2024

CPPG hosted a monograph launch of **Juvenile Justice System Act 2018: Assessment, Analysis, and Capacity Building** by Dr. Rabia Chaudhry, Principal Investigator of the research project.

February 28, 2024

CPPG organized a seminar on **Mind the Gap. An Early Fault Line: Britain and China's Hunza Stalemate** with Dr. Julie Flowerday, Professor at Department of Sociology, FCC.

March 6, 2024

New England Commission of Higher Education (NECHE) team visited the Director CPPG, Dr. Saeed Shafiqat.

March 6, 2024

CPPG organized a seminar on **Intergovernmental Rela-**

tions in a Federation and the Role of Civil Service – A Canadian Perspective with Dr. Saifullah Sumbal, Director, Southwest Region of the Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Parks, Government of Ontario, Canada.

**March 7, 2024**

CPPG organized a book launch of **Towards a Knowledge Economy - National Innovation and Technology System of Pakistan** authored by Mr. Shahid Najam, Dr. Athar Mansoor and Mr. Rehmat Ullah.

**March 19, 2024**

CPPG hosted Kate Somvongsiri, **USAID Mission Director** and colleagues Shally Prasad, Director Democracy, Human Rights & Governance Office, Ali Muhammad and Arshia Bano.

**March 20, 2024**

CPPG organized a seminar on **Industry Competitiveness and Policy Environment in Pakistan: Agriculture Industry (Dairy) as a Lens** with Dr. Sosheel Solomon Godfrey, Charles Stuart University, Australia.

**April 16, 2024**

CPPG MPhil students & faculty did a study tour of the **Counter Terrorism Department (CTD)**, Punjab Police.

**April 17, 2024**

CPPG organized the book launch of **Hain Kawakib Kuch** with author Dr. Muhammad Ahsan Rana, LUMS.

**April 25, 2024**

CPPG organized a seminar on **Think Tanks and the US Policy in South Asia: Misperceptions and Realities** with Michael Kugelman, Director of Wilson Center's South Asia Institute.

**April 29, 2024**

CPPG hosted Dr. Fatima Sajjad, Director of the **Centre for Critical Peace Studies** & Chairperson of the Department of Political Science and IR at UMT.

**April 29, 2024**

The **9th DSMCMC batch** of Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS) visited CPPG for their advising session with faculty members.

**May 7, 2024**

CPPG organized a seminar on **National Commission for Minorities Act 2023: An Expectation for a Better Tomorrow** with Dr. Noel Khokhar HI(M), former Ambassador of Pakistan to Ukraine. Honorable former Chief Justice of Pakistan Tassaduq Hussain Jillani presided over the seminar.

**May 9, 2024**

CPPG organized the book launch of **Social Policy for Women in Pakistan** authored by Dr. Sara Rizvi Jafree, Department of Sociology, FCC.

**May 20, 2024**

CPPG organized the book launch of **A Leadership Odyssey: Muslim Separatism and the Achievement of the Separate State of Pakistan** authored by Dr. Sikandar Hayat, Distinguished Professor and Dean of Social Sciences at FCC.

**May 23, 2024**

Professor Jon Geir Petursson from the **University of Iceland** visited CPPG for a discussion session with both students and faculty.

**May 29, 2024**

CPPG organized a seminar on **The State of Pakistan Studies in the United States of America: The Role and Relevance of the American Institute of Pakistan Studies** with Dr. Matthew A. Cook, North Carolina Central University.

**June 4, 2024**

Director CPPG, Dr. Saeed Shafqat has a discussion with Sheikh Waqar Ahmad, Head of Corporate Affairs & Sustainability, **Nestle** at the Nestle Head Office, Lahore

**June 25, 2024**

CPPG hosted a delegation from the **Civil Services Academy (CSA) - Pakistan Administrative Service Campus** led by DG CSA Farhan Aziz Khawaja to discuss the 10th DSMCMC topics and themes.

**June 27, 2024**

CPPG Director & Faculty visited the **Punjab Information Technology Board (PITB)** to discuss collaborative opportunities with DG E-governance Sajid Latif, DG IT Solutions Waqar Qureshi & other PITB officers.

## Faculty & Staff

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## Board of Advisors

- : **Dr. Akmal Hussain**, a development economist specializing in action research. He runs a private manufacturing firm, Sayyed Engineers (Private) Limited.
- : **Dr. Saba Gul Khattak**, former Executive Director SDPI specializes in comparative politics and state theory.
- : **Dr. Anjum Khurshid (MD, PhD)**, Chief Data Scientist, Sentinel Operations Centre, Associate Professor, Department of Population Medicine. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute.
- : **Javed Masud**, former Managing Director and CEO The Pakistan Credit Rating Agency Limited.
- : **Jean-Luc Racine**, Senior CNRS Fellow at the Center for South Asian Studies, School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Paris focuses on geopolitics of South Asia.
- : **Kamran Rasool**, former Chief Secretary Punjab, Federal Defense Secretary and Chairman PIA.
- : **Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua** is a security studies expert specializing in defense decision-making and civil-military relations in South Asia.
- : **Dr. Adnan Rasool**, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee at Martin.

## Contact Us

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