

From the Director's Desk

Number 11 - 13
April 2011

Since 2009 the Centre for Public Policy and Governance (CPPG) has held several seminars and policy dialogues on Afghanistan. The Centre has not only encouraged diversity of views on the subject but also explored what experts have to offer on possible American exit strategy from Afghanistan and how that may affect Pakistan. In this Special Issue we have attempted to bring together diverging perspectives on the subject and also some actionable policy choices for policy maker's consideration. Besides putting together the narratives and arguments of our esteemed invited guest speakers/experts, we are also sharing an extensively researched article by our Senior Research Fellow. At the CPPG we are optimistic that our contribution will lead to a constructive dialogue on the possibilities and prospects of a post Afghanistan strategy for Pakistan. As a first step in this direction, this issue also proposes a framework for Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy for deliberation, dialogue and further actionable policy research. During the coming months we also plan to have a one Day Conference on the theme and would welcome any suggestion to make it meaningful and policy relevant.

Contents

Saving Pakistan: Devising an Agenda for Counter Terrorism Strategy	02
"Strategic Depth": Does It Promote Pakistan's Strategic Interests?	07
Seminar Series	
> US Exit Strategy for Afghanistan. What are the Implications for Pakistan?	25
> Afghanistan Policy: Challenges of Reconstruction and Development	30
> Endgame in Afghanistan: A Pakistani Perspective	34
Visitors & Activities	38
Faculty & Staff	40
Contact Us	40

Editorial Board

Dr. Saeed Shafqat
Raheem ul Haque



Saving Pakistan: Devising an Agenda for Counter Terrorism Strategy

: Dr. Saeed Shafqat

The three recent incidents, namely, Raymond Davis Affair (January 2011), capture of Osama Bin Laden from Abbottabad (May 2nd), and attack on Mehran Naval Base (May 22nd) in Karachi have shaken the foundations of Pakistani security establishment and alarmed public on the vulnerability of Pakistani State. It has created skepticism about the professional capabilities of the armed forces to protect their physical infrastructure, Pakistani air space and citizens. This has highlighted fissures within, and cast aspersions on the organization, command structure and capability of Pakistan military to respond and manage the terrorist challenge. These incidents have not only exposed the vulnerability but also raised questions about the competence, credibility and gaps in the chain of command of armed forces leadership. It has jolted China-Pakistan project on Gawadar and also produced vibrations between the already complex, multilayered and painfully enduring US and Pakistan relations. This manifest vulnerability demands a fresh look at our strategic goals and defense policies. Is it the flawed policies and jaundiced strategic vision that has made Pakistan vulnerable? Is it time to re-imagine and rethink security? I would argue for a five steps pronged approach; first, abandon Religious Militancy/Extremism as a policy tool, second, adopt peace as policy tool for internal harmony and regional collaboration, third, stay engaged with US and foster relations with China, fourth, shift away from 'India centric' to Chinese modal of realist pragmatism—avoiding conflict and pursuing trade. Finally, prioritize developing a framework for national counter terrorism strategy.

America, Afghan War and its Impact on Pakistan

As American and NATO forces make a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan starting summer of 2011 leading to a declared total disengagement by 2014; radicalism and governance are likely to gain new regional salience—improving transnational governance and security will increasingly fall upon Afghanistan, its neighbors and near neighbors (Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia and Central Asian States). These regional actors had been engaged in the Afghan war and its spillover effects—civil war, cross border terrorism and civil strife since the late 1970s. Pakistan has been and for the foreseeable future is likely to be a key player in the region. Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan

has led to transformative political, economic and social consequences at home. Breeding religious militancy, escalation in suicide attacks disrupting societal peace and harmony and deepening the crisis of governance. Over three million Afghan refugees moved into Pakistan and changed the demographic composition and culture of many parts of Pakistan: heroine trade, drug addiction, proliferation of portable arms and cross border terrorism emerged as serious new governance challenges. Consequently, over these decades a complex web of jihad, sectarianism and extremist groups become a potent force, changing the complexion of Pakistani State and society.

“ Is it the flawed policies and jaundiced strategic vision that has made Pakistan vulnerable? ”

A number of policy analysts have argued and conducted evidence based studies to expose the involvement of Pakistani state in cultivating and patronizing the religious right and militant groups. In the post 9/11 period Pakistan came under enormous pressure from the US and the Western Powers to break its 'perceived' and 'real' connections with the militant groups. Reluctantly and half heartedly, when the Pakistani State tried to rein in these groups under intense international pressure, a full scale insurgency erupted leading to more than 253 suicide attacks since 2002. Resultantly the socio-economic fabric of Pakistani State and society has been ruptured and disrupted. Under these conditions, the year 2011 could become a defining year for Pakistan to help stabilize Afghanistan and formulate a policy response to disrupt, destroy and dismantle Al Qaeda and Taliban led militant networks and ensure regional security. Are Pakistan and its policy makers ready to make such a strategic shift? That remains a critical question and demands dialogue, deliberation and actionable policy research.

Historically and current trends clearly show that for Pakistan and its policy makers defense and security concerns remain 'India centric'. There is considerable body of literature, which articulates that in pursuit of its security goals the Pakistani state has been cultivating and maintaining

links with militant religious groups. Pakistan has yet to demonstrate that it has made a clean break from its previous pattern. There is a growing awareness and realization among the civil society, academia and media circles that Pakistan needs to redefine its national security paradigm—move away from 'India centric' to a broader formulation of counter terrorism and combat home based radicalism. That would imply re-defining national interest and broadening the scope of national security framework—a framework which explores the modalities of engaging with India and opens up new avenues of academic research, policy dialogues and deliberation. That calls for developing some minimal consensus on an alternative policy framework by engaging all stakeholders including civil bureaucracy, political and military leadership, academia, researchers and civil society.

Let me sketch an outline of alternate policy framework that centerpieces on peace.

Pursuing Peace brightens Prospects of Internal Reform and Development

In the Realist world view State has primacy in the international system, invariably the prospects of peace are linked with resolution of external conflict—thus perpetual rivalry and prospects of war make conflict endemic. Ironically in South Asia and many other cases the states themselves have used the instrument of 'external enemy' to perpetuate rivalry and deflect and curb inner peace and societal reform. Consequently, internal culture of peace, tolerance and harmony has suffered stagnation. Lack of culture of peace has been used by states to perpetuate insecurity syndrome, animosity and hatred of the other. Thus the notion of 'external enemy' has often been used to create an impression of domestic order and internal peace, but this has neither curbed social injustices nor led to sustainable development. While at times, external conflicts have forced leaders to restrict the needed reforms for internal peace. For example, In the 1920's British India witnessed two models of peaceful reform; first the Gandhian Model which propounded non-violence and communal harmony; second E. V. Ramaswami Naiker's model of Self-Respect, calling for restoring the dignity of the lowest of the low and marginalized-- the Adivasis. Neither was particularly successful. But looking at growth, development, innovation and relative peace in South India it appears Naiker's model has provided better development dividend to South

India, which appears to have an edge in education, innovation and development and offers better opportunity for peace, growth and sustainable development.

“Pakistan needs to redefine its national security paradigm— move away from 'India centric' to a broader formulation of counter terrorism and combat home based radicalism.”

The examples of Britain vs. Germany vs. France and France vs. Britain as perpetual rivals and 'enemies' until the end of Second World War is yet another and often quoted historical narrative. Was it death, destruction, and demolition of their economies as a result of the two World Wars or internal peace, growth, reconstruction and rejuvenation of their communities in the post World War period that brought home the salience of peace and creation of the European Union? There is considerable evidence to suggest that more than perpetual rivalry and animosity, its internal reform and conditions enabling the promotion of culture of peace that encouraged regional cooperation and led to the founding of the European Union.

Modern China offers another example, where internal peace and reform have paved the way for economic growth and rise of China. A China that opposes cross border violation and encourages cross border cooperation—a China that is at peace within, in the region and globally.

These examples clearly show that for peace, internal reforms are a necessary pre-condition. It is thus important for both Pakistan and India to rethink their current relationship of perpetual conflict and animosity. Both countries are confronted with internal insurgencies, violence and terrorism and yet continue to make exorbitant defense expenditure to combat an 'external enemy'. Changing this mind set demands a structural change – a change from an economy of war to an economy of peace and that implies internal reform. This also means cross border and proxy wars must be replaced by cross-border cooperation. The negotiations and troubles for Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline continue, while the recent signing of Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) energy pipeline agreement is a step in the right direction.

“...important for both Pakistan and India to rethink their current relationship of perpetual conflict and animosity.”

For internal peace, expanding economic opportunity and improving social justice needs to be recognized which takes quality of manpower as a pre-requisite and requires investments in human resources. Citizen security, citizen welfare and drive for promoting internal harmony and peace would encourage a culture of peace. By incentivising peace for self growth, community development, internal reform and prosperity, a culture of peace and economic growth would gain momentum. It is only improvement in quality of life which instills the value for life, respect for the well being of fellow citizens and possibly curbing and deflating tendency towards violence and terrorism. But most importantly, it is the democratic process which promotes evolutionary change through negotiated settlements and resolves conflicts on resource allocation that eventually leads to internal peace. That is where Pakistan and South Asia need a Cultural Revolution, where peace is cherished and conflict is abhorred, where upholding cultural values and territorial integrity gains respect, where intractable conflicts are managed and resolved through negotiation and non-violence and brutal force of the State is curbed. With out internal reforms, promoting a culture of peace will remain a distant goal. Imagining new South Asia demands imagining a culture of peace and that implies dismantling, disrupting and destroying the nexus of poverty, social injustice and economic inequities.

Is there a Way Forward? Yes,

- First, it is time to review and abandon any and all backing of Militant/Jihadi groups/networks. Pakistani State has to make a clean break on this issue.
- Second, any and all sanctuaries for militant groups must be destroyed and dismantled. Both the State and Civil Society need to act in concert to demonstrate zero tolerance for any form of terrorist activity/group.
- Third, Kerry-Lugar Act demands a more robust consultation and debate among Pakistani civil society to effectively utilize the support for democratic and social sector development that the Act offers. Pakistani

Government needs to develop a broad consensus on Energy, Governance, Education and Health as key areas for cooperation with the US on priority basis. Through internal political consultation, a priority list of areas on which the country needs support be created and a shared vision for cooperation and support in social sector is developed with the US.

- Fourth, Pakistan needs to initiate a national dialogue on reviewing the status of the Durand Line and that implies assessment of entire FATA policy. Through consultative process in KPK and at the federal level we need to embark on a policy where by Durand line is defined as a boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is going to be a cumbersome and tedious process and we will need to show patience and prudence to achieve our goal. A well defined border with Afghanistan would be a step forward in curbing cross border terror and terrorist sanctuaries.
- Finally, on Baluchistan we need to come clean on providing sanctuaries to Afghan Taliban leadership and the issue of 'missing persons'—its alleged that Intelligence Agencies have been involved in human rights violations and abducting opponents of the military in the province. Many analysts point out that there is a low level 'separatist insurgency' and that needs to be addressed politically. Baluchistan Package was a good beginning but the implementation process has yet to take off, therefore it is time to take into cognizance the issue of rights, representation and protecting the interests of Baluchs of different tribes and origins. Over the years a policy of benign neglect in Baluchistan has alienated the people from the Pakistani state and that demands a comprehensive and sustainable development plan for the province.

Next Steps: Strategic Vision and Counter Terrorism Strategy

To pursue this alternate framework, Pakistan needs to develop a counter terrorism strategy. At the global level that implies despite challenges and agonizing differences, staying engaged with the US and consolidating relations with China. Taking cognizance of primacy of relations with the US, Pakistan needs to develop a strategic vision that explores at least five areas of mutual cooperation and shared understanding; First, institutional development, second, intra-governmental and civil-military institutional

coordination, third, data sharing, fourth, international institutional collaboration and fifth, assessing shared needs and developing a research agenda based on the needs and threats identified. In defining the principles and guidelines of its counter terrorism strategy, National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) needs to assess extremism and terrorism at three levels; the local level and its domestic context; regional level includes neighboring countries in the analysis to appraise the regional situation; and lastly the global level, the global context is the most intricate and troublesome; which increasingly perceives and identifies Pakistan as the epicenter of terrorism.

“Lack of culture of peace has been used by states to perpetuate insecurity syndrome, animosity and hatred of the other.”

In terms of research and policy prescription, the initial step towards devising a counter terrorism strategy requires an in depth study on threat assessment for Pakistan emerging from domestic and external sources. To initiate a process of consultation and policy formulation, following ten areas are suggested:

1. **Demographic:** It explores the nexus between youth bulges, poverty and inequality and how a combination of these makes large populations in general and youth in particular vulnerable to conflict. Given 67% of the Pakistani population is under the age of 30 with limited prospects of employment increases the possibility of conflict. The hugely unequal class structure of society further aggravates social, ethnic and economic tensions, which promotes politics of protest, agitation and mass mobilization.
2. **Ideology, Infrastructure & the Cold War:** The proliferation of religiosity; politicization and later militarization of Islam has changed the ideological nature of religious practice; both have created space for extremism in society; producing a small but belligerent cadre of ideologically motivated militants (who have captured the madrassa system and penetrated in the public and private sector educational institutions) who have built a vast religious infrastructure to promote their brand of militant Islam.
3. **Psychological:** An all encompassing religious identity had led to a belief based world view, viewing social and political issues in terms of contrasting belief system thus requiring defense of one's belief against non-believers. Thus religious belief not only shapes narrow identity but also influences the understanding of worldly and scientific matters through the prism of belief, inducing violence against the 'other' and trivializing evidence based, rational and scientific knowledge. What is inexplicable through belief is explained through conspiracy syndrome; increasingly the challenge in Pakistan is developing credence for knowledge base.
4. **Hate Literature & Curriculum:** More than 80% of the student population is enrolled in public schools and there is growing evidence that their world view is shaped by the curricula that is taught to them. This curriculum and other hate literature need to be assessed carefully to understand if it is tied to the ideology promoted by the state. Specific policy choices and Shariah Laws that the state promulgated need to be examined methodically to assess the severity of threat arising from this problem (refer to 8th Amendment).
5. **Hate Speech & Media:** The advent of private electronic media roused hope and expectation of freedom of speech, diversity of information and knowledge and the making of an effective watch dog. It has increasingly become a powerful instrument of indoctrination. In the absence of established rules and ethics of journalistic professionalism and ineffective regulation of programming guidelines, it has at times led to blatant hate speech and promotion of a particular ideology.
6. **Urban Growth & Unregulated Territories:** In South Asia, Pakistan is considered to be the most rapidly urbanizing state (35% of Pakistan is urban). Urban centers are becoming breeding grounds of urban insurgency (Karachi since the 1990s and more recently). This demands better understanding of urban centers, laws and institutions that govern them. Increasingly, the

unplanned and unequal growth of cities has left them wide open for criminality. Similarly peripheral territories where either State regulation is lacking by design (PATA, FATA) or writ of the State is minimal are turning into sanctuaries for 'abandoned fighters', militants and even criminals. At least four cities, namely, Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad and Peshawar are important entry and exit points for migration and international travel and this flow needs to be carefully researched.

7. **Expatriates & Global Networks:** A large number of Pakistanis reside outside the country in alien cultures. Depending on the country of residence, their stay could lead to indoctrination in a harsher brand of religious ideology (Saudi Arabia), a born again religious worldview in reaction to the perceived moral laxity of society or militant Islamist worldview in reaction to the perceived injustices of the world order perpetrated by the host country (West). The global networks providing linkages among expatriates and various domestic and international groups' need to be assessed.
8. **Proxy Wars:** As a consequence of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution (1979), the territory of Pakistan and adjacent areas have been used for proxy wars by Saudi Arabia, Iran, US, Britain and India either in competition with activities of Pakistani intelligence agencies in their respective country or in competition with one another. The impact of events of 1979 and intelligence wars needs to be scrutinized dispassionately.
9. **Weaponization & Privatization of Security:** With the rise of insecurity in the country, there has been privatization of security functions leading to proliferation of portable weapons and increased weaponization of society. A lack of legislation and regulation has further enhanced the problem. Private armed guards and private militias have become a way of life for the powerful and privileged. This demands careful examination.
10. **State Role:** The role of the state is changing in Pakistan or is it? It is adapting and changing according to global demands. Pakistani state has the dubious distinction of 'sponsoring terrorism'. It has been alleged,

insinuated and sometimes researchers and reporters have provided evidence that Pakistani state has 'cultivated particular religious groups', promoted 'fundamentalist ideology', sponsored specific religious groups and organizations and continues to follow a policy of 'deliberate ambiguity' on its role and relationship with militant groups. A systematic examination of these dimensions of state could help us in appraising the severity of threats allegedly emanating from its role and thereby assist in re-strategizing the role of the state.

“Pakistan and South Asia need a Cultural Revolution, where peace is cherished and conflict is abhorred, where upholding cultural values and territorial integrity gains respect, where intractable conflicts are managed and resolved through negotiation and non-violence, and brutal force of the State is curbed.”

Executive MA in Public Policy

Admissions Open for the 2011-12 Batch

Open House on Thursday, July 07, 2011

“Strategic Depth”: Does It Promote Pakistan’s Strategic Interests?

: Raheem ul Haque

In assessing Pakistan’s response to the ongoing ‘global war on terrorism’ in Afghanistan, this paper presents two sets of arguments; first, I argue that Pakistan’s strategic interests constituting secure and peaceful borders along with internal strength, development and prosperity, are annulled rather than furthered by the Strategic Depth policy framework, adopted and pursued for the last three decades. Although this framework has allowed Pakistan to maintain a semblance of regional military power balance with India, yet it has led to a rise of extremism and militancy within Pakistani society and to a loss of internal sovereignty. Today, this flawed policy has created conditions that have made Pakistan a sanctuary for ideological non-state actors. Second, with an in-depth analysis and scrutiny of factors and actors in the three decades of the Afghan war theatre, I submit that Strategic Depth is an outcome of the institutionalization of Ideological Guardianship mindset within Pakistan Army during the Zia years, and its continuation has led to civil-military power imbalance which needs to be altered to secure Pakistan from militancy and terrorism. Democratic consolidation, peace, prosperity and sustainable development in Pakistan hinges on abandoning the flawed, failed and nationally injurious policy of Strategic Depth.

Overview: from Muslim to Islamic

Pakistan was born with undefined and problematic boundaries. On the Eastern front it inherited the Kashmir dispute with India and on the Western front the Durand Line¹, which divided the Pashtuns between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Given the Pashtun ethnic factor, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remained bitter but generally bearable. For example, at the time of independence Afghanistan was the only country that opposed Pakistan’s entry into the UN, yet, over the year’s transit trade between the two counties has rarely been discontinued. On the other hand, relations with India have largely remained adversarial to hostile, punctuated by border skirmishes to outright wars (1965 and 71, while 1999 Kargil is recognized as a limited conflict). The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war and the resultant break of Pakistan had three consequences for South Asia. First, India emerged as the ‘dominant power’ of the region, second that intensi-

fied Pakistan’s insecurity syndrome leading to an illusive search for Strategic Depth, third, although it shook the foundations of “Two Nation Theory”, Pakistan still began to drift towards Islamization through invoked fears of ‘Hindu India’. All this obliterated Jinnah’s vision of liberal, secular and democratic Pakistan. Although the process had begun with the adoption of Objectives Resolution in 1949, anti-Ahmedia riots in 1953, Pakistan’s joining of anti-Communist block, SEATO and CENTO pacts, however, it accelerated through State sanction in post 1971 Pakistan with the passage of bill (1974) declaring Ahmedi as ‘non-Muslim’, the religious parties led PNA movement against the PPP government in March-April 1977 and General Zia- ul Haq’s military coup in July—who was quick to announce that Pakistan was an ‘Ideological State’², thus Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan was deconstructed³.

Institutionalization of Ideological Guardianship within the Military: 1978 - 1989

General Zia-ul-Haq’s rise in Pakistan coincided with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Socialist Revolution in Afghanistan supported by Russian forces. He had been quick in revealing his ‘Islamist and fundamentalist’ streak when he changed the army’s motto from Jinnah’s ‘Unity, Faith, Discipline’ to ‘Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi sabeelillah’ (Faith, Obedience of God, Struggle in the path of Allah) as army chief.⁴ Following the coup, he went full pace in Nifaz-e-Islam (the implementation of Islam) making the army not just the guardian of territorial but also the ideological frontiers of Pakistan.⁵ Zia aligned himself with the Islamist Jamaat-Islami, inducted its cadres in state institutions, while manipulated his core constituency, the Army through promotion and incentivization of religiosity, even allowing Tableeghi Jamaat to preach in the military academy. More importantly, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) which had developed links with Jamaat-e-Islami during the era of General Yahya Khan (1969-71) to counter mainstream PPP, NAP and National Awami League⁶, became directly responsible for operational, logistical and psychological warfare during the US and Saudi-Arabia sponsored Afghan Jihad. This network was instrumental in churning out 80,000 warriors between 1982 and 1987⁷. By most accounts ISI emerged as the sole conduit of funds to Afghan Mujahideen and encapsulating both Operations

and Intelligence functions, it became independently powerful and resourceful growing in strength from 2000 employees in 1978 to 40,000 with a \$1bn budget in 1988⁸. The distribution of funds and linkages to Afghan groups based solely on being more Islamist and pro-Pakistan⁹ helped it take on an ideological character. Thus as Saudi Arabia matched America's funding for the Afghan war, in reality Zia's Islamization drive would be better categorized as 'Wahabization' of Pakistani State and society¹⁰. Additionally, during this decade use of ideology emerged as a potent factor in regional and global politics.

“...encapsulating both Operations and Intelligence functions, ISI became independently powerful and resourceful growing in strength from 2000 employees in 1978 to 40,000 with a \$1bn budget in 1988.”

The 1980s also saw the rise of an ideological US president Ronald Reagan, thus providing an ideological affinity for the Pak-US leadership. This affinity was to play a crucial role in subsequent years on the formation and emergence of Taliban and the internationalist Al-Qaeda. While the situation fit the strategic interests of both America to counter the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia to counter Iran—giving it overt sectarian overtones. On the other hand, Pakistan played the role of a client state accepting America's strategic interest of defeating the Soviet Union rather than securing its Western border; simultaneously, accepting thousands of Islamic radicals from other countries and putting up hundreds of 'militant training cells' to generate the radicalized manpower needed for this task. There was little realization about the cultural consequences to a plural and a relatively peaceful society. Rather than finding a political solution to the Afghan imbroglio to end war and its consequences as suggested by the Russians as early as 1983¹¹, Pakistan pressed on with America's strategic interests to defeat the Russians in Afghanistan only to sign on the Geneva Accords in 1988. After fulfilling its strategic interests in Afghanistan, America left the region leaving behind a war torn country, millions of refugees and thousands of trained Islamist militants while additionally splashing sanctions on Pakistan soon

after for its nuclear program. This period thus involved an overt State sponsorship of Islamist ideology, full throttle international support for ideological non-state militants (the Mujahideen) and institutionalization of Ideological Guardianship within the army.

“...the Strategic Depth policy became the practical manifestation of strategic interests understood through the prism of Ideological Guardianship of Pakistan military.”

Manifestations of Ideological Guardianship in Strategic Depth: 1989 - 2001

The third phase of Pakistan's history began with a transition to democracy rather than a fundamentalist ideologue at the helm, however, the ideological tilt of the military lingered on; first, the army ventured to undercut the liberal PPP in elections through the formation of an alliance of rightist parties—Islami Jamhuri Ittehad (IJI), then it dictated terms for government formation¹² and eventually it brought an aligned political party to power. Zia's ideological focus continued with the new army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Baig, who disregarded Pakistan's territorial interests by wanting to sell nuclear know how to Iran, but the deal was rejected even by the ideologically aligned civilian leader¹³. The Soviet failure and eventual withdrawal provided further impetus to the framework of Jihad—the nexus of Islamist ideology and the use of non-state actors. Thus as the Kashmiri rose in open revolt against Indian policies and a rigged election, rather than strengthening the nationalist movement to build internal and international impetus to resolve the tripartite issue, Pakistan instead wrested the struggle away in favor of an ideological framework¹⁴ negating the territorial aspect of undefined boundary and nationalist aspirations at the heart of the issue. The surplus manpower and infrastructure of the Afghan war was redirected to the Kashmiri struggle with the confidence that if a superpower could be defeated so could India.¹⁵ The ideological aspect was pushed to its logical conclusion by Zia's civilian protégé, Nawaz Sharif with the appointment of an Islamist ideologue (General Javed Nasir, who had connections with Tableeghi Jamaat) to head the ISI thus extending Jihad operations beyond

Afghanistan and Kashmir. It was only after the fall of civilian government that the existing military dispensation removed the ISI chief and sent personnel back to their regular army units, but only when Pakistan was threatened with being declared a terrorist state¹⁶.

The concept of Strategic Depth evolved and was promoted under these broad considerations. With the US departure; Afghanistan still in shatters, the Western front gradually became an extension of Pakistan's battle with India. The institutionalization of Ideological Guardianship was based on the fear of India invoked in religious terms; the non-state actors were galvanized as ideological weapons and the second line of defense against India. This provided a rationale for the option of strategic space in Afghanistan to safeguard military assets against India. Its practical manifestation was the pursuit of an illusionary and flawed policy of Strategic Depth. With Jihad now transformed into a civil war among former Mujahideen leaders, Pakistan shifted its support¹⁷ to an alternative Pushtun movement of Taliban (Deobandi Madrassa students) to bring peace in Afghanistan. While the march through Pushtun areas into Kabul was easy, the diversity of Afghanistan either afforded peace of the dead or a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian broadening of the Taliban, an impossibility within the Taliban's ideological framework. As Pakistan became one of only three countries (in addition to UAE and Saudi-Arabia) to recognize the Taliban government, Afghanistan instead became a regional battleground. Still, even a dependent Afghan government refused to accept the territorial integrity of its neighbor¹⁸ and there was no change in the Afghan position on Durand Line. Rashid argues otherwise stating that Durand Line was never a priority for Pakistan because a fixed border would amount Strategic Depth as blatant interference in another State. He further states that even though the UN was inclined to resolve the Durand Line issue during Geneva talks in 1988, Pakistan never raised the issue then or during the decade that Pakistan proxies ruled Afghanistan¹⁹. Thus the Strategic Depth policy became the practical manifestation of strategic interests understood through the prism of Ideological Guardianship of Pakistan military. This policy had four components; first, an undefined boundary—retaining the contested Durand Line, second, ensuring a friendly regime in Afghanistan, third, curbing Pashtun separatism and nationalism through Islamism, fourth, ensuring a safe

sanctuary for training ideological non-state actors for Pakistan's regional policy objectives.

Although Pakistan's connections with few internationalist Jihadi groups continued because of their convergence of interest in supporting the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, they were not a part and parcel of the Strategic Depth framework as conflicting reports appeared in regards to Pakistan's policy towards Al-Qaeda. On the one hand, Osama Bin Ladin's training camp 'The Lions Den' in Afghanistan reportedly also trained ISI linked local Jihadist groups, on the other, Pakistan also repatriated foreign Jihadists to their countries in 1993.²⁰ Yet, another report indicates that just before the 1999 military coup the Prime Minister of Pakistan had agreed in principle to support the American effort to nab Osama Bin Ladin.²¹

“...the use of ideology by the State disallowed any comprehensive counter terrorism strategy while trained militants changed garbs and seamlessly moved between overtly sectarian and Jihadi organizations,”

The internal cost of Ideological Guardianship combined with privatization and outsourcing of military functions (Jihad) started to be felt in the 1990s²². The proliferation and militarization of Deobandi-Wahabi mosque-madrassa network grew in parallel to Khomeini inspired Shia mobilization deepening the sectarian divide within Pakistan. This had an impact on the more peaceful and Sufi tradition inspired Barelvis, who also resorted to militarization to protect their interests²³. As Saudi-Iran funded proxies battled it out, the use of ideology by the State disallowed any comprehensive counter terrorism strategy while trained militants changed garbs and seamlessly moved between overtly sectarian and Jihadi organizations, some hunted while others supported and funded by the paradoxical security environment. The sectarian divide had become pronounced much earlier as even General Zia ul Haq had to concede that some Ulema were using the Anti-Ahmedia Ordinance to fan sectarianism²⁴. Thus it was not a surprise when a decade later an ideological ally, the Taliban refused to hand over sectarian terrorists

enjoying sanctuary in Afghanistan while the same person (Riaz Basra of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) had earlier 'disappeared' from the courts in Pakistan²⁵. The level of accountability for ideologically aligned non-state actors can be judged from the fact that a Jihadi commander (Qari Saifullah Akhtar) implicated in an internal military coup in collusion with military officers was let go while the officers were incarcerated.²⁶ In total 997 were killed and 2,523 were injured in sectarian violence from 1989–2000.²⁷ Furthermore, Pakistan's sectarian Jihadist connections had raised tensions with neighbor Iran as the killing of the Iranian Counselor General in Lahore²⁸ and the killing of Iranian Consulate Staff in Mazar-e-Sharif were blamed on groups linked to Pakistan's intelligence agency.

Thus during this period, the Strategic Depth framework based on the internalization of Ideological Guardianship within the military and the institutionalization of non-state actors as a tool for furthering it gained momentum. Resultantly, there emerged a Jihad Industry with numerous militant organizations, some proxies of the Pakistani state and others driven by their own independent agenda. These organizations competed for battlefield success, publicized their ideology and adventures through more than a hundred publications²⁹ while generating funds through State patronage, and international and domestic private contributors³⁰.

Territorial versus Ideological Guardianship: The Aftermath of 9/11

The dawn of Sept 12, 2001, while changing the strategic interests of the West did not alter the existing regional game play where the Pakistan-Saudi alliance backing the Taliban was pitched against the Iran-India-Russia alliance supporting the Northern Alliance throughout the 1990s. Additionally, Afghanistan had become a sanctuary of global Jihadi groups-- including Pakistani, Arab, Uzbek, Chechen, Uighur Chinese and others, each pursuing its own agendas.

Faced with territorial threat from the sole superpower, the head of ISI agreed to all American demands in Washington. But he was one of the four generals to argue against pulling out support for the Taliban in favor of America in the Corps Commander meeting³¹. While tactically Pakistan had changed its position to safeguard the home terri-

tory, still the military deeply imbued in Strategic Depth ideology over the last two decades needed time to rethink its future options in the region now that America had become an active player. Additionally the Jihad infrastructure created over these years needed just the right compromise to avoid a blowback. This explained General Musharraf's defensive speech to the nation supporting the American "War on Terror", literally abandoning the Taliban, but sheepishly shielding Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons and the Kashmir Policy, while ensuring that Pakistan was not declared a state sponsoring terrorism or was encircled by India. Pakistan accepted most American demands, breaking diplomatic ties and logistical support for the Taliban, providing bases, over flight and landing rights, and sharing of intelligence on key Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders among others³². But while getting billions in military and economic aid³³, Pakistan's strategic interests of a friendly Afghan government through inclusion of moderate Taliban³⁴ (who disown Al-Qaeda) or Hizb-e-Islami³⁵ did not find any ears and instead a Northern Alliance dominated government was formed in Kabul.

General Musharraf was quick to conduct a military shakeup rooting out Generals who had disagreed with his policy shift and disbanding two main units of the ISI with links to Islamist militants³⁶. Against intense American pressure, Pakistan moved 80,000 soldiers to the Afghan border to stem and capture Al-Qaeda operatives entering into Pakistan. According to Rashid, Pakistani military was careful not to place security forces at the border adjoining Warizistan or Baluchistan, implying it allowed Al-Qaeda operatives' access to Waziristan³⁷. While Pak-US intelligence worked closely to capture Al-Qaeda, Pakistani or Afghan Taliban who had been furthering Pakistan's policy objectives in the region were not touched and simply went home or to the mosque-madrassa establishments that facilitated them. Furthermore some 500-1000 men fighting the Americans to a standstill were airlifted from Kunduz as a personal favor to Musharraf in late November³⁸. A complete strategic re-alignment had yet to come as the military safeguarded its assets either because its strategic interests still required them or because it considered the risk to take on the complete ideological network it had molded for twenty years as too high. Pre-empting Pakistan's policy agenda, the ideological groups conducted a master stroke on December 13, 2001 (Tora Bora fell on

December 16) with an attack on the Indian parliament forcing Pakistan to stop troop deployment to the Afghan border³⁹ and for Pakistan to reflect on who its ally and foe were as Pakistan army came face to face with the largest Indian troop mobilization since 1971⁴⁰ as more than 1,000 Al-Qaeda operatives slipped through the border⁴¹.

“ ..attack on Musharraf clearly indicated a nexus between the Punjabi Taliban and Al-Qaeda while showing their penetration in the armed forces as more than fifty Air Force personnel linked to JeM were charged.”

The Afghan chess board which was dominated by the Pakistan-Saudi-Taliban alliance throughout the 1990s was shuffled overnight following the US and NATO engagement. America initially needed and then supported the Iran-India proxy-- the Northern Alliance to dominate the Kabul government. Iran looked the other way as its arch foe America dismantled Taliban in Afghanistan. India began making strategic investments worth more than \$1.2bn⁴², constructing road infrastructure (connecting Iranian port Charbahar to Central Asia thus bypassing Gawadar), telecom facilities which used Indian satellites and re-opening four consulates especially Qandahar and Jalalabad close to the Pakistan border⁴³. Pakistan while logistically supporting the American “War on Terror” and capturing Al-Qaeda was unsure of its future course of action. With the history of American cut and run in 1989, its own strategic interests unchanged, its rivals gaining ground and most importantly a society socialized to the Islamist discourse through twenty years of Jihad propagation and Taliban eulogizing by Army establishment in cahoots with right wing forces, Pakistan dithered to make a clean break with the Taliban as it would have demanded a complete reorientation of its ideological strategic outlook.

Policy Ambivalence and the Making of FATA Insurgency: 2002 - 2006

With the changed post 9/11 scenario, Pakistan could not keep its Kashmir policy of using non-state actors intact for too long especially after Kashmiri Jihadi groups were implicated in the attack on Indian Parliament in Decem-

ber 2001. The attack forced Pakistan to ban Kashmir oriented Jihadi groups⁴⁴, however, these groups moved their training camps to Azad Kashmir or FATA continuing training till at least March 2004⁴⁵. The 3000 arrested members of banned organizations were freed after a month⁴⁶ but continued American pressure forced demobilization of Kashmiri militants in 2003-04⁴⁷ and closing of the intelligence's Kashmir Cell by 2004 without extensive de-weaponization or rehabilitation. The great majority of Kashmir centric Jihadi organizations drew their manpower from Punjab. Most of these groups had trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan where their leaders rubbed shoulders with Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. While the ideologically imbued secular institution of Pakistan Army took its time deciding between its ideological inclination and territorial necessity, the Punjabi Taliban no doubt were clear about the ideological basis of their cause. Few restrained (Lashkar-e-Taiba) under the ISI umbrella, others split (Jaish-e-Mohammad - JeM) or moved wholesale (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) into the Al-Qaeda camp. Christian and American installations were the initial target of these groups across Pakistan in 2002 till they regrouped in Waziristan. It was only after General Pervez Musharraf came under attack in December 2003, that Pakistan military began to review its policy of maintaining connections with Jihadi groups. This attack clearly indicated a nexus between the Punjabi Taliban and Al-Qaeda while showing their penetration in the armed forces as more than fifty Air Force personnel linked to JeM were charged.⁴⁸ Various senior Kashmir Jihad leaders were picked up and interrogated further increasing the gulf between the once partners. This led highly trained guerrillas along with master strategists such as Ilyas Kashmiri of the 313 Brigade to join the Afghan war theatre in 2005⁴⁹. Although Kashmiri argued that he would not go against Pakistan's interests, still the strategic guidance to Punjabi/Kashmiri groups based in Waziristan was now being provided by Al-Qaeda rather than the ISI.

On the political front, the Islamist and religious parties who came together under the banner of ‘Defense of Afghanistan Council’⁵⁰ and later took the shape of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (a conglomeration of Deobandi, Wahabi, Shia and Barelvi parties but effective power lay with the larger JUI & JI) came to power in Khyber Pukhtoonkha (NWFP) and Baluchistan. Several factors contributed to

the emergence of MMA—its open anti-American stance, exclusion of PPP and PML- N leadership from electoral process (while Azam Tariq, the head of Sipah-e-Sahaba was allowed to contest from his jail cell), the requirement of a Bachelors degree while accepting madrassa degrees. All these factors demonstrated that the military government was falling back on its ideological proxies to cobble together a pliant government that fit its strategic interests.⁵¹ Thus as JUI virtually gave Pashtunabad, Quetta to the Afghan Taliban, heads of JUI madrassas along the Quetta-Chaman area met in Quetta with senior ISI officers for funds and student rotation every month⁵² and Musharraf made Ijaz-ul-Haq, son of the fundamentalist military dictator the Minister for Religious Affairs, the MMA reciprocated by supporting the constitutional amendment to make Musharraf a powerful president. With ideological godfathers of the Taliban in power, those who had fought America alongside the Taliban as ministers, and a cadre that considered sheltering Al-Qaeda leaders a responsibility, the Afghan Taliban and other militant groups were given a free hand in organizing, mobilizing and propagating their message at the local level without any threat from the provincially controlled police.

“...Pakistan managed to spark its own insurgency in FATA through haphazard military operations being ill-trained for a highly mobile war, taking responsibility for American attacks in FATA , and allowing militants to consolidate their control.”

For the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, it was a time to regroup. While Al-Qaeda regenerated in its new high HinduKush safe haven, the Afghan Taliban prepared their manpower as expansion of madrassas gained pace along the Quetta Chaman Highway. Pakistan had no counter-terrorism strategy other than intelligence and operational facilitation to the Americans in hunting Al-Qaeda members, while not a single top Taliban was given to the Americans⁵³ who themselves were also least interested, instead shifting their strategic focus to Iraq. Still the ISI (collusion with CIA is suggested) did create proxies early on either


to keep the Jihad flame burning or to split the Taliban through the notion of 'moderate' Taliban - the Jamiatul Khudamul Koran or later Jaish Muslimin condemned Mullah Omar's support for Al-Qaeda while fighting foreign forces in Afghanistan⁵⁴. Initially the Afghan government became concerned about Taliban regrouping in Pakistan in mid 2003 and later as American casualties in Afghanistan doubled in 1st six months of 2004 compared to the previous year, American pressure vis-à-vis Taliban changed into threats. Americans had been pressuring for action in Waziristan since mid 2002 owing to cross border attacks and hostage taking. Pakistan had initially tried the tribal elder route to dissuade locals to shelter foreigners or to conduct cross border attacks but to no effect. It then followed it up with small scale operations which did not resolve the problem either. But following the assassination attempt on Musharraf traced to Warizistan and American pressure to tackle Al-Qaeda militants in South Waziristan, Pakistan eventually went for a larger scale operation⁵⁵ leading to high military casualties at Kaloosha (See Figure 1). Two leading Pakistani journalist present varied interpretation of the operation; Gul calls it a spontaneous reaction and mobilization of people to defend a comrade leader and a wakeup call for the military in relation to militants. Rashid goes a step further terming it an intelligence failure blaming the ISI, which understood the ground realities in South Waziristan. This would lead to first of many peace agreements with FATA militants done from a position of weakness. The peculiarity of the Shakai Agreement was that it was done in 'Jamia Arabia Ahsanul Madaris', a madrassa rather than the usual public jirga thus subscribing legitimacy to the mullah-militant nexus in the eyes of the local people.⁵⁶

The terms of agreement required tribal militants not to attack the Pakistan Armed Forces, conduct cross border attacks or to establish parallel administration while committing to register foreign militants. In turn the Army would dismantle check posts in the area, free incarcerated tribal militants and compensate the tribe for damage done during the operation. While the agreements stopped attacks on Pakistan military, attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan spiked invoking a conflict of interest between the two partners in the 'War on Terror'. This tactical conflict of interest could have been resolved if Pakistan and America had the same strategic vision but low trust factor

and demonizing of the ISI and America in the Western and Pakistani press respectively precluded a real partnership for a troubled relationship instead. Thus a cycle ensued where America would either sabotage the peace agreement through a drone strike⁵⁷ making new martyrs or Pakistan would conduct a haphazard operation coinciding with a meeting of an American dignitary inflaming a new tribe, followed by a new peace agreement⁵⁸.

tribal Maliks in FATA⁶⁰ were killed leaving the militants to run a parallel government where they were the only negotiating partner and decision makers for the tribe while hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced. Thus in Waziristan where the Pakistan Army had initially targeted Ahmadzai Wazir militants for harboring foreign elements in 2003, by 2006 the three tribes of Waziristan, the Mehsuds, Wazirs and the Dawars were fighting together against a common enemy for the first time in history⁶¹.

Figure 1: Taliban Insurgency & Military Operations in Pakistan



Source: Interactive Map; Leaders of Pakistan's Militant Groups. Center for American Progress

Additionally, the military's air raids, scorched earth and collective punishment practices affecting civilians in trying to kill or capture key militant commanders followed by peace agreements led to enmity with the tribe⁵⁹ while raising commander's profile in the tribe as often compensation was distributed through his offices. It also gave the militant commander financial strength, while pulling the army back from the areas made it easy for militants to target pro government tribal leaders who had initially invited or acquiesced government's operation. In total 400

Thus while the Pakistani state showed policy ambivalence similar to the 1990s at a cursory level; in reality it was still focused on its ideological Strategic Depth policy, the difference being that two independent players, America and Al-Qaeda had now joined the fray. Pakistan targeted Al-Qaeda only to keep America happy while opting for peace accords with tribal militants to concentrate their activities inside Afghanistan and not attack Pakistani forces. America had yet to differentiate between Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban and wanted Pakistan to target both

groups rather than sign peace accords. Al-Qaeda wanted to stay an important player in the Afghan theatre as this ensured its survival in the Waziristan safe haven primarily because it could be sacrificed for Pakistan's strategic interests and was the primary reason for American presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan military had misjudged that Jihadis, especially the lower cadre would also understand compulsions of state craft where Al-Qaeda was targeted while Afghan Taliban facilitated. Thus even though Pakistan's strategic interests gained ground as Taliban insurgency flourished in Afghanistan by the summer of 2006, it had instead managed to spark its own insurgency in FATA through haphazard military operations being ill-trained for a highly mobile war, taking responsibility for American attacks in FATA⁶², and allowing militants to consolidate their control. The government had tried but failed to outbid Al-Qaeda, which was handsomely paying its tribal hosts for housing and security, and provided ideological guidance while military's actions alienated tribes and only enhanced militant hold in other agencies. Additionally the State negligently allowed shifting of militants from Kashmir to the Afghan front; not realizing that they could move under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda enhancing both Al-Qaeda's skill set and strike capability within Pakistan.

War Hits Home: The Loss of Internal Sovereignty 2007 - 2008

The spillover effects of policy ambivalence appeared as the militants' targets increasingly moved beyond the tribal areas focusing on the State's security apparatus. Mullah Dadullah, the Afghan Taliban Commander in Chief had earlier brokered a ceasefire between militants and Pakistan Army arguing that militants should concentrate their efforts on fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan; while foreign militants and Al-Qaeda linked groups such as Tahir Yuldashev, the head of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan disagreed.⁶³ Although there was a short reprieve when Uzbek militants were expelled from Wazir section of South Waziristan due to infighting and with Army's support of the Taliban commander Mullah Nazir, they found sanctuary with the Mehsuds. Thus indicating both turf wars and enmeshed linkages between groups in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

The situation had aggravated earlier when government authorities brushed aside the killing of 82 including

12 teenagers at a Tehreek-e-Nifaz Sharia Muhammadi (TNSM) seminary in October 2006 in Damadola, Bajaur in an air strike calling them militants, thus provoking TSNM movement in Swat to openly call for arms⁶⁴. But it was the military's quashing of militants in the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007 in full media publicity and national public uproar, when militants finally gave up the possibility of rapprochement with the military further moving into the Al-Qaeda camp, leading them to formulate a common strategy across FATA. Other than a spate of suicide bombings across the country, the affect of Lal Masjid could be judged from the 'abduction' of 200-250 security personnel in August 2007 including nine army officers who offered little resistance⁶⁵.

“ With momentum shifting to the militants, the insurgency increasingly over taken by Al-Qaeda linked groups and under increased pressure from the international community to do more, Pakistan allowed America to setup a secret CIA base for drone attacks inside FATA in January 2008.”

Pakistan lost its key link with the Qandahari group⁶⁶, and leverage over FATA militants with the killing of Dadullah in March 2007. His death was defining moment as it led to a shift in the Afghan Taliban leadership, which increasingly came under the control of Haqqani Network, a closer associate of Al-Qaeda. By this time, militants had carved out a territory for their command and control centers, more than 100 illegal FM Stations operated in FATA & NWFP, half of them in settled areas working as their propaganda arms⁶⁷ while Al-Qaeda's media arm Al-Sahab tripled its Audio Visual production to 58 in 2006 and 89 in 2007⁶⁸ for militants' strategic guidance in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The year culminated with formation of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) with an estimated strength of about 40,000 militants⁶⁹.

As an all out war began in 2008, TTP gained an upper hand with militants seizing to try to blow up the Kohat Tunnel cutting off Peshawar's access from the Indus High-

way unsuccessfully. It overran the Sararogha Fort, South Waziristan in January 2008 and increased suicide bombings in urban areas leading the government to launch military operations in a number of tribal agencies followed by peace agreements. While it seemed that the Pakistani State had finally woken up to the militant terrorist threat, the valley of Swat away from FATA proved otherwise as a small time mullah practically took over the territory with the help of TTP militants (foreigners included) who had shifted from FATA to get away from military operations and more importantly the drone attacks. Though he had been facilitated by the MMA government and intelligence agencies⁷⁰, the 2007 military operation neither closed down his propaganda radio, nor targeted his headquarters (Imam Deri) or arms dump, thus allowing the emerging Taliban to increase their control of Swat from 15% to 70%, eventually leading a Malik (tribal leader) Afzal Khan Lala to ask if Taliban and the Military were actually partners?⁷¹

The Americans unable to contain the Afghan insurgency shifted the blame to Pakistan and its inability to close down militant sanctuaries in FATA. It's reassessment of the war shifted the focus on Pakistan to do more in the

"War on Terror". America thus supported a negotiated settlement between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto, the head of a liberal party who could rally public support and provide the much needed civil political backing for a complete break with Pakistan's ideological strategy, which was required to tackle the Afghan Taliban problem along with Al-Qaeda. But Benazir Bhutto, a strategic threat to Islamist, Jihadi and the Islamist segment of military establishment became the biggest Pakistani casualty of war. With momentum shifting to the militants, the insurgency increasingly over taken by Al-Qaeda linked groups and under increased pressure from the international community to do more, Pakistan allowed America to setup a secret CIA base for drone attacks inside FATA in January 2008⁷². The drone attacks would strictly be an American affair, disowned and publicly berated by the Government of Pakistan allowing it to keep its peace agreements intact with FATA militants.

The year 2007 was a year of political turmoil in Pakistan as pro-democracy movement gained speed along side the TTP insurgency in FATA, specifically denting the army's morale as it was being criticized by all segments of the political spectrum – the liberal segments berating it for

Table1: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence & Number of Attacks

	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/ Insurgents	Total	Drone Attacks	Suicide Attacks	Bomb Attacks
2002						2	35
2003	140	24	25	189		2	41
2004	435	184	244	863		7	137
2005	430	81	137	648	1	4	245
2006	430	325	538	1,471	0	7	299
2007	1,522	597	1,479	3,598	1	56	678
2008	2,155	654	3,906	6,715	19	59	485
2009	2,324	991	8,389	11,704	46	78	499
2010	1,796	469	5,170	7,435	90	67	193
Total	9,410	3,325	19,888	32,623	157	282*	2,612*

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, Institute of Conflict Management. <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/index.html>

*Figures calculated in From Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10, Karachi: SPDC 2010

being in alliance with the Mullah-Jihadi nexus, questioning its will to take on the surging militants while the Islamists condemned it for bringing the American war to Pakistan. The political dynamics changed as the new Army Chief took over followed by the formation of government by an alliance of secular liberal parties in the Centre and Khyber Pakhtoonkha in March 2008. Policy formulation now included the civilian leadership which wanted good relations with the Afghan and Indian governments⁷³ along with a more independent role for America to tackle threats emanating from Pakistan but had to convince the powerful ideological guardians, the military and intelligence establishments. The overtures of the weak coalition civilian government in regional policy matters were soon rebuffed and its international credibility ruined with the attack on the Indian embassy⁷⁴ and Hamid Karzai in Kabul. The nail in the coffin was the December 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai implicating Lashkar-e-Taiba, the most disciplined and the only non-state actor which had not split staying within the ISI umbrella after the demobilization of Kashmir Jihad.⁷⁵

Regaining Governance: Are We Approaching the End Game 2009 – 2010?

As Taliban control in Afghanistan increased from 30/364

districts in 2003 to 164/364 districts by end of 2008 owing partly to suicide attacks 21 (2005), 136 (2006) and 137 (2007)⁷⁷, it was clear that the American policy of outright military victory over the Taliban had failed. America shifted blame equally to corruption in the Afghan government and the double game of the Pakistan ISI arguing that 80% of the suicide attacks in Afghanistan could be traced back to Warizistan⁷⁸ as CIA shared evidence of ISI links with the Haqqani Network⁷⁹ which was behind Afghan suicide attacks. The Afghan voices had started arguing in late 2007 that there could be no peaceful solution to Afghanistan without Hekmatyar & Taliban⁸⁰, later taken up by the British Defense Secretary⁸¹. Obama laid out his Afghan Policy (Af-Pak) in March 2009 accepting both a reconciliation strategy in principle as well as the importance of Pakistan's role in American exit strategy. But rather than initiating a political dialog with the Afghan Taliban, the American strategy involved a military buildup to break the Taliban momentum while using the eighteen month period till July 2011 to articulate a political strategy followed by draw down of troops. The reconciliation strategy was eventually endorsed by the international community in the January 2010 London Conference with even India and Russia giving up their opposition to talks with the Taliban⁸².

Table2: Incidence of Terrorist Attacks/Clashes in Pakistan

	Terrorist attacks ¹	Operational attacks ²	Clashes militants ³	Border clashes	Political violence ⁴	Inter-tribal clashes	Drone attacks
Number of attacks							
2008	2,148		95	55	88	191	32
2009	2,586	596	209	78	130	217	51
2010	2,113	260	369	69	233	214	135
Number of persons killed							
2008	2,267	3,182	655	395	162	1,336	216
2009	3,021	6,329	1,163	700	210	1,209	667
2010	2,913	2,631	2,007	65	660	766	961

1. Including insurgent and sectarian incidents.

2. Operations conducted by security forces against militants.

3. Ethno-political and sectarian.

4. Clashes between security forces and militants.

Source: Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), Pakistan Security Reports 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010.

Referenced in From Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10, Karachi: SPDC 2010

The peak years of war (2008 & 2009) in Pakistan were years of realignment as well as a movement away from clandestine to a relatively more open articulation of its interests. Pakistan had bore the brunt of the "War on Terror" losing 1,211 soldiers by Dec 2007⁸³ along with excessive collateral damage as suicide bombings jumped from 7 (2006), 54 (2007) to 59 (2008)⁸⁴. While the Pakistan military had formally launched military operations in FATA on July 19, 2007⁸⁵, it still seemed to lack the resolve to tackle the insurgency holistically either because this went against its strategic goals in Afghanistan, it was scared of defections within army ranks due to soldiers subscription of Al-Qaeda ideology, or because it needed public support lost during years of military dictatorship. Gul argues that GHQ finally woke up to the internal threat when the war came home in late 2008. But more importantly, pressurized from all fronts: by the international community following Bombay massacre; by civil society in Pakistan after Swat fell to the militants; by the civil government after militants broke the Swat peace agreement; and by the Americans invoking security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and the capital Islamabad, the military conducted a successful large scale operation in Swat with political backing. However, almost all top militant leaders escaped. This was followed by another successful operation against the command and control centre of TTP in South Waziristan in the summer of 2009 while keeping peace agreements intact with two main Taliban commanders of South & North Waziristan. This arrested the Pakistani Taliban momentum in FATA and adjoining areas thus pushing them into North Waziristan⁸⁶, which was outside the writ of the State. Pakistan's new initiative increased the cost of war with 76 suicide bombings in 2009⁸⁷ (Also see Table 1 & 2) and then finally the seat of power, the Army General Headquarters (GHQ) was attacked in October 2009 while additionally army families were targeted in a mosque attack. It seemed that the army had finally taken note with a serving general stating that the army had reached a consensus in principle to go after all groups indiscriminately, irrespective of their earlier links to military institutions⁸⁸.

By now, America had recognized the need to engage Pakistan in a strategic dialogue to influence its policy rather than solely using it as a client state to try to achieve American goals in Afghanistan. Although Pakistan still publicly denied the existence of Quetta Shura and the

presence of Haqqani Network in Pakistan⁸⁹, it picked up key leaders and incarcerated more than half of the top Afghan Taliban leadership to stall a direct channel between Karzai and the Taliban without ISI sanction⁹⁰ as well as to show its leverage before entering into a strategic dialogue with America in March 2010. Pakistan finally opened up regarding its own interests in the Pak-US Strategic Dialog. America acknowledged the importance of Pakistan's role in peace talks between Kabul and the Taliban but rebuffed a civil nuclear deal similar to India's while asking the army to abandon its 30-year reliance on Islamist militants for foreign policy objectives⁹¹. Additionally, Pakistan and America were still at odds with specific aspects of their Afghan strategy, as America wanted to weaken or divide the Taliban⁹² through the surge, extension of drone strikes in Baluchistan and military operation in North Waziristan, to negotiate with the Taliban from a position of strength. While Pakistan agreed in principle with the need for a North Waziristan operation, it excused itself citing over-extension. In actuality Pakistan's leverage in Afghanistan depended on the strength of the Taliban with sanctuaries and nerve centers both in the Quetta-Chaman border region and North Waziristan. Additionally, the army leadership was unsure of the backlash of such an operation understanding full well that it would exceed all previous operations given NW was now a sanctuary of all kinds of militant groups (Haqqani, Hezb-i-Islami, Al-Qaeda, TTP and the Punjabi Taliban).

As Pakistan delayed the North Waziristan operation, the Americans doubled drone attacks to 90-124⁹³ in 2010. But the Pak-US perspective differed drastically as independent Pakistani media reports put casualty figures in terms of terrorist to civilian ratio at 41:59⁹⁴, while an American journal assessing all drone attacks till June 2010 put the terrorist: civilians: unknown ratio at 80:4.5:15⁹⁵. This provides an apt indication of why America could not relate to the increasing anti-Americanism in the country. Although there had been an American presence in Pakistan since 2001, the terms of engagement had been settled with the Pakistan Army. But since the return to civilian rule and with its acquiescence⁹⁶, American had increased its footprint through a \$1bn embassy and personnel expansion from 300 to 1,000 including both civilians (for Kerry Lugar Bill's civilian support) and also covert operatives outside the ISI domain⁹⁷. As American pressure and operation increased

leading to the killing of two Pakistani soldiers in Kurram Agency crossing the red line of cross border operations, Pakistan closed the Afghan border crossing constituting 80% of NATO's non-lethal supply line for 10 days⁹⁸ while more than a 100 trucks were burnt by Taliban inside Pakistan, further indicating Pakistan's leverage over NATO forces just a few weeks before the Pak-American Strategic Dialogue in October. With its enhanced leverage intact, Pakistan Army, the real power in the country took steps to limit American covert operations in the country, primarily those being conducted unilaterally.

“ America acknowledged the importance of Pakistan's role in peace talks between Kabul and the Taliban but rebuffed a civil nuclear deal similar to India's while asking the army to abandon its 30-year reliance on Islamist militants for foreign policy objectives. ”

Thus this period saw America falling back to the original Pakistani position of negotiating with the Taliban for peace in Afghanistan. Additionally, Pakistan Army practically showed its strength and leverage in all spheres of the Afghan imbroglio: taking on militant groups within the country, incarcerating Afghan Taliban leadership, strangulating the NATO supply line, and lastly arresting America's independent intelligence operations within Pakistan. Although Pakistan had now acted in all tribal agencies of FATA except NW, it clearly discriminated between militant groups targeting the Pakistani state and those targeting Afghanistan. Thus suggesting that Pakistan's Strategic Depth policy, which seemed to be in disarray following 9/11, was back on track and Pakistan was well positioned to negotiate its interests in Afghanistan and the region.

Rethinking Pakistan's Strategic Interests

Afghanistan, a land locked gateway between South, Central and West Asia has been a confluence of competing interests of regional states (Central Asian States, Iran, India, China and Pakistan) and international powers (US, Russia). Pakistan's initial interests in Afghanistan

had been based on the territorial security of its unrecognized western border inhabited by 19 tribes⁹⁹ living on both sides of the Durand Line. While America left the region following Soviet withdrawal, its sponsored Jihad, the ideological warfare that it had helped groom with Saudi Wahabi ideology and ISI's logistical expertise was continued by Pakistan for its own strategic interests in the region. Although Pakistan had gradually left the secular ideals of its founder increasingly using Islam for bringing together a multinational state before the 1980s Afghan war, the sponsorship of Deobandi-Wahabi ideology mixed with militancy training and funding facilitation by the State had created a huge Jihad industry. This industry allowed Pakistan to gain Strategic Depth in Afghanistan and to keep India bogged down in the Kashmir border conflict throughout the 1990s but with tremendous internal costs.

As 9/11 brought the West back to Afghanistan primarily to undo the same ideological militant infrastructure it had helped germinate, it left Pakistan's regional policy executed through ideological non-state actors in tatters while also threatening Pakistan's territorial security. Musharraf allayed the territorial threat by joining the American "War on Terror" but America's expedient policy framework which excluded the Taliban from the Bonn process, which Lakhtar Brahimi aptly phrased "the original sin",¹⁰⁰ led to a hostile Kabul dispensation. Further, sensing America's lack of long term interest in Afghanistan by not putting needed boots on the ground and more importantly by shifting strategic priority to Iraq left Pakistan Army with no choice but to preserve its blood line in Afghanistan, especially when its arch enemy India was closing its grip by opening consulates near the Pakistan border and making investments which could bypass Pakistan's strategic location as the transit trade route for energy rich Central Asia. As Pakistan's competition for influence in the region vastly outweighed the country's interests in the "War on Terror",¹⁰¹ its perceived policy ambivalence towards militants was in actuality a conscious decision as Pakistan Army never considered Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban or the Punjabi Taliban a threat to the State. But a forced closing of Kashmir Jihad at the threat of war with India and the incursions in FATA to net Al-Qaeda primarily to show its support for the "War on Terror" to America, redirected some militant factions to instead focus on the Pakistani State and security apparatus. Pakistan's elite

perceived that targeting of the Pakistani state had been because of its alliance with US rather than the militants wanting State power¹⁰². Thus Pakistan's implicit policy has since been to convince all militant groups to concentrate their energies in Afghanistan while tackling anti-state groups who fail to understand Pakistan's compulsion vis-à-vis America¹⁰³. Taliban still fit Pakistan's interest well within the Strategic Depth framework, allowing Pakistan's influence in Kabul following NATO withdrawal, check Pushtun nationalism, provide access to Central Asia and facilities for Kashmir bound militants¹⁰⁴.

But does Pakistan want to have the same scenario in Afghanistan as the 1990s when its intelligence agency was

deeply linked in an Afghan civil war (along with other regional players) while being diplomatically isolated for supporting the Taliban? The Pakistan Army Chief Kiyani while subscribing to Strategic Depth defined it as "a border we don't need to worry about" indicating his interest in a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan rather than its descent into obscurantism¹⁰⁵. He has stated that a gradual transition within the military establishment is under way while hinting a policy change towards non-state actors, saying that national defense will not be outsourced¹⁰⁶. But Pakistan still perceives Afghanistan as a battleground for influence with India as Kiyani told Obama in their meeting that US was not addressing his strategic imperatives (vis-

Table3: Pakistan's Burden of War

	(Rs in Billion)		
	2007-8	2009-10	% increase
Direct Cost of War on Terror	149	320	115
(Potential) cost compensation to victims	3	6	100
Cost of damage to property and infrastructureb	8	13	63
Higher cost of defence	109	247	127
Higher cost of police	21	43	105
Higher cost of private security	8	11	38
Indirect Cost of War on Terror	231	521	126
Costs to local economies	42	130	210
Loss of economic growth in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	40	130	225
Cost of IDPs	2	n.a	n.a
Costs of higher risk perceptions	189	391	107
Fall in private investment	52	244	369
Fall in stock market capitalizationa	120	123	2
Others	17	44	41
Total Cost of War (Pak Rs.)	380	841	
Total Cost of War (US\$ billion)	6	10	
US Bilateral Assistance (US\$ billion)	2	3.6	
Pakistan's Burden of War (US\$ billion)	4	6.4	

Source: Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10
Karachi: Social Policy & Development Centre (SPDC) 2010

à-vis India)¹⁰⁷. This India centric security thinking which dictates Pakistan's Afghan policy, leading to the support of the Taliban in Afghanistan and reluctance of the army to become a counter insurgency force,¹⁰⁸ thus following containment rather than eradication of militants at home (military refuses to act against Lashkar-e-Taiba till Kashmir and other issues with India are resolved¹⁰⁹) is based on a number of assumptions. First, the reconcilable ideological militant groups can be separated from the irreconcilable, who can then be tackled independently without affecting the relationship with the others. Second, Pakistan alone has the strength to compete with the interests of the sole superpower, NATO and regional players who all now see ideological non-state actors as a threat to their security in a post 9/11 security environment.

“ It is also perfectly understandable for a military institution to be strategically trained in a zero sum game with its arch enemy, but for that to be unchallenged State policy for decades is anathema to growth and progress of any nation. ”

Experts agree that multiple groups constitute the insurgency in Afghanistan and FATA but only Shahzad accepts that a gulf is possible between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda¹¹⁰. The Qandahari group is less inclined towards Al-Qaeda¹¹¹ and its foot soldiers are less ideologically inclined than the Pakistan based groups. Others argue that Mullah Omar, although key to reconciliation has little power on the ground which rests with the neo-Taliban (the new generation Sirajuddin Haqqani versus Jalaluddin Haqqani) who predominantly subscribe to the pan-Islamic Al-Qaeda ideology¹¹²; the Haqqani group especially has close ties with both Al-Qaeda and TTP (Baitullah Mehsud got three members of the Haqqani family released in a prisoner swap with Pakistan Army¹¹³). Thus most experts dismiss Pakistan's strategic thinking that homegrown militants can be crushed while maintaining Afghan Taliban proxy for final settlement.¹¹⁴

America's war in Afghanistan initially focused on the elimination of Al-Qaeda but has since evolved into an

Af-Pak framework. This includes both a stable Afghanistan devoid of terrorist bases and civil war, as well as a stable Pakistan, which does not support militant groups¹¹⁵. America's concern regarding Pakistan, with some terming it the biggest foreign policy challenge of the 21st century is because of Pakistan's mix of the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world and being home to a large number of terrorist organizations¹¹⁶. This concern is now shared by other European capitals and the change of focus can be termed from the fact that Lashkar-e-Taiba is now mentioned alongside Al-Qaeda in most policy reviews. Mindful of its current weak position vis-à-vis Pakistan, which enjoys unusually strong leverage with both sides of the Afghan war, and could jeopardize the American war through reduction of intelligence cooperation and closing of NATO's logistical route¹¹⁷, America pursues a carrot heavy strategic dialogue to encourage Pakistan towards its own policy interests while strategizing to decrease its reliance on Pakistan¹¹⁸. America had lost leverage in the region because of the earlier deterioration of Pak-India, US-Iran, US-China and Russia-NATO relations¹¹⁹ and thus roping in China and others to pressure Pakistan or to defuse regional tension through Pakistan India peace have not yet borne fruit. But on the contrary, American policy analysts have also put the option of cut & run in Afghanistan, putting Pakistan on the list of states sponsoring terrorism¹²⁰ and forming a strategic alliance with India to contain a dangerous Pakistan¹²¹ on the table. Additionally, America is aware of its long-term leverage over Pakistan as 1/4 of Pakistan exports are US bound, 1/3 foreign investment comes from US, and additionally it has the power to use IFI's to isolate Pakistan or curtail military assistance stalling Pak-Army's American made weaponry for lack of spare parts¹²².

Thus both assumptions underlying the current policy framework are weak, but even if they are granted, what can not be looked over is the internal cost of the Strategic Depth policy framework which discriminates between good versus bad ideological militants and uses non-state actors as a key tool for foreign policy objectives. Terrorism cant not be countered when suicide bomber training camp in Shawal, SW is run jointly by Sirajuddin Haqqani, a strategic asset for Pakistan Army focusing on Afghanistan and Qari Hussain¹²³, a hunted TTP militant commander responsible for most suicide attacks within Pakistan. Such

paradoxical security framework is a step up from the 1990s instead making Pakistan the Strategic Depth for Afghan and international Islamist militants, and leading to State's loss of sovereignty over vast areas. It has allowed domestic terrorism for strategic needs in Afghanistan to the effect that militant's practically gained control over people's lives in FATA and Swat by eliminating traditional leadership. But more importantly, it is this subservience of domestic security to the Strategic Depth framework that has led to immeasurable costs in the socio-cultural domain. The continuing need of Deobandi-Wahabi schools for Jihad has led to increased religious extremism, militarization and criminality in society as other sects have followed suit in safeguarding their own communities. Sectarianism and violence earlier restricted to Sunni-Shia has taken on a new dimension as other than the Ahmedi and Shia, now the Barelvi sect (Sufi saint mausoleums and Eid Milad-un-Nabi) is also being targeted while religious scholars (the ulema), who have passed injunctions against suicide bombings have been killed irrespective of their schools of thought¹²⁴. Since 2001, a total of 2,564 citizens have been killed while 5,071¹²⁵ have been injured in sectarian violence, triple the casualty figure of 1989-2000¹²⁶. Thus a change in Strategic Depth policy is necessary for Pakistan's internal stability. While Pakistan Army as an institution is skilled in the realism of international relations, as it forgoes its ideological partner when faced with a territorial threat; It closes down and reforms sections of the ISI when faced with internal threat and insubordination; still it fails to understand that its strategic policy framework is flawed and hurting the country. An important factor in this regard is the civil military power imbalance and a lack of trust between the two institutions. The army has managed the Afghan and Kashmir policy since Zia's time leading to a lack of rethinking and reassessment for the last 30 years as policy change is primarily an outcome of pluralism, opposition and peaceful transfer of power, the beauty of democracy. It is also perfectly understandable for a military institution to be strategically trained in a zero sum game with its arch enemy, but for that to be unchallenged State policy for decades is anathema to growth and progress of any nation. This can be judged from the fact that all democratically elected leaders since the last 30 years have either extended or accepted peace overtures towards India and Zardari's foreign policy agenda also includes peace with India, no

Taliban safe havens in Pakistan and good relations with America¹²⁷. But the civil political leadership has yet to gain the confidence of the powerful security establishment and lacks the institutional strength to forcefully make a case for policy change¹²⁸, thus the strategic policy role stays with the military¹²⁹.

“As Pakistan's competition for influence in the region vastly outweighed the country's interests in the "War on Terror", its perceived policy ambivalence towards militants was in actuality a conscious decision as Pakistan Army never considered Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban or the Punjabi Taliban a threat to the State.”

As the end game in Afghanistan nears, Pakistan would be well advised to understand that the root of its current predicament lies in its undefined borders in the West and East and thus its leverage should be used towards these ends. Although Pakistan is in a strong position to gain strategic space in Afghanistan, the Pakistan military should understand that this leverage is an outcome of excessive internal costs and its unaccountability. Pakistan should not confuse this short-term leverage with long-term influence, which is dependent on internal strength and strong diplomatic relations based on mutual interests. For this, Pakistan would need to bury the Strategic Depth policy framework to explore and exercise the following set of policy options: First, make a clean break from using ideological non-state actors for its policy objectives. Second, enhance its diplomatic relations (US, Saudi, and China), which were built on the foundations of security arrangements with security agenda usually trumping economic interests,¹³⁰ to encompass a broad development focus. Third, Pakistan desperately needs to put its internal house in order and to that end seeking peace with India, which is involved in proxy wars with Pakistan and can exploit its internal troubles¹³¹, would be a desirable goal. Finally, Pakistan needs to evolve a comprehensive counter terrorism and extremism strategy, foremost being integration of FATA with the rest of the country and strengthening

its public institutions to create the 2 million yearly jobs¹³² required for its current demographics. This demands a paradigm shift, which is not possible with a war in its own neighborhood that has caused 9,410 civilian and 3,325 security agencies fatalities¹³³ while displacing more than 3 million people from their homes (although most have gone back). Pakistan continues and could leverage in Afghanistan in strategic terms, however, time is running out and it has already lost the 1st decade of the 21st century with \$43bn¹³⁴ (Also see Table 3) as the cumulative cost of war to the economy and additionally reduced public services spending (due to higher spending on security) leading to Pakistan most likely missing its Millennium Development Goals 2015 targets¹³⁵. Thus there is a growing realization in Pakistan that a continuation of war in Afghanistan does

not serve its national interest.¹³⁶

On the other hand America has yet to devise a regional solution to allay Pakistan's security concerns¹³⁷ vis-à-vis India. It is pushing ahead with combat troop withdrawal date to 2014¹³⁸ buying itself more time. Pakistan still has time and opportunity to re-strategize and devise an innovative policy towards Afghanistan combining regional and bilateral approach, whereby Afghanistan and India are seen as part of the solution to dismantle and disrupt terrorism in the region and have stake in peace and sustainable development of the region. Such a vision demands broad internal consensus, which implies that the civilian government and the Pakistan Army must act in unison and concert, supplementing and supporting each other and pursuing shared goals.

End Notes

1. The Durand Line was agreed upon as the border between Afghanistan and British India in 1893 to be in effect for a 100 years till 1993.
2. Haq, Sadr Pakistan General Zia ul. Speeches Vol. 1 5 July – 31 Dec 1977. In the founding address to Council of Islamic Ideology on Sept 29, 1979 he is quoted "We want to make Pakistan as experiment in Islam". On July 5, 1977 quoted "Pakistan came into being and will stay for Islam. Islamic System is necessary".
3. Muneer, Mohammad Justice. From Jinnah to Zia, Lahore: Vanguard Books 1979.
4. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008 p. 384.
5. Haq, Sadr Pakistan General Zia ul. Speeches Vol. 1 5 July – 31 Dec 1977. Zia's addressed the Pakistan Army as "Soldiers of Islam" in Address to the Nation 27th July 1977. Jalal, Ayesha. The State of Martial Rule, Lahore: Vanguard Books 1991. For Zia, Pakistan & Islam were two sides of the same coin. Protection & integrity of both was the task of military establishment alone.
6. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 373.
7. ibid, p. 375.
8. Riedel, Bruce. Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the future of global Jihad, The Brookings Institution, July 18, 2011. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011.
9. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007.
10. The Tableeghi Jamaat and Jamiat –Ulema-Islam (JUI) are Deobandi groups while the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) though eschewing sectarian is much closer to Deobandi, Wahabi groups in ideology than the Bareilvi or Shia. Among the Islamists, JUI & JI have primarily influenced State policy as elected government or through the support of dictators.
11. Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 377.
12. Hasan, Mubashir. 'The Military loses and gains clout', The Express Tribune, October 26, 2010. Military allowed Benazir slot of Prime Minister on 3 conditions: 1. Military to remain independent in its own affairs; 2. No jurisdiction over nuclear program; 3. Ghulam Ishaq Khan to serve as President, Lt. Gen Retd. Yaqub Khan as foreign minister and VA Jaffery as head of the finance ministry.
13. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 166.
14. Rana, Amir. Jihad-e-Afghanistan or Kashmir, (Urdu), Lahore: Mashal Publications 2002, p. 20.
15. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010.
16. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 27. General Nasir was sacked in May 1993 and some 1100 ISI operative were retired or sent back to their army units.
17. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010. Pakistan supported with logistics and supplies through ISI offices in Herat, Qandahar and Jalalabad.
18. Khattak, I. Taliban Claim Mohmand Agency. The Friday Times, 11th February, 2001.
19. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 267.
20. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 27. The governments of Egypt, Jordan and Libya had specifically complained about the Peshawar base for terrorism planning in their country.
21. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 38.
22. Although two purges of the Shia in Parachinar and Gilgit had already taken place in 1988.
23. Jamal, Arif. 'Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan', The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor, Volume 9 Issue 8. www.jamestown.org. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011.
24. Haq, Zia ul. Speech to the Majlis Shura , 1983. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iPkIqd4nNIM>. Last accessed Feb. 28, 2011.
25. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjab Taliban, Lahore: Nigareshaat Publications 2009, p. 138.
26. Rana, Amir & Gunaratna, Rohan. Al-Qaeda Fights Back Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2008, p. 86.
27. 'Sectarian Violence in Pakistan', South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management. <http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>. Last accessed March 15, 2011. The sectarian killings were initially restricted to leaders and activists, then state symbols eventually becoming indiscriminate by 1997 according to Zahab, Mariam. 'The regional dimension of sectarian conflict in Pakistan', CERJ Paris. Last Accessed March 11, 2011. The sectarian penetration of body politics could be assessed by the promulgation of two ministers of Sipah-e-Sahaba (the parent party of anti-Shia terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and also categorized as the 'mother' of all Deobandi Jihadi organizations) in the 1995 Punjab Government in Ahmed, Khaled. Religious Developments in Pakistan 1999-2008. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2010

28. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjab Taliban, Lahore: Nigareshaat Publications 2009, p. 24.
29. Rana, Amir. "Jihadi Print Media in Pakistan: An Overview", Conflict and Peace Studies, Issue 1 Number 1, Islamabad: PIPS 2008, p. 47.
30. Hussain, Mujahid. Punjab Taliban, Lahore: Nigareshaat Publications 2009, p. 138. The ISI facilitated Lashkar-e-Taiba's fund raising drive by asking traders to contribute. Additionally LeT's donation boxes across the country generated Rs. 120 million daily.
31. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 41
32. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010, p. 41. Pakistan provided three bases Jacobabad, Dalbandin and Shamsi.
33. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007. Economic Aid included \$1 bn loan writeoff, \$600 million budgetary support, \$12.5bn debt rescheduling.
34. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 45.
35. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'Pakistan has its own battle to fight'. The Asia Times June 28, 2010. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011
36. *ibid*
37. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 148
38. *ibid* p. 91
39. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 120.
40. *ibid*, p. 107
41. A Pakistan-India war at this time would have achieved Al-Qaeda's civilizational war paradigm through an America-India-Israel (the 'Christian-Hindu-Jew') alliance versus a nuclear armed Muslim state. Still, that this later came to dominate the conspiracy theory whirlwind behind terrorist attacks in Pakistan attests either to the dominance of Islamism in the Pakistani public discourse or to the sponsorship of this discourse by the dominant military establishment.
42. Pakistan Policy Working Group. The Next Chapter: The United States and Pakistan, September 2008, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/pakistan-policy-working-group-next-chapter-united-states-pakistan/p17413>. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011.
43. Yousafzai, Rahimullah, 'A New Proxy War?', Newsline 19 June 2006.
44. Though Jaish-e-Muhammad initially took credit for it, some authors state that it was instead a Lashkar-e-Taiba operation. These and two sectarian groups Sipah-e-Sahaba and Tekrik-e-Jafaria were banned.
45. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 165.
46. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 147.
47. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 159.
48. Zahid Hussain. General Sympathy Aiding the Taliban, Newsline, 18 Nov, 2009.
49. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'Al-Qaeda's guerrilla chief lays out strategy'. The Asia Times Oct 15, 2009. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.
50. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 173, while Ahmed Rashid calls it a ISI sponsored alliance.
51. *ibid*, p. 175. While these parties publicly criticized Musharraf's policies and enflamed the public with Anti-American rhetoric, still they were aligned with military's objectives as indicated by the three hour meeting between Musharraf and head of Jamaat-e-Islami on the eve of 2002 elections.
52. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 249
53. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 240
54. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'Pakistan has its own battle to fight'. The Asia Times June 28, 2010. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011. Jaish Al-Muslim was publicly and officially launched on Sept 17, 2003 in Peshawar.
55. Rana, Amir & Gunaratna, Rohan. Al-Qaeda Fights Back Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2008, p. 71.
56. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010 p. 76. A Lt. Gen went to the militants' location and exchanged gifts. He thus accepted the madrassa and associated clergy as the new power in the area while subscribing legitimacy to the militants as negotiating partner rather than tribal chiefs.
57. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'Another deadly blow for Pakistan'. The Asia Times Oct 31, 2006. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011. While Nek Mohammad was killed by a Drone strike in South Waziristan, the Pakistan Army took credit for the killing. Similarly Baitullah Mehsud was targeted by Drone few days after an agreement with Pak Army. Additionally the Oct 2006 American helicopter gunship strike in Damadola, Bajaur came two days before Pakistan Army and militants were to sign a peace deal.
58. Rana, Amir & Sial, Safdar & Basit, Abdul. Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2010. Fact Files 2 & 3. Major military operations which began in South Waziristan (2004), extended to North Waziristan (2005), Swat (2007), Bajaur (2008) and Khyber (2009). In all but Khyber, military action was followed by a peace agreement with the militants.
59. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'Hostage deaths adds to Musharraf's woes'. The Asia Times October 16, 2004. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011. Argues that September 2004 bombing by Pakistani planes leading to civilian deaths among the Mehsuds led the Mehsud youth to join the insurgency which was earlier limited to few Waziri sub-tribes. Even Baitullah Mehsud had earlier disagreed with Abdullah Mehsud in targeting Pakistani forces only to change his opinion later.
60. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010.
61. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'Revolution in Pakistan Mountains'. The Asia Times March 23, 2006. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.
62. Pakistan government took responsibility of American attacks on Nek Mohammad and the attacks in Bajaur Agency in 2006.
63. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'Waziristan Jihadi wage war on each other'. The Asia Times March 13, 2007. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 20, 2011.
64. Yousafzai, Aqeel. Talibization, Lahore: Nigarishat Publications 2009, p. 205. Fazlullah's brother died in the strike leading him to take a militant route.
65. GlobalSecurity.org, "Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan", Alexandria: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ttp.htm> Last accessed on April 4, 2011.
66. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'Pakistan makes a deal with the Taliban'. The Asia Times March 1, 2007. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.
67. Rana, Amir & Sial, Safdar & Basit, Abdul, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA, Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies 2010, p. 155.
68. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008.
69. *Ibid*, p. 385.
70. Yousafzai, Aqeel. Talibization, Lahore: Nigarishat Publications 2009. When trucks full of arms from Dir to Imam Deri, Swat was intercepted by the police, both SHO and DCO were transferred in 2007. Earlier in a case of Bank Robbery in 2004, when police captured the robbers, three Al-Qaeda men were flown out by helicopters while the investigation officer linking it to Peochar Camp was transferred at the behest of Intelligence Agencies.
71. *ibid*, p. 215.
72. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 389.
73. Karzai's (much criticized for being anti-Pakistan in the media) attended the inauguration of President Zardari signaling government's intention of good relations with Afghanistan while PPP-ANP-MQM have long been considered Indophile (India loving) parties by the military establishment.
74. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 163. The Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul on July 7, 2008 had been traced back to Pakistani intelligence while both Karzai and embassy bombings were carried out the Haqqani group.
75. Hussain, Zahid. Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Lahore: Vanguard 2007, p. 53.
76. Rashid, Ahmed. 'The Afghanistan Impasse' The New York Review of Books August 10, 2009. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 01, 2011.
77. Rashid, Ahmed. Descent Into Chaos, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 366.
78. Hussain, Zahid. From Suicide to Safety, Newsline Aug 8, 2009.
79. Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 161.

80. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. 'Much ado about nothing', Newsline September 9 2007.
81. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. 'More money more problems', Newsline December 9, 2007.
82. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. 'Desperately seeking peace', Newsline February 26, 2010.
83. 'Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2011', South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011.
84. 'Fidayeen (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan'. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fiyadeenattack.htm>. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011.
85. Rashid, Ahmed. *Descent Into Chaos*, London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 385.
86. Pakistan military's peace agreements with both Commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan and Mullah Nazir of South Waziristan stayed intact during the South Waziristan operation.
87. 'Fidayeen (Suicide Squad) Attacks in Pakistan'. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fiyadeenattack.htm>. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011
88. Gul, Imtiaz. *The Most Dangerous Place*, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 136.
89. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. 'The long haul', Newsline November 30, 2009.
90. Rashid, Ahmed. 'Pakistan and Afghanistan End Game 1', Yale Global December 3, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011.
91. Rashid, Ahmed. 'US-Pakistan Dialog with a difference', BBC News March 30, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011.
92. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. 'Desperately seeking peace', Newsline February 26, 2010.
93. Sources differ on the number of Drone attacks in Pakistan. 'Drone Attack in Pakistan: 2005-2011'. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011 <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Droneattack.htm> states 90 attacks while Mir, Amir. 'Drones killed 59pc civilians, 41pc terrorists' The News, Jan 03, 2011 states 124 attacks.
94. Mir, Amir. 'Drones killed 59pc civilians, 41pc terrorists' The News, Jan 03, 2011.
95. William, Fricker & Plaw. 'New Light on the Accuracy of the CIA's Predator Drone Campaign in Pakistan', The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor Volume 8 Issue 41. www.jamestown.org. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011
96. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'All roads lead to Paksitan'. The Asia Times April 7, 2009. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.
97. Mir, Amir. 'Unannounced settlement likely between Pak-US spy agencies', The News March 07, 2011.
98. Yousafzai, Rahimullah. 'Still at Odds: Pakistan-US Relations', Newsline November 13, 2010.
99. Gul, Imtiaz. *The Most Dangerous Place*, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 178
100. Rashid, Ahmed. *Descent Into Chaos*, London: Penguin Books, 2008.
101. Wirsing, Robert referenced in Fair & Crane & Chivvis & Puri & Spirtas. Pakistan: Can the United States secure an insecure State? Santa Monica: RAND 2010.
102. Fair & Crane & Chivvis & Puri & Spirtas. Pakistan: Can the United States secure an insecure State? Santa Monica: RAND 2010.
103. Gul, Imtiaz, *The Most Dangerous Place*, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 56. Thousands of Punjabi Taliban were allowed into Wana in late 2006 to fight against the Uzbeks in allegiance with Mulla Nazir with the commitment that their struggle would only be against foreign forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani forces would not be attacked even if they conduct a military operation at America's behest or allow American drone attacks in its territory.
104. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010.
105. Gul, Imtiaz. *The Most Dangerous Place*, London: Penguin Books 2010.
106. Gul, Imtiaz. *The Most Dangerous Place*, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 127.
107. Riedel, Bruce. *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the future of global Jihad*. The Brookings Institutions Jan 18, 2011
108. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010.
109. Rashid, Ahmed. 'US-Pakistan Dialogue with a difference', BBC News March 30, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011. Though recently even he has raised doubts arguing that the neo-Taliban wholeheartedly subscribe to Al-Qaeda ideology
111. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'War & Peace: A Taliban View', The Asia Times March 26, 2010. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011
112. Shahzad, Syed Saleem. 'The rise and rise of the neo-Taliban'. The Asia Times April 2, 2009. <http://www.atimes.com>. Last Accessed on March 11, 2011
113. 'Pakistan frees Haqqani relatives under swap deal', Pajhwok Afghan News, November 13, 2007. Last Accessed on March 25, 2011
114. Rashid, Ahmed, 'The Road to Kabul Runs Through Kashmir', Foreign Policy November 10, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011
115. Armitage & Berger & Markey. *U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations 2010.
116. Riedel, Bruce. *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the future of global Jihad*. A Panel Discussion. The Brookings Institutions Jan 18, 2011. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011.
117. Armitage & Berger & Markey. *U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations 2010.
118. Pande, Aparne. 'Dangerous Games', The Friday Times. April 22-28, 2011. Russian parliament approved a deal in March 2011 to allow transit for military equipment & personnel across Russia to NATO forces in Afghanistan.
119. Rashid, Ahmed. 'Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan', Routledge October 27, 2010. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011
120. Jones, Seth G. & Fair, C. Christine. *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan*, Santa Monica: RAND Corporation 2010.
121. Cohen, Stephen P. *Coping with a failing Pakistan*. Oslo: The Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre Feb 2011.
122. Armitage & Berger & Markey. *U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations 2010
123. Gul, Imtiaz, *The Most Dangerous Place*, London: Penguin Books 2010, p. 130.
124. Among others, Maulana Hasan Jan, a deobandi (JUI-F) was killed in 2007, Maulana Naecmi, a barelvi was killed in 2009.
125. 'Sectarian Violence in Pakistan'. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011
126. Jamal, Arif. 'Sufi Militants Struggle with Deobandi Jihadists in Pakistan', The Jamestown Foundation: Terrorism Monitor Volume 9 Issue 8. www.jamestown.org. Last Accessed on March 15, 2011. The penetration of extremism and militancy within society can be perceived by the cheering of the killing of State Governor by a State security guard belonging to a Bareilvi organization formed in response to the Deobandi-Wahabi dominance.
127. Rashid, Ahmed, 'The Pak-Army's Political Gamble', The Daily Beast October 15, 2009. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011.
128. Both placing the ISI under Interior Ministry as well as sending of ISI Chief to India post Mumbai Massacre were rebuffed by the military.
129. Yousafzai, Rahimullah, 'The fly in the ointment', Newsline June 11, 2008.
130. Fair & Crane & Chivvis & Puri & Spirtas. Pakistan: Can the United States secure an insecure State? Santa Monica: RAND 2010.
131. Gul, Imtiaz, 'It takes two to tango', The Friday Times April 8-14, 2011.
132. Armitage & Berger & Markey. *U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations 2010.
133. Figure till end of 2010. 'Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2011'. South Asia Terrorism Portal. New Delhi: The Institute for Conflict Management, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>. Last Accessed on Feb. 20, 2011.
134. Finance Ministry Figures, Government of Pakistan. Referenced in *From Social Impact of the Security Crises, Social Development in Pakistan Annual Review 2009-10*, Karachi: SPDC 2010.
135. *ibid*
136. It seems time is in favor of Taliban, India and Saudi Arabia's interests. India's costs in Afghan involvement are negligible while its adversary Pakistan bears the brunt of war. Saudi Arabia would rather have Al-Qaeda stationed in Afghan-Pakistan border than Yemen. America & West have a falling public support for war as well as high costs in the time of an economic downturn. Afghan citizens have a war fatigue as Afghanistan has been at war since 1980. Pakistan's internal governance problems are increasing with insurgency in Pushtun & Baloch areas, its economic disparity vis-à-vis India increasing drastically. Pakistan needs an end to war for development and for putting its internal house in order.
137. Rashid, Ahmed, 'Bridging a gap for India and Pakistan', Washington Post November 25, 2009. www.ahmedrashid.com. Last Accessed on March 1, 2011.
138. 'Joe Biden: 2014 Afghanistan Pullout is 'Drop Dead Date''. The Huffington Post. www.huffingtonpost.com. Last Accessed on Feb. 5,

: **Ahmed Rashid**, the acclaimed author of 'Taliban', 'Jihad, The rise of militant Islam in Central Asia' and most recently 'Descent into Chaos' was invited by the Centre for Public Policy & Governance (CPPG) on the 4th of February 2010 to deliver a talk on **"US Exit Strategy for Afghanistan. What are the Implications for Pakistan?"**



Rashid began by quoting the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon, stating that the situation in Afghanistan was very dire and would become irreversible if it deteriorated any further. The Taliban had expanded to the predominantly non-Pushtun areas of the North and West of the country in the past 12 months and were now a countrywide movement with shadow governors in 33 out of 34 provinces. The movement's military capacity could be judged by a more coherent use of technology, and better weaponry and communication, which perhaps was an outcome of their working relationship with Al-Qaeda, IMU, Pakistani Taliban and the Punjabi Kashmiri groups. They could attack Kabul at will, had started attacking UN and aid agencies and their enhanced urban gorilla capacity could be judged by the attack on the CIA centre killing six operatives.

Rashid argued that the Americans had made three major mistakes in the early years after the fall of the Taliban. One, they had no future vision for Afghanistan in mind and the nation building agenda including economic, institutional and indigenous Afghan security apparatus was missing. Second, it was only after the insurgency began in 2003 that the nation building agenda was given attention, still the American involvement and emphasis on Iraq in terms of money, troops, and resources had by then relegated Afghanistan to a step-child status in the so called "War on Terror". Third, America failed to recognize

that most of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership had taken refuge in Pakistan. While it pressured the Musharraf regime to go after Al-Qaeda, killing, arresting and handing over non-Afghans to the Americans, the Afghan Taliban were left alone due to a lack of American interest and as a potential reserve for Pakistan Army in case things went bad in Afghanistan.

The consequences were tremendous, somewhat contradictory and multiple. First, the Afghan people were not won over because the indigenous economy was never revived, an outcome of slow recognition that roads, electricity and water were basic pre-requisites. Second, aid money was wastefully spent to the effect that Afghanistan had yet to reach economic levels of the pre 1979 Soviet invasion. Third, concentration towards infrastructure did eventually pick up speed but by then a growing insurgency and insecurity had become a hurdle to the efforts of building dams, water irrigation channels and roads. Finally, the security situation was mismanaged. There was insufficient number of troops till 2007 because of an American commitment to Iraq; initially most of the Europeans were reluctant to send troops and later they decided to treat Afghanistan as a peace keeping mission resultantly, a full scale insurgency grew stronger. This lack of commitment to take the Taliban head on coupled with the incoherence of divided responsibilities disillusioned the Afghan public and restricted their support to Western presence especially when Taliban were seen to attack them at will. Thus while the last nine years had led to a lot of infrastructure development, the indigenous economy remained in shatters.

“Pakistan's real national interest included development of the country, education, health and putting the economy on a sound footing rather than using extremism for an eternal conflict with India.”

Discussing the American plan, Rashid stated that the US President Obama had inherited a policy disaster in Afghanistan and his current plan suggested a military surge of some 30,000 troops taking the total number of foreign

troops to 137,000 by late summer of 2010. This military surge was limited to about 18 months with regional focus on the South and East where Taliban were the strongest and was meant to secure population centres to carry out development tasks. To succeed, this plan depended on a reformed and modernized Afghan government in Kabul, while the reality was that corruption, drugs and low credibility vis-à-vis the election fiasco had failed to effectively impart Western aid or military services. Thus, while Obama's strategy hinged on an effective partnership with Kabul over the next 18th months, the onus of the surge, both civil and military was going to fall on Western forces rather than on the Karzai government. Moreover, domestic political compulsions with congressional elections in 2010 and presidential elections in 2012 had compelled Obama to specify a date for drawing down of American troops in the summer of 2011. The crucial challenge was, if huge investment of 11 billion dollars on Afghan army and police, with projected collective strength of 400,000 by the end of 2011 could take over the security responsibilities against a trained, well equipped and a committed country wide Taliban force numbering about 25-30,000.

“American involvement and emphasis on Iraq in terms of money, troops, and resources had by then relegated Afghanistan to a step-child status in the so called “War on Terror”.”

Karzai government had been trying and did succeed in engaging Taliban for a dialogue; however, Karzai was unsuccessful in persuading the West to do the same. The current American strategy with exit in mind had an enhanced focus on the Taliban. The surge would attempt to divide the Taliban through a reintegration strategy, which wheels away Taliban fighters through amnesty, compensation and resettlement. In addition, a reconciliation strategy would support strategic dialogue between the Afghan government and presumed Taliban leadership (Quetta Shura including Mullah Omer). This process had started with talks in Saudi Arabia, but would require the international community to fulfill the following points articulated by Dr. Saeed Shafqat at the beginning of the talk:

1. Convince Afghanistan's neighbors to sign on to a reconciliation strategy with the Taliban led by the Afghan government
2. Allow Afghanistan to submit a UN Security Council resolution to remove Taliban leaders from the list of terrorists drawn up in 2001
3. Pass a UN Security Council resolution giving Afghan government a formal mandate to negotiate with the Taliban
4. Have NATO and Afghan forces take responsibility for the security of the Taliban and their families on their return to Afghanistan
5. Provide adequate funds for staffing and training to an Afghan led reconciliation body
6. Encourage Pakistan military to assist NATO and Afghan security forces in providing security to returning Taliban and their families, and additionally allow necessary cross border support from international humanitarian agencies
7. The Taliban be provided with a neutral venue such as Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, where they could hold talks with Afghan government and NATO

More importantly, facilitation by various countries including Pakistan would be needed for Afghan government to eventually work out a compromise with the Taliban through either a power sharing agreement, coalition government or a Loya Jirga. Rashid argued for an inclusive dialogue, castigating Karzai for not including non Pashtuns - the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras leaders in the Saudi talks last year. He stressed that the talks seen as solely between Pashtuns increased perceptions of Pashtun hegemony inside Afghanistan furthering chances of civil war of the 1990s, when neighboring countries supported warring sides inside Afghanistan. Thus it was important that non-Pashtuns were a part of the talks along with Pakistanis, Iranians and Americans.

Focusing his attention on Pakistan, Rashid argued that Pakistan was in a mess deeper than anything it had faced earlier, elaborating that all earlier crises were restricted to the ruling elite: civil-military, intra-civil arbitrated by the military or intra-military, leading to economic downturns and social upheavals without effecting the broader population of the country. But the crises today were multifold including economic and political, further exasperated by

Baloch and Pashtun insurgencies. A momentous economic crisis continued with neither Pakistanis nor foreigners willing to invest in the country, a civilian leadership perceived as corrupt restricted instilling investor confidence and more importantly, a corrupt and incompetent Pakistani bureaucracy lacked the necessary trust of the 'Friends of Pakistan' to guide the country's economic imperatives. Pakistan was also going through a political crisis between the judiciary, political government and the army further hurting the chances of resolving the economy or terrorism issues. The Baluchistan issue could have been dealt with politically a few years ago by negotiating the share of Sui revenues and other resources but instead military involvement had escalated the Baloch insurgency.

“ Afghan people were not won over because the indigenous economy was never revived,”

The Pakistani Taliban insurgency in Khyber Pakhtoonkha was an outcome of the State's Afghan and Kashmir policies. During 1994–2001, an estimated 80,000 Pakistanis of all ethnic groups went to fight or train in Afghanistan aided and abetted by the military, which encouraged formation of Lashkar and Jaish (a nome de guerra for militant groups) at the time. Pashtun tribesmen trained in ISI run camps. Tribal forces fought against the Northern Alliance alongside the Taliban throughout the 1990s in a civil war termed Jihad, with Iran India and Russia supporting one side and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the other. After 9/11, as Afghan Taliban leadership and significant number of Al-Qaeda escaped into Pakistan hosted by young tribesmen who had been fighting for and along side them for years, there was a natural symbiosis of the existing residue. This led to an accelerated radicalization of Pakistani Pashtuns as Al-Qaeda's ideology and finances compensated for the lack of development, education and economic opportunities in FATA. Thus in the eight year process, the tribesmen became very rich because Al-Qaeda paid well for their hospitality and a Pakistani Taliban went from owning a mule, to six horses, to a jeep, to 10 jeeps, to becoming a militia commander and eventually to a Pakistani Taliban commander.

Ahmed Rashid asserted that in 2003 he had warned

against the rise of an indigenous Taliban movement but unfortunately the military paid little attention and even when it moved into FATA in the summer of 2004, this was in a half hearted way. Only with Swat and South Waziristan operations last year, did the army become more determined to deal with terrorism though it had yet to touch North Waziristan where Taliban leaders including Jalaludin Haqqani with close links to Al-Qaeda and the ISI, were living.



Unpacking Pakistan's Afghan policy, Rashid critiqued Pakistan's India focus driving its policy of "Strategic Depth". He argued that Pakistan's concerns regarding Indian involvement in Afghanistan were debateable as 67 countries were involved in Afghanistan and the Americans consulted countries with military presence before the Indians. In terms of investments, while India had an economic investment of \$1.2 billion in rebuilding of Afghanistan, most European countries had a much bigger investment. He accepted that India's possible interference in Baluchistan needed to be tackled, but disagreed with India's need to use Afghanistan for it arguing that most of the Baloch leadership was living in Dubai and just like the Taliban, the Baloch could also receive ammunition through the Dubai-Makran route. Additionally Afghanistan was going to be heavily dependent on Western support for the next 15-20 years for its security forces and developmental aid, while India, still a developing country could not single headedly provide the needed billions of dollars. He thus suggested that Pakistan's concern of being shut out while India ran Kabul were misplaced.

Additionally, Pakistan was particularly friendless in Afghanistan at this time as the Northern Alliance never liked it while the Pashtuns blamed Pakistan for dividing them and denying them development because of Taliban attacks. Still the current Army Chief had stated the same "Strategic Depth" position in Afghanistan as articulated by General Aslam Baig about 20 years ago but was rubbished by a lot of people at the time. If "Strategic Depth" meant that Afghanistan was going to be a heaven against India, this was completely misplaced as a country which could not even look out for itself could hardly provide for a retreating Pakistan Army. But if it meant a stable and secure Afghanistan, which was friendly to Pakistan, that was eminently possible, though it could only be done in partnership with regional allies.

“ Pakistani Taliban insurgency in Khyber Pakhtoonkha was an outcome of the State's Afghan and Kashmir policies. ”

Though Pakistan had an incredible card to play considering the Afghan Taliban were based here with Pakistan military as the gate keeper, it was important that Pakistan did not overplay its hand and instead played a role in concert with other regional powers. Thus Pakistan needed to get over its Indian hangover and stop insisting on keeping India out of the regional grouping for the Afghan peace process as keeping India out of a regional settlement would be detrimental to Pakistan's interests. He argued that even during the insurgency, Pakistan's illegal trade with Afghanistan was \$2 billion but in case of regional stability and Afghan reconstruction (at least a 20 year project), Pakistan could attract investment and become the main supplier for needed goods. It also provided an excellent opportunity for Pakistan to move beyond the Aid oriented economy to one based around the region as most goods manufactured in Pakistan were saleable in this region (Afghanistan, Iran, India) but not necessarily in Europe. Thus regional political stability was critical to Pakistan's economic recovery. Fourth, an end to state's sponsorship of extremism to counter India and instead using effective foreign policy measures to resolve the bigger issue of relationship with India. He argued

that groups like Lashkar and Jaish, which had close links with the intelligence and military had to be dismantled irrespective of the status of dialogue with India. These groups had been temporarily put on ice for 3-4 years owing to the peace process initiated by General Musharraf, their splinter groups were part of the Red Mosque, Swat, South Waziristan as well as the attacks on GHQ and the ISI headquarters. The Punjabi boys trained for Kashmir had linked up with the Pakistani Taliban to form a countrywide terrorist network, which could now carry out sophisticated urban terrorism at will. Giving the example of Nero watching Rome burn down, Rashid argued that Pakistan needed to change direction which was not possible without the political and military leadership accepting responsibility for sponsoring extremism for the last thirty years rather than blaming India, America and the rest of the world. This required a change in discourse that suggested a difference between good militants who fought India and bad militants who fought in Swat, Bajaur or South Waziristan. Additionally, Pakistan had to put its own house in order rather than blaming donors' conditions as in the Kerry Lugar Bill especially when no other country (except Saudi Arabia gave up to \$500million) had helped to salvage the Pakistani economy.

“ A Pakistan dominated Afghanistan through "Strategic Depth" was neither acceptable to the Afghans nor to the neighbouring countries. ”

Summing up Rashid said that Pakistan needed to deal with the issue of American withdrawal in conjunction with negotiations with the Taliban, based on its own interests. Both successive military and political governments had failed to further Pakistan's real national interest, which included development of the country, education, health and putting the economy on a sound footing rather than using extremism for an eternal conflict with India. A Pakistan dominated Afghanistan through "Strategic Depth" was neither acceptable to the Afghans nor to the neighbouring countries. Additionally Pakistan's regional ambitions if based on its needs, resource base, current economic and social conditions, and ability did not

support a conflict with India. If Pakistan wanted to face down India, it needed to do so diplomatically by building up trust with regional players. But unfortunately Pakistan was currently friendless in the region with Iran suspicious, Central Asians abhorring the policy of backing the Taliban and Russians carrying the old enmity due to backing of the Mujahedeen. This reality needed to be kept in mind as Pakistan played its cards to further its national interest's in the future Afghan peace dialogue.

“Pakistan needed to change direction which was not possible without the political and military leadership accepting responsibility for sponsoring extremism for the last thirty years rather than blaming India, America and the rest of the world.”

The talk was followed by a lively question and answer session. Answering a question, "what kind of exist strategy could be discussed in the absence of legitimate political authority in Kabul and if the Americans would feel secure leaving Afghanistan with Al-Qaeda intact?", Rashid argued that the reality was not just set in Afghanistan but also on the streets of Europe and America where majority of the public wanted to pull out troops. Thus America would draw down troops but keep troop presence for another 5-10 years. Additionally large armies were not needed to tackle Al-Qaeda, which would continue through special teams, drones and ground intelligence.

Answering another question regarding how Pakistan could disengage from Afghanistan especially when a divergence of views existed between civil and military leadership, Rashid stated that the definitional difference of National Security with military focusing on India and civil focusing on prosperity, health etc. had been at the root of the civil-military argument. In the short term, Pakistan had to end its insurgencies before discussing economic progress and thus a countervailing voice to the militaristic Strategic Depth strategy was necessary for Pakistan to not overplay its cards and work towards a stable, peaceful and friendly

Afghanistan in conjunction with other neighbours. While for the long term, continuation of the political process was the only option.

“...keeping India out of a regional settlement would be detrimental to Pakistan's interests.”



Ahmed Rashid presenting his books for the University's library

In regards to the question if media was now a major hindrance in the reappraisal of the Strategic Depth strategy, Rashid agreed and stated that the new electronic media had been seized both by the military and political forces. Thus media was deeply politicised rather than objective, leading to creation of disinformation.



: **Mark Ward**, Special Advisor on Development with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) delivered a talk on **Afghanistan Policy: Challenges of Reconstruction and Development** on the 21st of December 2009 at the Centre for Public Policy & Governance with **Dr. Rasul Bukhsh Rais**, Professor of Political Science, Lahore University of Management Sciences as the Discussant.



Mr. Mark Ward began his talk by stating that key decisions and changes have to be made by the donor and international community in helping Afghanistan as we move from the first to the second decade. He asked the audience to picture how it all began in 2002, when donors came to Kabul in record numbers after the Taliban were driven out. They flew in from capitals all over the world carrying big suitcases full of money, took their places around the table leaving two empty chairs for somebody from the government to walk in and say 'this is what we want you to do', 'these are our priorities, this is what we want you to spend your money on'. But no one from the government showed up and as donors' governments questioned them and pressurized them to do something, they had two choices: first, to wait for the Afghan government to show up, second, to get started without it.

The donors when they arrived in Bonn in 2002 had goodwill; they had guidance neither from the Afghan government nor from their own capitals. Furthermore, neither they nor their capitals were patient and thus their strategy was to start the programs and figure out things

as they progressed. Enormous programs in terms of money involved, were started in 2002 with very little input from the Afghan Government. The same happened a couple of years later with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), originally the forward operational bases around the country run by foreign militaries including the US, UK, Canada, Sweden, Germany, France and Italy (see Figure 1). Awash with money, they started "Quick Impact Projects" without talking to anyone and even if they did find someone, it was the local warlord.

As large amounts of money were spent around the country, the Afghan Government gradually wanted to take a hold of this donors and PRT juggernaut to follow the Government's lead and spend money according to its priorities. But there were only a couple of ministers in 2004–2005 with enough confidence, experience and discipline, and were also loud enough to convince the donor community to support the Afghan plan. Thus successful national projects were started in three areas; basic education, public health access and rural development. Most of the other sectors remained in chaos as donors ran amuck following directions from their far off capitals, mostly implementing projects without understanding the Afghan reality or discussing with the Afghan government. With no one in charge and no donor coordination, there was duplication of effort in some areas while other areas were neglected leading to wastage of money. The UN Security Council acknowledged it and mandated UNAMA about a year and a half ago to help the government reign in donors and coordinate the development effort.

“...perverse incentives forced personnel to continue with quick impact projects rather than involving the Afghan government for slow or medium-impact projects.”

Ward was asked to lead this new team at UNAMA fifteen months ago. His initial thinking was that if he could help the government put good programs, ideas, initiatives and action-plans in front of the donors, surely they would fund them and the money would start to coalesce behind the government programs rather than behind multitudes

of donor programs. But he soon learnt that this was not enough as it was very hard to break bad habits. Although some very good ideas were put in front of the donors, still they would rather fund their own ideas than of the governments. Ward stated that UNAMA had made little bit of progress in the last fifteen months but had a long way to go. More importantly, he argued that Afghanistan was at the crossroads and the one thing that needed to be done differently was to start investing in the capacity of the government to design programs. This required spending money on building organizational capacity and institutionalizing the program design process, which was currently individual based and ad-hoc. But a bigger challenge was to convince the reluctant donors to fund Government plans when the Afghan Government was perceived to be corrupt, as donors thought that they could keep track of their hard-earned tax money only if they spent the money themselves. Ward argued that the biggest challenge in moving from US Government to the UN was that it was unable to influence anyone given UN's lack of power and authority over donors and member countries. He stated that UNAMA was even having a hard time coordinating UN agencies in Afghanistan, as they also followed instructions from their own headquarters and behaved much like the donors. Thus UNAMA's and Afghanistan's challenge for the second decade of the new century was to lead these seven years in the making donor juggernaut into a new direction without the necessary authority over them.

“...donors ran amuck following directions from their far off capitals, mostly implementing projects without understanding the Afghan reality.”

Ward argued that any serious effort to transition governance and development to the Afghans through the reduction of troop levels and international community could only work when the country could manage its own affairs. This practice of funding projects designed thousands of miles away and funding quick impact PRT projects was neither helpful for Afghans nor sustainable. He pleaded that it was time to start trusting the Afghan Government especially the ministries that had shown their

capacity to handle money and design programs, and use small projects to build Afghan capacity rather than just talk about transition. Another aspect that hindered transition to Afghans was the incentive structure of the PRTs. As world capitals wanted to see their men and women in uniform doing good things, short six months tenures required personnel to execute small projects, concluding with a ribbon cutting picture for promotion. Thus even if these personnel understood that their building of schools, clinics, roads and wells in the presence of Afghan Government was actually doing harm rather than good, perverse incentives forced them to continue with quick impact projects rather than involving the Afghan government for slow or medium-impact projects.



In conclusion, Ward stated that UNAMA's message at the next international conference on Afghanistan was clear that if the international community was serious about transition then it was time for the Afghans to get into the driver seat and for the donors to start following, putting their money in government projects and telling PRTs to quit doing what the Afghans could do.

Commenting on Mark Ward's talk, Dr. Rasool Bux Rais elaborated that reconstruction of state, society, economy, infrastructure and institutions in Afghanistan was linked to political reconstruction, regional diplomacy and security inside and around Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a unique case as the country had gone through three cycles of conflict over the past thirty years, and one casualty of the war had been the Afghan State. The loss of the State had been great as modernization of society, development

and improvement of the human conditions was just not possible without some State capacity. It was this absence of the State, an institutional rather than an individual absence that was the key point of Ward's talk. Although an authority structure was sanctioned at the Bonn conference and later at the 2002 elections, the institutional capacity still needed to be built to guide, to give ideas or to follow good ideas of the international community. Government did not mean picking up a team under Mr. Karzai. It meant institutions, security and democracy using the entire infrastructure of the State.

Figure 1: ISAF Regional Commands



Source: ISAF

Rais' own assessment was that the international community had lost too much time and wasted too much energy and resources to be at the crossroad of the Afghan project. He argued that even if Afghanistan continued to fail because of various problems highlighted by Ward, there was still no alternative as no one would like to leave this project unfinished. It was both strategic, moral as well as the collective responsibility of nations that Afghanistan succeeded, as the alternative would be a strategic disorder in the region with the impact of violent transnational movements far beyond it.

The presentations were followed by a vibrant question and answer session. Answering a question if most of the money donated by foreign governments went back to their home nations through consultants and procurement?, Ward accepted the argument that donors' importing of everything from outside was wasteful, stating that

about 60% of the donated money did stay at home rather than becoming a part of the Afghan economy but it was changing for the better. The Afghan government did take a stand when the civilian surge was announced at the Hague Conference. It initiated a Local Procurement Campaign arguing that while it needed advisors to improve government's capacity, advisors who didn't speak the language, couldn't stay long in Afghanistan, and required extensive security costs could not be effective. Recognizing that not a lot had been achieved in the last seven years, donors accepted the plan but years of bad habits would take a while to go away. He argued that although capacity of the Afghan private sector had grown over the years, it was still a challenge to get donor funded PRTs to hire Afghan firms and NGOs.

“...reconstruction of state, society, economy, infrastructure and institutions in Afghanistan was linked to political reconstruction, regional diplomacy and security inside and around Afghanistan.”

In answering a question challenging the capacity of Afghan Government outside Kabul and the involvement of Afghan Diaspora in the reconstruction effort, Ward gave the example of District Governors in Afghanistan who got paid \$60/month with a monthly operating budget of \$15/month while stating that in such situation, the warlords with more power and resources could not be constrained. Thus capacity building was a definite need and was aggressively projected by UNAMA, but it was still a hard sell among donors who wanted working accounting and monitoring systems before providing any money, and immediate results for their domestic constituency. But this did not mean that the Afghan Government had no capacity as the Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Health, Education, Commerce and Rural Development (Ward had not interacted with the Government's security team) had solid teams and understood the challenges that confronted them. Still they needed help in interacting with donors. Some members of the cabinet were from the Diaspora, which had come back to Afghanistan from different parts of the world. But unfortunately even the Diaspora who

were contributing to the reconstruction effort was at times mistrusted by general Afghans.

With regards to a question challenging democratic and representative credentials of the Afghan Government, perceived occupation of Afghanistan and the possibility of sustaining an insurgency without majority support, Ward did not defend the popularity or representativeness of the Afghan Government while stating that the elections were certified by the International Election Commission. Still he took exception to the popular support for the Taliban stating that in the opinion polls conducted every year, there was still a very negative reaction to the Taliban. Taliban support was very small and limited to the communities they controlled. Discussing occupation, he stated that domestic constituencies in all Western countries including America wanted to bring their troops home rather than seeing their young fight, die and at times commit crimes and thus these countries did not see themselves as occupiers. This was also the reason why Obama had given an 18 month timeline to draw down troops.

“...if the international community was serious about transition then it was time for the Afghans to get into the driver seat”

Rais instead took a broader view arguing that Afghanistan was a product of strategic understanding between the British and the Russians, a state on the frontiers of all neighboring states and the only state in the world where majority ethnic groups lived across the border. Afghanistan thus needed to strictly define its boundaries and act as a neutral state as its internal stability depended on it. He suggested two pre-requisites for peace in Afghanistan. First, peace beyond boundaries as cross border involvement from and in Afghanistan was likely because of the intrigue and strategic concerns of Afghan neighbors including Russia, India, Iran and Pakistan which could again plunge it into a civil war. Second, peace among the ethnic groups. Rais argued that the 1990s Civil War was an outcome of the Taliban's (who were mainly considered part of Pashtuns) lack of accommodation of minority eth-

nic groups' national aspirations, which further extended to a confrontation with Iran (& other neighboring states). Further exploring the ethnic dimension, he argued that though Taliban were not the enemies of America and had no role in 9/11, they were now part of the Pashtun ethnic group fighting the American and international forces. Rais thus argued that both intra-afghan ethnic composition and the regional dimension needed to be kept in mind before lasting peace could be achieved in Afghanistan. He contended that voices arguing for international forces to go home tomorrow based on public opinion and moral ground needed to answer two important questions. One, what kind of a signal would a triumphant Taliban and religious militancy in Afghanistan give to Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan? Two, would it lead to another mini Great Game played by regional actors as throughout the 1990s? Instead, Rais argued that the need was to put Afghanistan back on track.



Answering a question if donor funds were being funneled into militant hands and if poppy cultivation was an issue in terms of reconstruction and the Taliban insurgency, Ward accepted that the odds for employing bad guys to provide security for infrastructure projects were pretty good though it was not intentional. He added that a new system to register security firms was being introduced to close such loopholes. There was also good news on the poppy front with the exact status available at the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) website. Production and cultivation were down and 22 provinces were poppy free. Cultivation was even down in Helmand by

about 20% this year owing to a number of factors including high wheat price. But it was not straight forward as Nangahar province which went poppy free four years ago again saw poppy cultivation two years back.

Answering a question in reference to imposing a Western style system on the Afghans and expecting that democracy would pay dividends, Rais suggested to the audience to perceive Afghanistan the way international community found it in 2002 in statelessness. He challenged the audience to imagine what statelessness meant? He suggested bringing the events of 1947 to mind when an imperial state collapsed at the time of partition giving rise to a Hobbesian man. Having no capacity didn't mean that there was some inherent weakness in the Afghans. It meant a lack of institutional capacity due to decades of war. But the Afghan State was evolving, developing and one had to accept that infrastructure and institutions are built over time. A legitimate government required a democratic order though its quality would be conditioned by the socio-cultural circumstances of the locale. Finally, in answering a question regarding the importance of local involvement in development specifically of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and how could the juggernaut courtesy of Kerry Lugar Bill (KLB) would be handled intelligently in Pakistan? Ward argued that the major developmental successes in Afghanistan since 2002 had been of the Afghan ideas. The seven million Afghan kids in school and 65% people with access to basic public health was mostly because of a couple of strong ministers. The National Solidarity Program was also a popular project as it involved the community through Community Development Councils whereby community's ideas were funded given the community bore at least 10% of the costs. Ward argued that it was important to institutionalize these programs and make similar progress in other areas. Regarding development in Pashtun areas, he stated exactly the opposite arguing that UNAMA had actually criticized the international community for spending funds in areas where their young men and women were fighting while ignoring important parts of the country. He argued that United States was spending almost 80% of its foreign aid in Afghanistan in the South and East. On KLB his departing advice was: "Please learn to say no to the donors. They're not going to take their money and go somewhere else, at least not right now."

: Mr. Moeed Yusuf, South Asia Advisor at the United States Institute of Peace delivered a talk titled "Endgame in Afghanistan: A Pakistani Perspective" on March 18, 2011 at the Centre for Public Policy & Governance.



Moeed Yusuf began by laying his argument that Pakistan and the United States had started out with inherent internal divergence of interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan had been supporting the Taliban before 9/11 and was worried about two aspects. One, given its political and ethnic links with Afghanistan, it feared an internal backlash, as well as a reaction inside Pakistan if military was sent into tribal areas. Second, Pakistan wanted to avoid a two front situation with greater Indian influence in Afghanistan through the Northern Alliance. Additionally, it could not afford a solution in Afghanistan which left out the Pashtuns because that would have destabilized Pakistan's Pashtun belt. Looking back, both these concerns came true. Pakistan reluctantly sent its military into tribal areas but not in the numbers requested by the US while Indian presence in Afghanistan increased through investments and four consulates. Pakistan reacted by trying to do as little as possible to appease the US without creating an internal backlash- it struck peace deals rather than conducting a major military operation.

“Pakistan faced a serious dilemma because even if it did not support America it still had to deal with the terrorism problem.”

Thus the often quoted Pakistan's double game which encompassed getting as much money as possible from the Americans while doing little. Pakistan did not do enough to please the Americans because it did not want to undermine its own security as enhanced military force would have led to a bigger backlash. But a more worrying aspect was the double game played with the Pakistani people by Pakistan's strategic establishment, as deals with the US were struck behind closed doors while a very different message was given to the Pakistani people (For example, Drones are terrible and we want to stop them yet we will give America a base to fly them from. We don't want American money if the terms are humiliating, yet we want as much money as possible. We don't want Raymond Davis in the country yet our embassy will give visas). Similarly America also played a double game. It never made a case for how much Pakistan had done instead providing a sense that Pakistan needed to do more. It argued that no legal, ethical or moral boundaries were broken as Drones were only killing militants. Thus there was no transparency in this opaque relationship as both sides consciously kept the public out. Yusuf argued that a non-transparent model was no longer feasible as it would lead to multiple crises similar to the Raymond Davis affair.

Assessing the current situation, Yusuf stated that although Pakistan had developed a rentier relationship with the US, still both Pakistan and the US were playing out realpolitik to further their own interests. Pakistan faced a serious dilemma because even if it did not support America it still had to deal with the terrorism problem, while it also needed to show sensitivity to Iranian and Chinese suspicions on America gaining a foot hold in the region.

Yusuf argued that the policy under Obama had matured by a movement away from excessive military force and by discussing options towards policy convergence between Pakistan and America; He identified three basic pillars of Pakistan's policy. One, it wanted relative stability in Afghanistan as anarchy meant a new wave of human spillover leading to major economic consequences and large ungovernable spaces (reverse Strategic Depth) which militants could use against Pakistan. Two, with the realization that benefits of American presence in Afghanistan could not be undone; Pakistan was vehemently opposed to the Afghan Taliban returning to power as in the 1990s

because this could only happen with a prolonged civil war and additionally, because it would lead to the empowerment of Pakistani groups with same ideology. Three, Pakistan had a serious interest in seeing Haqqani, Hizb-Islami and other Afghan Taliban groups going back to Afghanistan and vacating FATA as Pakistan could not take on the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) wholeheartedly because it co-habited as well as had linkages (tactical if not strategic) with these groups.

“...saw a growing Pak-US convergence in the broad narrative encompassing a stable Afghanistan, a broad based government with satisfactory Pashtun representation and a negotiated settlement rather than a military solution.”

America had its own three pre-conditions for peace negotiations. First, it did not want Al-Qaeda (AQ) in the region and was desperate for a guarantee. Second, it wanted the Taliban to lay down arms which was a deal breaker. Third, it wanted all parties to accept the constitution though was flexible. Assessing these conditions, he argued that no country could give a guarantee on AQ as even the Taliban (considered a Pakistan proxy) did not give into any strategic issue during the 1990s. In the absence of a guarantee, America would keep 20,000 troops and 5 bases against the AQ threat (American opinion was split between Pentagon wanting bases and Obama wavering). But the Afghan mindset irrespective of ethnicity would not accept this long-term American presence and neither would Iran and Russia. He also disagreed with the military surge meant to weaken the Taliban enough to negotiate on American terms. He argued that this was devoid of local context because if it did work, the Afghans rather than coming to their knees would instead buy time to fight another day while regional states including Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia would not allow an overwhelming Taliban defeat. However, if the surge did not work then the Taliban considering themselves successful would not want to negotiate.

As the end game neared, Yusuf saw a growing Pak-US convergence in the broad narrative encompassing a stable Afghanistan, a broad based government with satisfactory Pashtun representation and a negotiated settlement rather than a military solution. However a fair amount of divergence existed in the tactical sphere. To preserve its interests, Pakistan had to ask itself what leverage it enjoyed among stated insurgent groups because it seemed that these groups actually leveraged the ISI rather than the ISI leveraging them. Could Pakistan bring these groups to the negotiating table if America left out few of its pre-conditions? He argued that America did not have unlimited time to plan out its strategy because its lack of initiative would compel regional players to act as could be seen from Karzai's recent visits, Pakistani Prime Minister's visit to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan President's visit to Pakistan.

Yusuf favored a Regional Framework for bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan provided its neighbors agreed on 'non-interference'. He contended that it could mean a huge economic potential for Pakistan if Pakistan was prepared to look beyond the security lens. Although Pakistan had lost a lot of goodwill among the Afghans by playing one group against another, and it was criticized for being hegemonic and excessively interfering, the Afghans still had a longing for Pakistan because of the geographical link as most Afghans had no concept of the Durand Line and went to Peshawar instead of Jalalabad for medical treatment. Yusuf argued that Pakistan had to change tact and offset India through constructive means rather than creating a nuisance value. Pakistan had to accept Indian presence in Afghanistan, acknowledge India's right to further its interests under international rules (\$1.2bn investment) and realistically assess the Indian factor by accepting that there were 4 and not 44 Indian consulates in Afghanistan. Instead Pakistan should only concentrate on India's illegitimate activities and had two options for a response. A tit for tat strategy was unfeasible because of Pakistan's internal insecurity. A better option was to open a dialog with India and tell them pointblank of what was not acceptable. He argued that India was aware of its limits in Afghanistan and knew that it couldn't outfight Pakistan in Afghanistan. Pakistan however needed to generate a counter narrative to convince the world of its legitimate concerns in Afghanistan as currently Pakistan was considered a universal bad boy. But this required an

internal consensus and credibility of the Pakistani State, which was even lacking internally. Introspection was required as the real problem was internal corrosion which outsiders could take advantage of. Pakistani leadership had to convince its people that what they were doing was in Pakistan's interests.

“...no solution had worked for Afghanistan unless the Afghans themselves came up with it and a regional framework provided Afghans that needed space.”

The talk was followed by a lively Q&A session. Answering a two part question, one, if he considered Afghanistan to be invincible; two, in case of an American failure what did he think of Afghanistan being split into two with Pashtun areas left to Pakistan?, Yusuf answered that the problem was not of Afghanistan's invincibility but instead of America's thinking that victory was possible. If America had understood that outright victory was not possible five years ago, we would not be in this mess. He stated that a division of Afghanistan was a nightmare scenario for Pakistan and was already happening in some ways. However, the territorial integrity of Afghanistan was not under discussion by any one including the non-Pashtuns. There was consistency in this aspect of American strategy-- coming from Generals McCrystal and Petraeus who had exploited the Shia-Sunni divide in Iraq and used a similar Pashtun- non-Pashtun divide model in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the most viable government in Afghanistan was when everyone (ethnic group) had their own sphere of influence while Kabul had a symbolic representation. Pakistan's major advantage had been that Afghanistan's supply routes went through it but still Pakistan needed to work for a broad based government.

Answering a question regarding the importance of Al-Qaeda and approach towards other militant groups in the Afghan-Pakistan war theatre, Yusuf stated that AQ's strength was fairly lean at around 500 and its capacity degraded because of Drone attacks and shifting of personnel to Yemen and Somalia. But AQ was no longer an Arab

organization and had instead become truly universal. Additionally, one needed to be careful in discussing militant groups as all could not be taken in unison; however they all had links at different levels and invariably used Pakistani territory for training. Financing and master minds of some attacks did come from AQ but it was not a wheeler dealer of all groups. There was a huge political economy around this insurgency and hundreds of freelance militants conducted operations at night while doing their normal day jobs. The approach had changed such that the military surge did not go after leaders because splinter groups were far more radical as could be seen in the case of Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT), which did not splinter and thus could be roped in. While Pakistan's will and capacity to tackle existed for the TTP but the capacity was probably not there for LeT as it could lead to an internal rupture. He thus agreed with specific approaches to deal with different groups as long as conceptually the strategy was to finish militancy.

“...legality of Drone attacks was never raised by Pakistan at an international forum meaning that Pakistan was complicit in allowing it to happen.”

Answering a question if America had other interests in Afghanistan or was it only after Al-Qaeda, Yusuf stated that no superpower had ever come to a country and set up bases only to 'civilize' people. All countries operated based on their interests and the only thing that mattered was who won the game. The US base in Herat was Iran specific and its long term presence may be China specific which also explained why India was currently in its good books. Although Pakistan's strategic interests diverged from American presence, Pakistan could not do much because its internal costs for taking on the US were too high. Instead it needed to make the best use in this situation. Among other key players for peace in Afghanistan, Iran supported the Northern Alliance; Russia could be a spoiler while Saudi Arabia looked towards Pakistan to ensure its minimal interests.

Answering a question if the US policy of Drone attacks

could be adopted by any country considering itself under attack, he stated that a UN resolution provided legal immunity to American invasion and presence in Afghanistan. However legality of Drone attacks was never raised by Pakistan at an international forum meaning that Pakistan was complicit in allowing it to happen. He thought that Pakistan was saving the International Law argument in case of a rupture between the US and Pakistan.

“Pakistan however needed to generate a counter narrative to convince the world of its legitimate concerns in Afghanistan as currently Pakistan was considered a universal bad boy.”

Professor Sajjad Naseer contested the arguments presented by Yusuf and asked the final question. He raised the point that if the inherent divergences that had existed after 9/11 still did? While the US had lost economic and military strength over the last couple of years, it still had power but not control, and though double games were played by both, Pakistan had lost out because it was a weak State. But more importantly with Afghanistan without a credible political centre, wouldn't it be difficult to negotiate a settlement and additionally to bring together 6-7 actors for a Regional Solution? Yusuf agreed that inherent divergence still existed, but argued that convergence was an outcome of both sides realizing their constraints and limitations while America's major mistake from 2003-2007 was to underestimate the importance of India factor for Pakistani Policy Makers. Furthermore, he said that no solution had worked for Afghanistan unless the Afghans themselves came up with it and a regional framework provided Afghans that needed space.

“Introspection was required as the real problem was internal corrosion which outsiders could take advantage of.”

Visitors and Activities

22 July, 2010

The Centre for Public Policy & Governance (CPPG) arranged an **Open House** for prospective students of Executive MA in Public Policy 2010-11 batch at the Centre.

26 July, 2010

Dr. Athar Osama, Founding Partner of Technomics International visited the CPPG to discuss collaborative opportunities in Climate Change initiatives.

4 August, 2010

The CPPG hosted **Annual Dinner** for the pioneer batch of Executive M.A in Public Policy at the Lahore Gymkhana.

5 August, 2010

The CPPG arranged the 2nd **Open House** for prospective students of Executive MA in Public Policy 2010-11 batch at the Centre.

9 August, 2010

The CPPG arranged a workshop on **Growth Strategy for Pakistan** in collaboration with Planning Commission of Pakistan at the Centre.

16 August, 2010

The CPPG arranged an **Entrance Test & Iftar Party** for the Executive MA in Public Policy candidates at the Centre.

18 August, 2010

The CPPG signed an **MOU** with the **Urban Unit**, Government of the Punjab at the Centre.

19 August, 2010

A delegation from the **Punjab Agricultural Research Board (PARB)** visited CPPG to discuss mutual research interests.

17 September, 2010

The Director, CPPG was invited by the Director General, Pakistan Rangers Punjab to deliver a talk on **"Population Growth & Implications on National Security"**.

23 September, 2010

The CPPG arranged a Policy Dialog on **"Governance for Post Disaster Recovery: A Brainstorming Session"** in col-

laboration with the Urban Unit, Government of Punjab.

27 & 28 September, 2010

The CPPG organized **Orientation** for the new batch of Executive MA in Public Policy.

28 September, 2010

The CPPG arranged a talk on **"Critical Thinking"** by Dr. Mary Linda Armacost.

29 September, 2010

Dr. Muhammad Ahsan Rana, Executive Director, **Agricultural Research & Advocacy Centre** visited CPPG to discuss Agricultural Research opportunities with the Director.

4 October, 2010

The Director, CPPG was invited by the Department for International Development (DFID) to participate in a seminar titled **"Improving Governance and Civil Service Reform"**.

13 October, 2010

The CPPG invited Mr. I. A. Rehman to deliver a talk on **"Reflections: On the Changing Role and Dynamics of Media in Pakistan"**.

18 October, 2010

The Director, CPPG participated in a workshop **"Gender Concerns in the Flood Emergency-Scaling up in the Early Recovery"** at the invitation of the Education Department, Govt. of Punjab and UNICEF at the Pearl Continental Hotel, Lahore

20 October, 2010

The CPPG organized a Policy Dialog on **"Creating A Leaner Government"** in collaboration with Department for International Development (DFID) funded Technical Assistance Management Agency (TAMA).

27 October, 2010

The CPPG invited Brig. (retd) Mujahid Alam to deliver a talk on **"The Role of Pakistan's Military in Peace Keeping & International Conflict Management"**.

1 November, 2010

Dr. Mike Medley met the Director, CPPG to discuss possibilities of collaboration & research on the issues of peace and conflict with Eastern Mennonites University.

23 November, 2010

The CPPG invited Mr. Jahangir Tareen to deliver a talk on "Managing Successful Farming in Pakistan: Experimentation and Innovation".

25 – 27 November, 2010

The Director, CPPG chaired the "11th Annual Population Research Conference" at Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan as the President of Population Association of Pakistan (PAP).

30 November, 2010

The Director, CPPG was invited by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) to participate in the launch of "Climate Change Report on Punjab and Changing Livelihoods".

2 December, 2010

The CPPG invited Dr. Nosheen Ali to deliver a talk on "From Protests to Poetry: Contesting Sectarianism in Northern Pakistan".

8 December, 2010

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Peter Reed, author of 'Extraordinary Leadership – Creating Strategies for Change' on "Challenges of Leadership in Public Service: Global Experience and Lessons for Pakistan".

3 January, 2011

The Director, CPPG participated in Population Association of Pakistan's (PAP) "Executive Council Meeting" at PAP Secretariat, Islamabad.

5-6 January, 2011

The Director, CPPG was invited by the University of Agriculture, Faisalabad to chair a session in the 2-day international conference on "Migration and Desertification".

11 – 12 January, 2011

The Director, CPPG participated in a 2-day seminar organized by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad and

chaired a session on "Pakistan – China Relations".

13 January, 2011

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Dr. Imdad Hussain on "Is Islamization persisting in Pakistan's Education? An Institutional Analysis".

26 January, 2011

The CPPG arranged a policy dialog with Dr. Ijaz Munir, Secretary Population Welfare Department on "Devising the Population Policy of the Government of Punjab".

3 February, 2011

Ambassador Fauzia Rizvi visited the CPPG to discuss initiatives of mutual interest with the Director.

5 February, 2011

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Dr. Michael Krepon, President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center on "Pakistan, India & US Relations: Future Directions".

08 February, 2011

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Prof. Jean Luc Racine, NRS Senior Fellow Centre for South Asian Studies at the School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Paris on "Emerging India and Asia's New Dynamics".

11 February, 2011

The Director, CPPG was invited by the Centre for Civic Education Pakistan for a talk on "Pakistani Federalism: Design, Developments, Deficits and Dreams" at Avari Hotel, Lahore.

March 9, 2011

The CPPG in collaboration with the Department of History, FC College arranged a seminar with Dr. Tahir Kamran, the Iqbal Chair at Wolfson College, University of Cambridge on "Community of the Marginalized: a State of Pakistani Christians".

March 10, 2011

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Suleman Ghani, Senior Policy Advisor on US-Aid Firm Project on "Reforming Regulatory Framework for Economic Growth: A Case Study of Agriculture Marketing".

Faculty & Staff

Dr. Saeed Shafqat | Professor & Director

- > PhD University of Pennsylvania
- > saeedshafqat@fccollege.edu.pk

Raheem ul Haque | Sr. Research Fellow

- > Masters Intl. Public Policy, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
- > raheemhaque@fccollege.edu.pk

Rashid Munir Kahloon | Research Fellow

- > MSc (International Banking and Finance), University of Glasgow
- > rashidkahloon@fccollege.edu.pk

Hajra Zafar | Research Fellow

- > Masters in Economics, Boston University
- > hajrazafar@fccollege.edu.pk

Khurram Waqas Malik | Research Fellow

- > MS-PPM, H. John Heinz III College, Carnegie Mellon University
- > khurramwaqas@fccollege.edu.pk

Reema Gill | Program Manager

- > MA Economics, Peshawar University
- > reemagill@fccollege.edu.pk

Nayer Aftab | Administrative Assistant

- > BA (Hon) Mass Comm. FC College
- > nayeraftab@fccollege.edu.pk

Contact Us

Centre for Public Policy & Governance (CPPG)

E – 017 & 018

F.C. College (A Chartered University)

Feroz pur road, Lahore – 54600

Phone: 042. 9923 1581 – 88 Ext. 388

Email: fc.cppg@gmail.com

http://cppg.fccollege.edu.pk

Board of Advisors

: **Dr. William B. Eimcke** is the founding director of the Picker Center for Executive Education of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs.

: **Barrister Shahid Hamid**, former Governor of Punjab currently manages his own Law Firm.

: **Dr. Salman Humayun**, Deputy Chief of Party, Education Sector Reform Assistance Program (ESRA).

: **Dr. Akmal Hussain**, a development economist specializing in action research. He runs a private manufacturing firm, Sayyed Engineers (Private) Limited.

: **Dr. Saba Gul Khattak**, former Executive Director SDPI specializes in comparative politics and state theory.

: **Dr. Anjum Khurshid** (MBBS, MPAFF), Assistant Professor and Director of the Health and Behavioural Risk Research Centre, University of Missouri.

: **Khushnood Akhtar Lashari**, a DMG officer currently serving as the Federal Secretary of Health.

: **Dr. Naushin Mahmood**, Senior Researcher at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) specializes in demography and population issues.

: **Javed Masud**, former Managing Director and CEO The Pakistan Credit Rating Agency Limited.

: **Dr. Jack Nagel**, Professor of Political Science, Business and Public Policy, Wharton, University of Pennsylvania.

: **Jean-Luc Racine**, Senior CNRS Fellow at the Center for South Asian Studies, School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Paris focuses on geopolitics of South Asia.

: **Kamran Rasool**, former Chief Secretary Punjab, Federal Defense Secretary and Chairman PIA.

: **Babar Sattar**, LL.M, a Rhodes Scholar who writes on social, political and legal issues and runs a law firm AJURIS.

: **Dr. Shafqat Shehzad**, Associate Professor Comsat University, Islamabad and former Research Fellow at SDPI specializes in health economics.

: **Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua** is a security studies expert specializing in defense decision-making and civil-military relations in South Asia.

: **Dr. Rukhsana Zia**, Director, Directorate of Staff Development (DSD), Punjab specializes in curriculum and management issues in education.



CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
AND GOVERNANCE



Forman Christian College
(A Chartered University)