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For the past three years at the CPPG, we have been debating to convert the Quarterly into a journal. But we also feel that its current format though demanding is robust. At the same time, we have been trying to evaluate our seminars, policy dialogues, in which national and international scholars are invited to share their research and express their views on issues and explore policy choices that confront Pakistan, across the region and globally. This issue is a backlog of our seminars and policy dialogues; during the years 2011 -12, the CPPG had the honor of hosting eminent national and international scholars who shared their ideas with the CPPG participants on matters related to critical issues; nuclear weapons and their safety, Indo-Pakistan relations, US- Pakistan relations, urbanization challenges, the relevance of French public service for Pakistan, colonial rule and its impact on Punjab—the range and choice of topics are vibrant, live and...cont. page 14

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CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
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Is Linguistic Culture Deep Rooted in Language Policy?

A reflective analysis of Harold Schiffman's article, "Language Policy and Linguistic Culture"

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Introduction

This paper provides a comprehensive review of the article "Language Policy and Linguistic Culture" by Harold Schiffman published in 1996, and analyses it with reference to the usage of language in Pakistani context, citing examples from different socio-ethnic groups in the country; to understand how language policy relates to the linguistic culture in Pakistan, in the light of the selected article.

In the article, Schiffman defines the term Linguistic Culture, and then identifies and discusses the link between explicit language policy and the implicit linguistic culture in a given language situation. He also studies how 'beliefs', 'religion' and 'myths' along with other 'cultural baggage' like 'prejudices', 'values' and 'ideas' affect the linguistic culture in a society. The article envisages case studies elaborating upon the usage of four languages in different socio-cultural settings to bring out this link between the language policy and the linguistic culture. These include Tamil language in Tamilnadu, India, German in America, Polish in Russia and mono-linguistic culture of using French in France. All these cases point to specific conclusions in terms of the variety of outcomes which this relationship results in, with a range of implications for the usage of each of these languages.

“...linguistic culture is distinct from linguistic ideology and captures a broader range of meanings.”

The linguistic situation in Pakistan is a result of the overt and covert nature of the language policy, variety of indigenous languages in use, languages for official and non official purposes, and influences of colonial rule. A blend of this creates a language situation where the language policy, though pivotal essentially, is actually titular in nature. Since linguistic culture, as defined by Harold Schiffman, unravels a distinct approach to understanding the role of language policy, hence this makes it apt to study it in order to evaluate the role of linguistic culture

and language policy in the Pakistani context.

This paper is not a research study. It does not draw upon a broader nature of impact resulting from qualifying reasons but only approximates a reflective analysis of the selected article. It endeavors to analyze and understand the vital but obscure nature of linguistic culture which is a consequence of the varieties of language in a linguistic community as in the case of Pakistan. It begins with the analysis of what is meant by "Linguistic Culture", followed by reflecting upon and relating three case studies used by Schiffman to the local context in Pakistan.

Defining Linguistic Culture

Linguistic culture is connected to the language policy where in some cases the former directly influences the latter. The article selected for analysis begins by dispelling any existing false notions about the meaning of the term *Linguistic Culture*. Harold Schiffman defines the term Linguistic Culture as a culture present in the ".....consciousness (or memory, or shared knowledge, or imagination) of linguistic communities." According to him, it does not reside in language, i.e., in the grammar of a certain language, but is a broader concept, which initially he considered, could be easily understood as the terms like 'business culture' and 'sports culture'; but linguistic culture is a term far more complex and intricate and needs explaining. Schiffman defines Linguistic Culture as:

[T]he sum totality of ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, prejudices, myths, religious strictures, and all the other cultural "baggage" that speakers bring to their dealings with language from their culture. Linguistic culture also is concerned with the transmission and codification of language and has bearing also on the culture's notions of the value of literacy and the sanctity of texts¹.

Sociologists and anthropologists have been studying the relationship between language and culture since early 20th century and the connection between the two is acknowledged. However, *linguistic culture* provides the flexibility of viewing language through the culture lens, hence,

adding richness to the contextual meaning of the term. In another article, Schiffman says that "I view linguistic culture as a powerful force that may underlie and guide the formulation of both *overt* and *covert* action on behalf of language, and I see it at work in many areas of linguistic activity"². Thus, Schiffman sees language policy grounded in linguistic culture³. However, the connection of overt and covert action with linguistic culture and linguistic culture's relation with linguistic ideology needs further exploration.

Linguistic Culture, Linguistic Ideology and Language Policy

The term linguistic culture generated a debate among various culture critics and linguists. Some critics viewed *linguistic culture* as something which the term *linguistic ideology* can better express; also this latter term was in use for concepts like those Schiffman wanted to cover under this new term. But, on the other hand, Schiffman holds that linguistic culture is distinct from linguistic ideology and captures a broader range of meanings than what other scholars tried to understand with language ideology. Linguistic culture and language practice in a society form a complex and dynamic landscape, which captures an over-arching framework for linguistic behaviour in a society and is not covered completely under the term *linguistic ideology*.⁴ Here it is equally important to differentiate between covert and overt language policy.

Covert and Overt Language Policy

Schiffman talks about the language policy as an *explicit factor* which takes decisions about language in a social setting. He believes that language policy, despite being explicit and formally articulated, has limited impact on linguistic behavior of the society. In another article, Schiffman emphasizes that the study of language policy has evolved into an interdisciplinary field involving social psychologists, political scientists, linguists, demographers, economists, geographers and anthropologists along with such pioneering sociologists of language as Kloss, Fishman and Weinreich⁵.

Schiffman points out that it is not only the "*overt, de jure*" or official decision making about the language which lays down the framework for language outcomes in a social setting, but it is also the "*implicit, covert or de facto*" usage of the language in a society which determines this linguistic behavior. He further points out that it is these

covert and implicit factors which at times result in a tenuous relationship between the language policy and its implementation, thus thwarting the operationalization of the policy developed by the policy makers. He strongly believes that "language policy is [deep] rooted in linguistic culture"⁶.

Many researchers prefer to think of language policy as much broader phenomenon, involving not only overt decision making regarding language but also more subtle kind of societal forces that I will subsume under the notion of "covert" or 'implicit' policy.⁷

The following section talks about why the term *linguistic culture* was coined and how it can be applied to understand the link between language policy and linguistic culture. It uses Schiffman's four case studies to explain the term, its evolution and its application to the Pakistani case.

Language Policy and Risk of Political Turmoil

Schiffman worked with Tamil language in India from 1960-1965, and found out that Tamil language is the second oldest language in India and has such socio-cultural features which can be explained only through the hypothesis that the language has a *Tamil linguistic culture*. He also points out that the language has much in common with other language groups but at the same time it is quite different from them because of the old traditions that it upholds.

“ The language policy as enshrined in the Constitution is aimed at freedom of preserving linguistic purity and allows all ethnic groups to promote this institutionally. ”

In the article, Schiffman points out that due to inappropriate language policies, sometimes, language becomes an important reason for political turmoil, unrest and at times violence in a country. He relates that he was in India in 1965-1966 (as he was working on his dissertation on Tamil syntax), when he encountered political turmoil in India emanating from a change in language policy.

The Indian Constitution of 1950 laid down that *Hindi* language would replace English in 15 years time. The cut off time frame for this change over was the year 1965. As India was not ready for this transition, there were many supporters of Hindi language who rose against the use of English language and proclaimed that its usage should be immediately abolished. They further demanded that Hindi should replace English both at official and non-official levels. Thus the policy shift became a reason for political upheaval as other languages existing in India wanted to establish and retain their independent identity, as in the case of Tamil in Tamilnadu.

Tamils as an ethnic group took pride in the 'purity' of their language and its unique ancient literature. The natives were endeavoring to "purify" the Tamil language from the influence of Hindi or Sanskrit for over half a century⁸. This policy change led to emotional trauma for the Tamils who refused to accept this transition, resulting in political unrest in India which also made the Tamils "language fanatics"⁹.

The Tamil language case is relevant in Pakistani context as Pakistan has registered conflict, violence and political turmoil emanating from implications of language policies, which disregard ethnic and linguistic sensitivities. "Pakistan is a multilingual and multiethnic country with six major and over 57 small languages" spoken and understood in the country¹⁰. The percentage value of linguistic diversity in Pakistan is given below in Figure 1. These diverse linguistic groups have a range of legitimate expectations regarding their linguistic objectives that need consideration in formulating language policy options.

Figure1: Linguistic Diversity in Pakistan

Languages	Percentage of speakers
Punjabi	44.15%
Pashto	15.42%
Sindhi	14.10%
Siraiki	10.53%
Urdu	7.57%
Balochi	3.57%
Others	4.66%

Source: Census 1988

The Case of Urdu vs Bengali: Pakistan has seen political unrest in 1960s resulting from policies aimed at making *Urdu* the national language for the whole of East and West Pakistan, leaving the Bengalis in East Pakistan feel discriminated against. Bengalis wanted to promote the agenda of recognizing both *Urdu and Bengali* as the national languages because for them "the language, Bengali, was a symbol of consolidated Bengali identity in opposition to the West Pakistani identity"¹¹. But the language policy adopted by Pakistani policy makers at that time left the Bengalis feel excluded and this "... most significant consequence of the policy that Urdu would be the national language of Pakistan saw its opposition by the Bengali intelligentsia"¹², which thus loudly contributed to the reasons for the separation of East from West Pakistan in 1971.

“...due to inappropriate language policies, sometimes, language becomes an important reason for political turmoil, unrest and at times violence in a country.”

The Case of Urdu vs Sindhi: In 1970s, Karachi saw the rise of strong ethnic concerns of the migrant Urdu speaking *Muhajirs* vis-à-vis the local Sindhi communities when the PPP government decided to introduce Sindhi instead of Urdu and then compromised in recognizing both Urdu and Sindhi as official languages of the province. This tenuous relationship led to the rise of violent conflict in the city resulting in huge damages to lives and property in later decades. This led to the creation of a distinct geographic division of the city of Karachi between Urdu speaking *Muhajirs* and the *Sindhis*. The tensions led to the emergence of interest groups who used it to push their vested agendas. Political alliances among the political parties became evident on the lines of ethnic divides which resulted in "ethnic opposition"¹³. Further, Rehman views how this affected the behavior of the natives of Sindh. He writes,

Apart from the riots, peoples conduct remains pragmatic. The *Mohajirs* knowing that they can get by without learning Sindhi, do not learn it except

in the rural areas where it is necessary for them. The Sindhis, again because they know they cannot get by without learning Urdu, do that¹⁴

Although the Sindhi – Urdu tension has now been controlled to quite an extent, the level of volatility in relationship is high and has seeped into other ethnic and linguistic groups as well; for example, the tension between *Urdu and Pushto* speaking communities in Karachi today which periodically results in unrest and turmoil in the city with massive property and life losses. However, the reasons for this unrest are different and more complex.

The current political unrest in the city of Karachi, results from the desire of the different linguistic groups (Figure 2) to retain the purity of their distinct languages. This political turmoil is in direct conflict with the explicit language policy that emanates from the constitution of Pakistan which provides for flexibility of promoting each language by the relevant ethnic group.

Figure 2: Linguistic diversity in Southern Pakistan



Source: Lewis (2009) *Ethnologue, Languages of the World*

Language Policy and Diglossia

Varieties in language are termed as 'diglossia', which comes from the Greek word, 'diglossos' meaning bilingual. Diglossia is such a sociolinguistic situation in which two completely different varieties of a language co-exist throughout a speech community each with a unique range of social function¹⁵. The American linguist, Charles A. Ferguson, said that "...high and low varieties ... belong to the same language"¹⁶. On the other hand, diglossia refers to those situations also where the high and low varieties are two entirely different languages¹⁷.

Schiffman points out that these language situations are a part of "covert" language policy and not "overt" language policy¹⁸. He also says that these covert policies affect the "linguistic habits and behavior" of the people as he noticed it in the natives of Tamilnadu and India. Furthermore, he says that this linguistic behavior is the result of "implicit policy" and not explicit policy making. Schiffman believes that no explicit policy planning can affect the linguistic habits of Indian subcontinent.

“ Language policy is completely rooted in the culture, though it may not be explicitly articulated and may remain "vague" and unclear. ”

Diglossia, being a language situation which results from an informal and implicit interaction of two or more languages, is often not a subject for explicit policy formulation. Policy makers do not take the diglossic language situations into consideration while framing language policy. Schiffman has concluded that this does not mean that diglossia does not impact the language outcomes in a social setting. Alternatively, it remains a major determinant of the linguistic behavior. This has been explained by Schiffman through case studies of which Tamil will be discussed here. A Tamil diglossic language situation existed in Tamilnadu in 1965. But the language policy then in use in Tamilnadu did not allow the foreigners to speak the *spoken or low varieties* of Tamil whereas these were commonly spoken by the natives.

Schiffman points out that the natives of Tamilnadu could easily use the "High" and "Low" varieties of Tamil when communicating with the educated and uneducated speakers in the linguistic community respectively. But they even denied the fact that they used the vernacular version of the language as they were concerned about maintaining its purity. Due to the implicit linguistic cultural dynamics in real language situations, involving interaction of the educated with uneducated sections of the society, the Tamils used the vernacular version in complete disregard of the explicit language policy which aimed at discouraging any diglossic language outcomes for Tamil.

The Constitution of Pakistan provides for the *preservation*

of language, script and culture:

...any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right to preserve and promote the same and subject to law, establish institutions for that purpose.¹⁹

The language policy as enshrined in the Constitution is aimed at freedom of preserving linguistic purity and allows all ethnic groups to promote this institutionally. This apparently means that all the languages should be allowed to remain pure and clear of the influences from other languages. However, there are several instances where people willingly start using the languages of other ethnic and linguistic groups. So the overt language policy outcomes are influenced by the covert language situations. The following case study further explains this disconnect between policy and implementation.

The Case of Punjabi and Pashto: As there is a diversity of the ethnic and linguistic groups in Pakistan, cross-pollination of languages results from close interaction between two or more of these ethnic and linguistic groups. The case under reference here is of the Pakhtuns from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (Figure 3) who migrate to the northern and central Punjab and bring their language (*Pashto*) along with them. However, due to their fusion in the societal fabric in Punjab and constant exposure to the *Punjabi* vernacular, commonly spoken in the province, they pick up Punjabi and speak this language informally as people do learn languages for pragmatic reasons while at the same time they want to preserve their native language.²⁰

Figure 3: Linguistic diversity in Northern Pakistan & Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa



Source: Lewis (2009) *Ethnologue, Languages of the World*

It is evident from this case study that covert language situations have an overriding impact on the overt policy decisions which are not often mindful of the diglossic linguistic developments that take place informally in a socio-cultural setting.

“ The small and regional languages are under tremendous pressure, some of which have become extinct, while others are about to become extinct ”

Language Policy and Instruction

Explicit language policies requiring adoption of a particular language as the preferred medium of instruction while disregarding the implicit language situation in that socio-cultural setting are neither effective nor completely implemented. Schiffman discusses this failure of covert policy through the case of Polish in Russia where the explicit language policy required adopting Russian as the medium of instruction. Schiffman quotes Marie Curie’s biography and argues that Polish was taught in a “secret” way in Russia before 1918. Marie Curie describes in her memoirs that instruction in Polish switched to Russian when Russian inspectors visited the schools and resumed it upon their departure. Schiffman calls this a “subversive and resistant” implicit policy; an example of covert policy, which kept Polish language alive in Russia.

In the sub-continent before the independence of Pakistan, Hindi-Urdu controversy created a situation quite like Polish in Russia, where Hindi was imposed on Muslim children in schools.²¹ Urdu was a “symbol of Muslim separatism in British India” and it was used by the Muslim League to “mobilize Muslims against perceived Hindu domination and the struggle for Pakistan”²². The advocates of Urdu wanted to safe guard their language so that it does not become extinct at the hands of Hindi and continued using Urdu as the medium of instruction in a discreet fashion. This was a consequence of the covert policy which refused to accept a non-inclusive language policy decision.

Language Policy and Myth

Schiffman uses the case of explicit policy failures in France to emphasize the importance of myths that in some cases prevail more strongly than the explicit language policy and have implications in real language

situations. Language policy in France, according to French belief, is the “most explicit and ancient in the world”²³. He further says that the French strong belief in their language policy makes it *mythological* in nature. It is for this reason that France is the only country where “the exclusive use of the national language in all private and public acts” is a part of the legislation²⁴. This means French is used by all individuals for the purpose of communication, such as “from drafting the laws” to “commercial transactions”²⁵.

France is a monolingual society and the overt language policy as discussed above actually had no basis and in fact resulted from the power of the myth. The “*Law of 8 pluviose an II*” said that “French shall be taught in every commune where the local people do not speak French”²⁶. This milder version had many loop holes, such as, it required to open new schools where bilingual teachers would teach. As there were no bilingual teachers so they would be found. Another resolve was to open “teacher training institutes”, “*ecolenormale*”; trained teachers would be sent to the provinces to teach others.²⁷ This was done by the decree of 1794, but very few people got registered. Thus, this was also “dead on arrival” with the result that old schools had closed down and there were no replacements for them. Schiffman is of the view that explicit language policy that was so believed to exist actually was not there.

It was only in the mid 1990s that France finally realized that its supposedly explicit language policy was in fact largely unwritten and developed an overt policy which gave them the satisfaction that their language purity will now be secured. The lesson here is that France *did not need* an explicit policy to safeguard the purity of their language – this was already taken care of through the existing linguistic culture in France.

The case of English language in Pakistan: This can be compared to the situation in Pakistan as English language has become the mode of instruction in public schools recently, especially in the province of Punjab. This implies that English language shall be introduced at Grade 1 and that all other courses shall also be immersed in English language. As there is a complete dearth of qualified English teachers who can teach at the public schools in Punjab province, there is a possibility of non-standard local languages adversely affecting the English language purity in these areas. “A credible and transparent mechanism of teacher’s

recruitment and facilitation is a core requirement...”²⁸. In addition to this, there is also non implementation of the language policy in the region, due to an existing strong linguistic culture which covertly resists the language policy proclaimed by the State.

Conclusion

In order to understand how policy works, it should be looked into rather deeply and in context because “things are not always ‘as they seem’”,²⁹. Language policy is completely rooted in the culture, though it may not be explicitly articulated and may remain “vague” and unclear. Languages evolve as a result of informal interaction between the various linguistic groups that exist in a given language situation. This leads to language outcomes which are completely different from those promoted in the explicit language policies adopted by the relevant societal institutions.

“ English and Urdu remain the languages of domains of power. ”

Linguistic culture, though informal and unarticulated impacts the contours of the covert language policies which are strong enough to resist the implementation of the covert policies. The implicit language policy draws its shape and structure on the basis of the existing linguistic culture which results from the informal realm of real language situations. The linguistic culture controls the languages that apparently are free and independent.

Pakistan has examples which validate the assumptions that lie at the heart of Schiffman’s hypothesis. The linguistic culture in Pakistan results from the dynamic real language situations where the explicit language policies are found to be ineffective. The minor languages are jeopardized and the major ones are devalued. Despite a clearly articulated policy aimed at promoting all the regional and ethnic languages in Pakistan to avoid any discrimination against the less privileged linguistic groups, English and Urdu remain the languages of domains of power – government, corporate sector, media, and education etc..³⁰ The small and regional languages are under tremendous pressure, some of which have become extinct, while others are about to become extinct because of the state’s favoring of Urdu and English at the expense of others.

Marxist theory of language policy states that language is "irrelevant" and when the states "wither[ed] away," then "differences between languages also cease to exist". It may be concluded that linguistic culture, despite being unwritten, vague, abstract and informal has a strong bearing on the outcomes of a formal, written, clear language policy and can resist the implementation of a formal language policy.

End Notes

¹ Schiffman 1996

² Schiffman 1994

³ Lara Ryazanova-Clarke Edinburgh University, U.K

⁴ ibid

⁵ Schiffman 1994

⁶ Schiffman 1996

⁷ Schiffman 1994

⁸ Ramaswamy, S 1997

⁹ Schiffman 1994

¹⁰ Numbers from Jan 1996

¹¹ Rehman, T 2002

¹² Rehman, T 1996

¹³ Rehman, T 2002

¹⁴ Rehman, T 2002, *Language, Ideology and Power: language-Learning among the Muslims of Pakistan and North India*, 2002. Ch.10

¹⁵ Crystal, 1997

¹⁶ Hudson, 1996

¹⁷ Khan 2011 pp. 9-10

¹⁸ Schiffman 1997

¹⁹ *Constitution of Pakistan*, 1973, Article 251

²⁰ Rehman, T 2002 pp. 36

²¹ K. Ali, 1980

²² Rehman, T 2002

²³ Balibar 1985 pp. 9

²⁴ ibid

²⁵ Balibar, 1985 pp. 10

²⁶ Schiffman 1996

²⁷ Schiffman 1994

²⁸ Ahmed, N 2012

²⁹ Schiffman 1996

³⁰ Rahman, T 1996

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The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, Article 251

Changing Trends in the Lifestyle of Pakistani Urban Youth: Glimpses from Lahore

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Youth comprise approximately 32% (aged 15-29)¹ of Pakistan's population and there are varying interpretations about their orientation, outlook and worldview. This study focuses on the changing lifestyles of urban youth in Pakistani society. It seeks to explore how life-styles are changing despite rise in religiosity, religious radicalism, acts of terror, violence, personal insecurity and vigilante justice? To have deeper understanding of changing life styles, this study focuses on three areas; fashion design, electronic media advertisements and the emerging café/restaurant culture. Are these changes confined to elite classes or cut across class lines? The focus of the study is urban Pakistan and particularly Lahore.

Fashion Design:

Fashion design, fashion shows and trendy clothes are gaining popularity with the youth. Is that an indicator of changing life style? Youth's predilection for fashion reveals significant change in the perception of morality and religiosity as well as hints towards a penchant for consumerism, extravagance to even ostentatiousness.

The fashion and apparel industry in Pakistan is experiencing accelerated growth and youth appear to be the guiding force behind it. Talented designers with innovative ideas and internationally competitive designs are projecting the cultural heritage of Pakistan. They are targeting the youth and catering to their demands. Fashion products and apparel industry is showing dynamism and diversity. In a relatively short span of ten years, a large number of international and local brands have sprung up all over Lahore. In an extremely competitive market, these brands endeavor to come up with the most creative designs that are edgy yet wearable.

Among the most thriving segments of the apparel industry is the lawn business. Lawn campaign advertisements have swept over the city. Prêt wear brands for women have gained immense popularity. While western-wear, prêt-wear and branded lawn are popular among the elite and upper-middle class youth, there is a matching demand for similar items among the middle and lower middle class.

The textile industry may be languishing because of energy shortages and inadequate investment in modernization of plants, yet cloth manufacturers are aggressively targeting the emerging middle class and the youth². Various fabrics are producing more innovative designs inspired by elite designer-wear. Cloth bazaars have loose cloth available in many varieties and in various price ranges. Buyers with low and high budgets can both find something to suite their pocket.³

Pakistan is passing through a phase of cultural and social change and this phenomenon is most visible in the urban areas. On the one side, we are witnessing increased religiosity and on the other fashion industry is re-shaping life styles. Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad and to lesser degree Faisalabad have hosted several fashion shows.⁴

“... various factors like growth in local and global media, a booming fashion industry, rising number of fashion weeks, all have created a major influence on the mindset of youth.”

Does this imply that society's perceptions on modeling and fashion design are changing and there is greater acceptance and tolerance for Western fashion designs? It is a complex and contradictory situation where acceptance and resistance are running in parallel. However, Vaneeza Ahmed, a popular model, clearly thinks it is changing. Ms. Ahmed says when she started her career 15 years ago, modeling had little cultural acceptance and “there were bored housewives with nothing to do”. Now, fashion designing and modeling have grown and cultural attitudes towards them have wider acceptance in society. Tariq Amin, stylist and photographer, endorses Vaneeza Ahmed's observations. He says that some years ago it was difficult to find female models, however, now it's a popular profession among young and aspiring women and men.⁵ While the proponents of fashion design are enthused and

seemingly thriving as seen through bill boards and fashion advertisements, the opponents are furious and assert that fashion industry is promoting immorality and vulgarity among the youth.

Religious parties like Tanzeem-e-Islami and Jamaat-i-Islami, and a women's organization called Working Women Society (WWS) have launched a resistance campaign in Lahore and Karachi, putting out banners that say; "Stop promoting nudity for selling your fabrics", "Sell dresses, not modesty" and "vulgarity spoils, modesty beautifies". Jamaat-i-Islami also observed an "Anti-Vulgarity day".⁶

Responding to this smear campaign, Sehar Khan, the creative director of Circuit, a famous advertising agency, claims that "90% of our advertisements wouldn't offend anyone. Of course, different groups and individuals have different standards of acceptability -some people feel that showing pictures or faces is immoral. But we cater to the mainstream". Sehar Khan could be right because the urban centers of Pakistan have not witnessed any public protests against fashion shows or billboards.

Thus various factors like growth in local and global media, a booming fashion industry, rising number of fashion weeks, all have created a major influence on the mindset of youth. Youth is now more fashion conscious and more consumerist. Their spending patterns, social behavior and lifestyle have been impacted by a raised interest and consciousness of fashion design.

Electronic Media and Changing Advertisement Styles

Electronic media as a whole but specifically television plays, morning and cooking shows, fashion channels and the dynamic styles of advertisements have impacted youth life styles. The glamour that television plays and advertisements produce in some ways is also contributed by the youth and cuts across class lines.

Television has played an important role in changing the mindsets of the youth. Television viewership has gone up as have the number of television channels. The top ten channels of Pakistan have a total/cumulative viewership of 127 million, and PTV Home is the most viewed channel with 53 million viewers⁷. Morning shows and cooking shows have gained wide viewership among young women belonging to the middle and lower middle class. These

shows are live and interactive as viewers make calls and can have direct telephonic interaction with TV anchors and hosts. Most are hosted by women dressed in branded clothes who also share on TV, which label or designer's clothes they are wearing. The shows also have quiz questions which viewers can answer to win prizes and often the prize involves branded clothes by elite Pakistani designers. Very often elite designers are called as guests in morning shows where they discuss and showcase their work. Television advertisements are now evermore innovative, modern with catchy taglines and more appealing to the youth.

“ On the one side, we are witnessing increased religiosity and on the other fashion industry is re-shaping life styles. ”

With the widespread reach of fashion channels, now a middle and lower class families and in some cases even the marginalized groups can also easily watch fashion shows and stay updated with latest trends and styles.⁸ Hence through television's various programs, people from all economic backgrounds are surrounded and influenced by fashion images and showcased trends.

Pakistani drama industry has witnessed immense growth and popularity in the past few years. Due to the staggering increase in popularity of these dramas, they have had a tremendous impact on their young viewers. In terms of trends, the male and female actors in many of the plays are attired in high fashion ensembles as well as western wear, as considered appropriate for their role. As the youth admire and look up to the actors in their favorite plays, they also endeavor to look trendy and up to date like them. The visuals and content is ever more innovative, catchy and appealing to the youth.

Television and billboard advertisements are two of the most effective visual marketing tools currently being used by corporations to market their products. Many of the products are targeting the youth market and advertisements are especially designed to grasp the youth's attention and influence their buying choices.⁹ These include mobile phones and network providers, juices and fizzy drinks, junk food (ice-cream and chocolates etc.) and

clothing brands etc which showcase youngsters in trendy clothes. Additionally, aggressive advertising through TV and billboards is not only changing the norms and mindset of society through the images portrayed but is also encouraging a consumerist lifestyle among youth.

Overall, this has led to a rise in fashion consciousness. Thus youth belonging to various income classes are now increasingly inclined to follow ongoing fashion trends and more willing to spend on fashion products according to their respective incomes. Though their budget and taste in fashion may vary, the rich and middle classes alike are part of the fashion race. Tracing the factors behind this emerging trend shows the pivotal role played by growth in media and its expanded outreach.

Here it is equally important to understand the role of the marketing industry, which has grown exponentially over the past few years and has increased its influence on society in general and youth in particular. Increased competition among brands has changed the dynamics and led to growth of this sector. Adil Khalid, Creative Director at Interflow for the last 15 years, argued that the swelling consumer market and rising consumerism in society is the primary reason for growth in advertising. Hassaan Ahmad, Ogilvy & Mather, asserts that the opening up of multinational corporations (MNC) in Pakistan has stimulated this growth as MNCs employ more developed and sophisticated marketing techniques. Elaborating, he said that it provides an opportunity for Pakistani employees to acquaint themselves with international systems and procedures. Thus the local industry has been significantly influenced by international marketing methods and strategies which have raised the benchmark and standard of advertising in Pakistan.

Further, the younger lot/crowd with immense creative talent are engaged and involved in concept and content development of advertisements. Younger persons compose the majority employees of marketing and advertising departments and agencies. "Younger people are leading big organizations and creative departments" says Hassan¹⁰. Suggesting that it is ironic that many talented young persons do not have a degree in the field, he contends that "Creativity comes from within". Hassan feels that Pakistani society and culture has become more globalized, modern and provides space for creative thinking, which

has resulted in more innovative and creatively inclined youth to come forward. He seems less inclined to accept that extremist and fundamentalism trends are burgeoning and spreading among the youth. Instead, he points out that globalization, media and advertisements are helping youth embrace liberal trends and values, and this acceptability of more liberal content on television and outdoor media is indicative of changing mindsets and transforming societal values. Adil Khalid seems to have greater faith in the resilience of youth. He states that Pakistani youth has always been accepting of modern and liberal advertisements and that it is a very small segment that is extremist and targets liberalism. Similarly, advertising has always managed to retain and sustain a liberal posture as "Fanicism and extremism hold no place in advertising", but "the role of youth in advertising has been enigmatic. It has added freshness and vitality to the industry, as reflected in its outcome and product."¹¹

“...the local industry has been significantly influenced by international marketing methods and strategies.”

Images on billboards depicting women in liberal attire, and of men and women posing together comfortably in eastern as well as western clothing, are now widely popular among the youth. Similarly "Youth Packages" by mobile service providers with cheap overnight call rates are demanded by the youth. Marketing experts believe that such images are reflective and representative of the demands of today's youth and society. "Pakistani youth is now more literate and more exposed to influences of globalization through media", Hassan argues. Youth from both rural and urban areas are exposed to current trends through television, internet and outdoor media. The youth is attracted by modern and innovative advertisements. Popularity of such advertisements depicts what the current Pakistani youth and society are demanding and appreciating. The success of these advertising campaigns is evident as brands are gaining more popularity and business. Youngsters are rushing to purchase the advertised products charmed by the advertisements is stimulating their consumerist instincts.

Expansion of television networks, growth in the advertising industry and marketing has had a threefold impact. First, it has perpetuated and promoted lifestyle liberal values and trends among the youth. These trends have been accepted and embraced by the youth population, evidenced by the success of the advertising campaigns. Second, the aggressive advertising has resulted in rising consumerist behavior among the youth. Third, the boom in advertising industry has provided opportunities for the innovative and creatively inclined youth to utilize their creative talents and invest their energies in building a dynamic and internationally compatible/ recognized marketing industry.

Lahore: Changing Styles of Restaurants and Eateries

To have a better understanding of changing youth styles, the author selectively made survey of eateries in Lahore. Observational evidence and interviews with the youth reveal a growing trend in café culture and its popularity particularly among the youth. Selected visits to diverse socioeconomic areas in the city indicate that the eating out culture is popular in the high, middle as well as low income areas and classes. A large number of cafes, restaurants, fast-food outlets, *dhabas* and informal eateries have mushroomed all over the city targeting customers from various socioeconomic backgrounds. These are largely frequented by the youth and it is becoming more common for young men and women to spend time in cafes and restaurants with groups of friends. This trend has impacted the youth's eating habits and preferences, social interactions, gender relations, public exposure, and lifestyle.

Over the years there has been a cultural shift from traditional eating habits of eating in towards dining out. In the Punjabi culture, families would prefer to eat home cooked meals and would rarely dine out together. It was more common for single males to eat out and the traditional *dhabas* would cater mostly to male bachelors. Females would rarely eat out independently. In the late 70's many new restaurants offering Desi food, Chinese cuisine and fast food opened up. Young married couples started dining out in these restaurants.¹²

In the late 90's eating out culture underwent a rapid transformation as fast-food chains came to Pakistan. While Pizza Hut opened its first branch in 1993, KFC started in 1997 and McDonalds in 1998. With a comfort-

able and refreshing ambiance, these outlets provided an attractive place for families to dine out. School and college students began going out and spending time in these places independently. One could also spot groups of young girls enjoying a meal in McDonald or Pizza Hut. In the initial years, these places catered mostly to the elite class but today the scenario has completely changed. Upon a visit to McDonalds, one find customers from diverse economic backgrounds, families as well as college students and surprisingly a very large number of young couples.

“...the aggressive advertising has resulted in rising consumerist behavior among the youth.”

The opening up of Masooms Café (2003), Coffee Tea and Company (CTC) and the likes in Lahore brought with it a wave of coffeehouse culture. The cafés offered various flavors of coffee, hot beverages, shakes, pastries, deserts and other bakery items as well as a sophisticated yet informal ambiance, quickly established a good reputation and became the preferred hangout spot for the elite. They were visited by families, students and the working professionals mostly from the upper class due to the high prices. It targeted those who had international exposure and taste to appreciate quality coffee and snacks along as with ambience. Jammin Java and Dunkin Donuts were also among the pioneers in the coffeehouse business, and their growing business lead to emergence of many more cafes. Gloria Jean's also opened up in 2007 to capture the pre-existing market for coffee drinkers. In the following years, the trend caught on like wildfire and cafes started mushrooming in the city. Due to the process of globalization and increased exposure and awareness among people, they welcomed this cultural change. The Lahorites gradually developed a taste for coffee along with the traditional liking for tea.

Globally, coffee shops have been a favorite spot for writers where they can sip on their coffee and work uninterrupted for hours. Students looking for a quiet place to study also chose to do so in coffee shops where they can study as well as take snack and coffee breaks. However, though Pakistan has also caught up with cafe culture, the primary purpose of cafes in Pakistan is socializing, hanging out

with friends and family and eating together. It is not an inviting place to work as usually very loud music is played. It is meant for groups of people rather than individuals wanting to enjoy some alone time. Thus the atmosphere of cafes in Pakistan is vastly different from the West even though they have become very popular hangout places in Pakistan.

There are numerous cafes now in Defence and Gulberg with the greatest variety on M M Alam road.¹³ It is evident from visits to the cafes that they have a large clientele and a flourishing business. A large number of fast food chains as well as restaurants offering continental food have also opened up¹⁴. These cafes and restaurants are frequented by families and working professionals, however a large majority of clients comprises of the younger generation.

Another trend which has become common, is for a working young professional to dine out during their lunch break. With the increase in the number of working women, one finds groups of office going young men and women enjoy a quick lunch at their favorite restaurant or café. Those who cannot afford to eat frequently at high profile restaurants on M M Alam (costing on average Rs.1000/per head), can choose from cheaper options like biryani and burger places. Dhabas offering a large variety of Desi snacks like samosas, chaneey chaat etc, are also widespread in the city and cater to the middle and lower-middle class.

While most cafes and restaurants are located in Gulberg and Defence, the dining out culture has also spread to middle income areas like Johar Town and Wapda Town. The main boulevard in Johar Town boasts of a diverse range of restaurants with various price ranges. There are cafés serving coffee, beverages, pastries and continental food and also some of Lahore's oldest and most well known traditional food restaurants¹⁵. Though price range here is high, the eateries attract many customers. Driving down the road, one finds shawerma places, BRBQ food as well as fast-food chains, offering food at more affordable prices targeting the middle-class customers¹⁶. Popular pizza places like Gino's and Pizza Hut can be spotted. At the end of the Johar town main boulevard, one finds a corner that is a hub of Desi food dhabas serving a wide variety of food ranging from Nihari to fish. It has the

famous Muhammadi Nihari, Rahoo Machli, Sardar Machli and Nihari House. These eateries mainly cater to the lower and lower middle class. The ambiance is different with outdoor seating arrangement and mostly young males eating there. Thus Johar Town's numerous restaurants cater to varying income classes. In the visit, about 40 restaurants were counted in addition to numerous *dhabas* catering to various income classes.

“...the primary purpose of cafes in Pakistan is socializing, hanging out with friends and family, and eating together.”

Conclusion

The evolving face of fashion, advertising and restaurant/ cafe industry, and youth's rising inclination and interest towards them has led to emergence of new lifestyle trends and patterns among Pakistani youth. Their consumerist tendencies are being brought out through effective advertising, and spending priorities are tilted towards dining out and on consuming fashion savvy products. There is a huge demand for entertainment by youth belonging to varying socioeconomic backgrounds. The restaurant industry and fashion industry are responding to this demand by providing wide range of products and services to select from. Thus youth values, habits and ways of living are being metamorphosed into a more liberal and at the same time consumerist outlook. Is it a small minority's life style or an emerging trend among the urban youth is difficult to tell and demands greater attention and research.

End Notes

- ¹ Labor Force Survey 2012-2013 Quarterly Reports, Pakistan Bureau of Statistic
- ² Sitara fabrics, Classic and Firdous are cloth manufacturers catering to middle-class
- ³ Karim Block at Iqbal Town has factory outlets of western-wear brands like Levis, Leisure Club, Crossroads, along with shops and vendors selling unbranded clothes at affordable prices. Street garment vendors at various bazars (Liberty market, Barkat market) are also providing cheaper clothing options for the masses.
- ⁴ Recent fashion weeks include Showcase 2012, Fashion Pakistan Week3, and Bridal Couture Week all of which were held in Karachi. PFDC Sun silk Fashion Week (PSFW) was held in Lahore and Islamabad Fashion Week IFW was the first fashion week to be held in Islamabad.
- ⁵ Kiran Khalid. "Pakistan's fashionistas: We aren't revolutionaries" CNN, 23 February 2010
- ⁶ Hamna Zubair. "Anti-Skin or Anti-Women" NEWSLINE, July 2012
- ⁷ Gallup Pakistan. "Gallup Pakistan Media Cyberletter", October 2012, <<http://www.gallup.com.pk/News/cyberletter-updated1.pdf>> (1st August 2013)
- ⁸ Fashion channel style 360 is a cable channel which airs only fashion and beauty content. It airs fashion shows and interviews of designers, stylists, beauticians and other fashion celebrities
- ⁹ Products targeting the youth include mobile phones sets and service providers (U-fone, Jazz), clothing brands, fizzy drinks and juices, food products etc
- ¹⁰ Hassaan Ahmad, Accounts Manager, Ogilvy & Mather, Interview by the author, 2nd February, 2013
- ¹¹ Adil Kahlid, Creative director, Interflow, Interview by the author, 3rd February 2013
- ¹² Some popular restaurants like Kababeesh, Kabanna and Tikana offered desi food while Salt and Pepper offered fast food. Bar-bq food was also very popular for dining out.
- ¹³ Famous cafes in Lahore include Gloria Jeans, Masooms, Coffee tea and company(CTC), Hotspot, the Cafe Upstairs, and Espresso
- ¹⁴ Some famous restaurants are Zouk, Freddy's, Aylanto while Fast food chains like Hardees and Subway are also very popular
- ¹⁵ Jammin Java cafe and Bundu Khan restaurant with price range of 700-900 Rs. per person
- ¹⁶ Cock n Bull , KFC , AFC, JFC , Gino's, Pizza Hut

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| <p>Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. "Labor Force Survey 2012-2013 3rd Quarter (Jan-March 2013)", <http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/Labour Force/publications/lfs_quarterly_2012_13/quarter3/tables/t02.pdf> (2nd August 2013)</p> | <p>Ayesha Tammy Haq. "Nargis..Let there be light" <i>Outlook India</i>, 23 November, 2009</p> |
| <p>Gallup Pakistan. "Gallup Pakistan Media Cyberletter", October 2012, <http://www.gallup.com.pk/News/cyberletter-updated1.pdf> (1st August 2013)</p> | <p>Hamna Zubair. "Anti-Skin or Anti-Women" <i>NEWSLINE</i>, July 2012</p> <p>Momina Sibtain "Coffee Culture: What's brewing?" <i>The Express Tribune</i>, 20 March 2012</p> |
| <p>Kiran Khalid. "Pakistan's fashionistas: We aren't revolutionaries" <i>CNN</i>, 23 February 2010</p> | <p>Amna Haider Isani "Everything you wanted to know about Pakistan's fashion weeks.. but didn't know who to ask" <i>Herald</i>, May 2012</p> |
| <p>Nosheen Abbas. "Models have fun as Pakistan fashion grows up" <i>BBC NEWS</i>, 14 April 2012</p> | <p>Hassaan Ahmad, Accounts Manager, Ogilvy & Mather, Interview by the author, 2nd February, 2013</p> <p>Adil Kahlid, Creative director, Interflow, Interview by the author, 3rd February 2013</p> |

From the Director's Desk cont.

... relevant not only with reference to the past, or present but for future generations. In addition, we have been consistently trying to enhance the journal potential of the Quarterly, by soliciting research articles. In this issue we have two peer reviewed papers, which clearly shows that the CPPG is strenuously trying to break the disciplinary boundaries in social sciences and also reach out and cut across humanities and literature.

Further, as our two person editorial team's task has become more demanding, it gives me pleasure to induct Ms. Hajra Zafar as a new member of the editorial board. As always, we look forward to your views, suggestions, comments in improving and re-designing the multi-disciplinary posture of the Quarterly.

:Philippe Thiebaud, Ambassador of France to Pakistan, was invited by the CPPG to deliver a talk on “The Tradition and Practice of French Public Services” on October 8, 2012.



His Excellency Mr. Philippe Thiebaud began with a detailed description of the structure of the French government and civil service. The government of France was half presidential and half parliamentary. While the president was directly elected by the people for five years, it was he who designated a prime minister, responsible for the parliament and the government. This system was established in 1958 by General De Gaulle with the goal to discontinue with the power imbalance and instability of a parliamentary system and was thus premised on the need for a stable system of government through rationalization of the parliamentary process. Thus, the French system incorporated some features of the American system with the president having legitimacy as the premier representative of the people, while retaining elements of the parliamentary system whereby the prime minister implemented policies and was answerable to the parliament constituting the senate and national assembly. The members of the national assembly were directly elected by the people while the senate was indirectly elected by representatives of the local governments and the provinces.

France was a welfare state where the government was responsible for generating employment opportunities for the public. Thus, it used to have a very large public sector with more than five million, about 20% of the population employed including the civil service, local government bodies, education, and health etc. There was no distinction

between civil servants and other public sector employees and a public statute oversaw the remuneration and job description for all people employed by the state. Further, there were three primary features of public service in France: first, a statutory contract which provided work protection to public sector employees; second, a meritocratic system whereby rules applied equally to all, and government officials and the public alike needed to follow procedures and channels to interact with a specific government servant; and lastly, public sector was divided into levels A (postgraduate), B (graduate), C (high school), D (middle school) and public servants were placed in these levels according to the qualification. The selection criterion was uniform with each public entity responsible for selecting its own employees. The only exception though was the *École Nationale d'administration* (National School of Administration), which was created to train top civil administrators and those, who would go on to serve as presidents and prime ministers. The school selected only a limited number of people (80-100 a year), who were appointed at top positions in the government.

Discussing the evolution of the public sector, Ambassador Thiebaud stated that the current system was established after the Second World War and continued to develop till the 1990s. With time, concerns were raised which led to its transformation. For example, when it was realized that the system was too rigid, certain management policies hitherto specific to the private sector were incorporated to make the administration more efficient and cost effective. Furthermore, with the establishment of the European Union (EU), France had to streamline competitive practices, thus opening up some public entities to competition and public-private partnership which led to the dismantlement of the huge public sector. Resultantly a number of public entities were privatized. The public sector which originally employed 5 million people shrunk to 2.5 million. It decreased further as successive governments introduced a rule to recruit one civil servant for every two retiring. Another outcome was a greater decentralization of power to the local and provincial governments which bore resemblance to the 18th Amendment to the constitution of Pakistan, he remarked.

He then analyzed the public sector in the context of the European financial crisis. As countries in the EU experienced stunted growth and other economic and social

repercussions, the crisis gave rise to questions like: Should the central government streamline its focus only towards core issues like defense, security, justice and foreign affairs? Was it affordable to sustain a large comprehensive welfare system requiring large amounts of government spending on social security? Was there a need to keep a statute which provided civil servants with a guarantee of employment, pension, other protections and securities or should there be a unification of policies across private and public sectors? France still stood at the crossroad as other countries in the EU had dealt with these questions in different ways with some streamlining their public sector. The interesting aspect was that countries like Germany and France with large public sectors had actually performed better during the European financial crisis because a large public sector helped create a buffer between the people and the economy so that they did not feel the brunt of the economic crisis. However, the question of what kind of a public sector France should have could not be judged in seclusion and had to include its impact on fiscal policy. Thus, a harmonization of fiscal policy between governments in the EU would lead to a certain level of harmonization of public sector structures. Lastly in comparison with Pakistan, he pointed out the glaring difference in tax to GDP ratio. While in Pakistan taxes constituted 8-10% of the GDP, in France this stood at 47-48%, consequently allowing huge spending in social welfare in France.

“ ...certain management policies hitherto specific to the private sector were incorporated to make the administration more efficient and cost effective. ”

Subsequent to the talk, a question answer session was held. Replying to a question regarding France's political system, the Ambassador explained that Europe had two basic political backgrounds, a British like parliamentary system and a Bonaparte-like centralized system. The French government under De Gaulle made a compromise between these traditions with France having a de facto presidential system in which the president took most decisions. Thus many people still perceived it as a monarchist

vision. However the French government did try to bring all stakeholders on board before formulating policies and large forums were held to address issues like the environment, social welfare, etc.

“ ...in Pakistan taxes constituted 8-10% of the GDP, in France this stood at 47-48%, consequently allowing huge spending in social welfare in France. ”

Responding to another question regarding the system of recruitment, selection and pay scale of the civil service, he stated that all civil servants were selected through a transparent and neutral examination process for a limited number of positions comprising 98% of the total while exceptions were made for few positions according to need. While previously pay scales had been uniform, it was only after the incorporation of private sector management policies that differentiation had set in as there was now room for performance based allowances.

Responding to a question on the local government system, he explained that the system of local government bodies went back to the French Revolution in which 36,000 local bodies were carved. The same structure existed today and was the largest in Europe. While some had begun questioning the need to have such a large local government system, many preferred it because it provided them an interlocutor at the government level.

Giving a final comment on EU and the financial crisis, Ambassador Thiebaud stated that economic integration demanded an integrated policy and the Euro system still required more time to become entrenched and strong. UK on the other hand being outside the European zone had an independent fiscal and monetary policy which made it easier to put in place certain mechanisms to insulate itself from the crisis.

:Michael Krepon, President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Toby Dalton, and George Perkovich were invited to a roundtable discussion on "Pakistan India & US Relations: Future Directions" on 5th of February, 2011.



Michael Krepon opened his remarks by identifying the consequences and repercussions of possessing nuclear arms. The advantage of having a nuclear bomb was deterrence, he said. However, it encouraged proxy wars by preventing direct exchange among countries possessing an atomic bomb. The US and the Soviet Union had been involved in proxy wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Similarly, with the acquisition of nuclear weapons Pakistan had also opted to pursue proxy wars more deftly.

Elaborating his argument, he went on to say that when two countries had the bomb, they sometimes used it as an insurance policy against escalation across the nuclear threshold, thus possession of nuclear bomb could encourage engagement in conflict below the nuclear threshold. More importantly, the bomb did not prevent limited conventional wars as could be judged from the Soviet Union - China, and the India - Pakistan wars. Explaining the repercussions of nuclearization, he asserted that if a country increased its stockpile of nuclear weapons, it does not diminish its insecurity as the rival power also attempts to increase its stock piles, thus the nuclear race ensues.

Talking specifically about Pakistan he suggested that as the country's nuclear stockpiles had increased so had its security concerns; as the message that came through from talks with the Pakistan government, the military and civil

society was that of wounded vulnerability. Referring to the attack on Pakistan Army Headquarters in 2009 and the fact that attackers had inside information, he asserted that Pakistan was facing a "design basis threat" to its nuclear assets and thus needed to design an effective defence mechanism to protect its sensitive sites holding fission material and nuclear weapons from internal security threats. Although the guardians of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent had said that there were 10,000 guards and other undercover officers protecting it, one needed to keep track of how reliable these guards were in the face of insider threats. The underlying question for Pakistan was how far its current defence strategies were successful in making Pakistan feel secure domestically as well as internationally because if these were resulting in an increase in security threats, then other strategies needed to be considered.

Toby Dalton picked up from here stating that Pakistan's efforts to improve the security of its entire range of nuclear assets was commendable; however the main problem was their co-location as terrorist groups had expressed an interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons. Further, the hyperbole in Pakistani media about the US wanting to take Pakistan's nuclear weapons was misguided as the United States had its own 30,000 nuclear weapons and was not interested in more.

Discussing India-Pakistan relations in the context of nuclear weapons, he stated that although only a few of the confidence building measures between the two countries had lasted, still these measures were important symbolically in trying to normalize and stabilize relations between the two nuclear powers. He termed the signing of Lahore memorandum in 1999 as one of the most successful confidence building steps because it had been taken independently by both governments, in the absence of any foreign pressure or interference. He stated that Pakistan and India were now on very different trajectories as India's economy was growing rapidly and so was its nuclear investment leading to growing nuclear asymmetries between the two countries. In these circumstances, it was increasingly important to build incentives to improve relations such as increased trade and an impetus for development. The main challenge was to bridge the gap between India's interest in discussing the issue of terrorism and Pakistan's interest

in strategic dialogue including Kashmir.

Focusing on the dynamics of Pakistan-India relationship, George Perkovich, (who has done extensive work on nuclear programs of India and Pakistan), stated that the terms of engagement insisted upon by India was action on counter terrorism. Although, most of the international community including India understood that it was not possible for Pakistan to provide a guarantee against future terrorist attacks, still the expectation was a dedicated effort by the Pakistani state to curtail such activities. The fundamental issue was that compared to Pakistan, India was a much larger country with a high GDP growth rate and a rising military budget, while tax evasion was rampant in Pakistan and tax to GDP ratio was low. This implied that the Pakistani government would have less revenue to invest in security and defence, dwindling any chance of matching India's defence budget. Given that India was also emerging as a regional and global power, Pakistan needed to explore the best strategy for a smaller state to engage with a larger state given the inequality of the two in economic and political power.

The roundtable discussion evoked a number of questions among the participants. Replying to question regarding the US interest in Pakistan and whether US focus on Pakistan was temporary or would deepen, the panel responded that Pakistan was of strategic interest to the US. There was recognition of its size and location, and the US was interested in combating and eliminating terrorism, security of nuclear weapons, regional peace and stability and growth of democracy and civil society. This interest was reflected in the Kerry-Lugar bill. However, it was easier to maintain an ongoing relationship if the partner country receiving aid showed positive and upward trends, while a worsening situation would increase challenges to sustain political support for assistance. Thus US help to Pakistan was contingent upon various socio-economic and political indicators. The current powerful US Secretary of State was extremely committed to Pakistan, so there was a strong possibility of building momentum for support of Pakistan, but the nature and duration of support and engagement depended upon Pakistan itself. The relationship had survived through various ups and downs in the past and should endure mainly because both countries had pivotal interests at stake, while common interests, tradeoffs and disagreements were all part of the same parcel.

Responding to a question about why US had not actively engaged in resolving the Kashmir issue, the panel asserted that contrary to popular belief, the US did not have enough clout to solve the Kashmir issue. The US could not force a diplomatic resolution of Kashmir or any other problem. Instead, a regional development authority that dealt with trade, water and infrastructure, power generation and the like was suggested to concentrate on raising living standards and bring about sustainable development in Kashmir. The panel argued for trade liberalization and an entrepreneurial bi-national commission of India and Pakistan to concentrate on improving the quality of life in Kashmir. Further, Pakistan should contemplate and figure out the most effective strategy to engage with India by learning from the examples of US-Mexico and France-Belgium relations. Power differential between India and Pakistan was expected to grow in the coming years. So would Pakistan's trust deficit with US and its perspective that US was unnecessarily favouring India because US would be engaging with India economically and militarily due to its emergence as a global economic and political power. Thus Pakistan should recognize and adjust to this change and develop an engagement strategy that would be beneficial and productive.

“ Though other countries had contributed to Pakistan's difficulties, still most of Pakistan's issues were home-grown. ”

Answering a question regarding what Pakistan could do given its grave and growing domestic difficulties, Krepon argued that Pakistan needed to stop blaming others for the ills of Pakistan. Though other countries had contributed to Pakistan's difficulties, still most of Pakistan's issues were home-grown and a consequence of poor decision making by its leadership. The fundamental issues for Pakistan were Pakistan Army's strategic culture, growing political disorder and schisms in civil-military relations. Once Pakistan recognized and took ownership of its problems, it would be in a better position to solve and address them.

:Jean-Luc Racine, CNRS Senior Fellow, Centre for South Asian Studies at the School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences and Associate Fellow at the Asia Centre at Sciences-Po, Paris was invited to deliver a talk on “Emerging India and Asia’s New Dynamics” on February 8, 2011.



Professor Racine began his talk by stating that Asia was on the move with tremendous growth and change taking place in India as well as China. However, China was progressing at a much faster rate than India and this differential was widening. Thus to say that India was emerging was not necessarily putting it in the same club as China.

Exploring the history of India’s economic and societal progression, he stated that by the late 80’s, India had transformed into a postcolonial country. Till the 1980’s, India followed a system of mixed economy under protectionist barriers with the state playing a significant role where the market could develop only up to a certain point. This economic model led to extreme bureaucratization and ran out of steam by the late 1980’s. In 1991, the then Finance Minister of the new Congress government, Manmohan Singh initiated wide ranging economic reforms. An interesting aspect of these reforms was that persons responsible for initiating and implementing them had been part of the older system. Thus the turnaround of India’s economy could not be considered as an outcome of an economic revolution, a change in regime or of international assistance. On the contrary, the momentum for growth was internally generated and sustained through the years. Reforms were implemented gradually at a pace that matched the capacity of society to absorb them. The other key event that marked the 1990’s was the nuclear

test by India in May 1998. In the context of the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with signatories from all over the world, the nuclear test was against international trends. So while liberalization of the economy was in tune with the times, the nuclear test was globally unpopular.

Discussing the outcomes of the 1990’s economic reforms, Racine stated that India’s GDP growth depicted mixed trends in the first decade. In the first five years (1991–1995), growth only increased from 5% to 6.8%, which was not a dramatic rise. In the following five years, growth rate dropped back to 5%. However post 2000, economic indicators showed consistent improvement while a dramatic improvement occurred after 2004, when the growth rate rose from 7.5% to 9.6% in 2007. The economic crisis in 2008 brought growth down to 6.8% but the recovery was quick and growth went back up to 8.5% in a year’s time.

As a result of this consistent economic improvement post 2000, there had been a change in the perception of India not only in the East but also in the West. In 1996, five years after economic reforms, ASEAN countries decided to give India, the status of full dialogue partner. By the end of 2005, a new regional body was constituted in Asia Pacific called the East Asia Summit and despite China’s objections, decided to bring India on board as the founding member. India thus became a significant part of the system of representation of Asian countries while in the perception of the West, India rose to prominence as a vital part of an emerging and dynamic Asia.

Racine argued that the change had not just been on the economic front. By 2000, India had established itself as a “post-colonial” country through a transformed mindset and he referred to Manmohan Singh’s 2005 speech at Oxford which symbolized this new mindset. In his speech, the PM had stated that the Indians were right to fight against the British at the time of independence, but that time had now passed and the nation must move forward. Further, that Indians were now confident enough in themselves to digest the time of colonization, and look into the future with confidence. Racine stressed that this transformed mindset and self-perception proved to be decisive for India’s progress. It helped build confidence among leaders as well as civilians, and created a momentum for economic growth as well as societal progress gradually

leading India to transform itself from a regional actor to a global player. India's notable services success stories also played a symbolic role as Indian IT companies emerged as global actors in a field which was the epitome of modernity while India's industrial sector particularly energy sector companies were fast transforming into dynamic multinationals.

“ ...India was emerging as a global power despite the persistence of some serious economic, social, political and foreign policy challenges. ”

He then highlighted some of the challenges and problems. Although reelection of Congress in 2009 was the first time in Indian political history that a government had been reelected in the general elections, its second mandate was not running as well. Its motto of increased growth had come under severe criticism in recent times with the objection that higher growth was only benefiting the privileged class and escalating income inequality while soaring inflation was creating growing unrest among the masses and fermenting resentment towards the government. But amidst these numerous internal problems and continued tension with neighbors, the fact remained that India was still making progress as its economy moved at an accelerated pace. This implied that decision-makers had decided to answer two very significant possibility questions in the affirmative: one, whether a country could be classified as an emerging country without having eradicated poverty which stood at 25% according to World Bank's \$1.25 a day definition; second, could a country play a growing international role despite tensions with its neighbors. He suggested that India's growing global significance in the international arena had demonstrated that it could move forward despite disharmony with bordering states. Thus India was emerging as a global power despite the persistence of some serious economic, social, political and foreign policy challenges.

Racine then proceeded to analyze India's relations with US and China. Historically, India's refusal to be a signatory to the NPT had also portrayed a negative image to the West. But after the 1998 nuclear test, India became a target of Western and the US condemnation and the Clinton administration imposed sanctions to discourage nuclear-

ization while their mutual dialogue bore no substantial outcome. However relations took a new turn when George W. Bush became U.S. President as he and his team of neo-conservatives made consistent efforts to bring India to the forefront. The countries' engagement and three years of negotiations on the nuclear issue led to the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2005 which was one of the most important milestones in US-India relations. Two points underlined this neo-conservative push: one that India was a parliamentary democracy and had a good record on nonproliferation; two, that establishing links with India would help the US to counterbalance the rise of China. However, Indian government's stance was not pro joining hands with the US to contain China. While India - US ties were strengthening, there was a simultaneous sustained attempt by India to normalize its relations with China which complemented a similar rethinking on the part of the Chinese government. The outcome had been a considerable increase in bilateral India-China trade which hit a record high in 2011 amounting to \$ 73.9 billion. Although there was significant trade imbalance to the benefit of China, strategists were trying to address it and move forward.

“ ...Indians were now confident enough in themselves to digest the time of colonization, and look into the future with confidence. ”

In conclusion, Racine shared a remark by former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, who said "For India, the goal is not to be at parity with China, but to be in a position of power where no important decision related to Asia or for that matter global issues, could be taken without it." Explaining, he stated that India's strategic goal was not parity with China, but to have a say in regional and global affairs. Discussing India - Pakistan relations in this context, he stressed that it was important for Pakistan to recognize and understand India's growing global significance and a transforming society and mindset. Although Pakistan had had a history of difficult relations with India, still it needed to establish a sustainable relationship that was mutually beneficial to both countries.

The talk led to a vibrant question answer session. Answering a question, if the term "emerging" was appropriate for

India given the widespread poverty, low literacy rates and poor HDI indicators, and if India was merely an emerging market, Racine responded that the term "emerging" implied that development was a process. While India could be categorized as an emerging market in the 1990s, it had since surpassed that stage and was now an emerging country and an emerging global power.

“...in the perception of the West, India rose to prominence as a vital part of an emerging and dynamic Asia.”

In response to a question regarding the impact of India gaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC), on South Asia and specifically Pakistan, and the possibility of a healthy dialogue between two nuclear powers, Racine said that a UNSC seat had more of a global prospect rather than a regional one. Thus India's inclusion would not have any immediate impact on South Asia, nor dramatically change the relationship between India and Pakistan. He said that in theory nuclearization played an equalizing role and could in fact help in confidence building and dialogue promotion among countries.

Responding to a question about why India did not allow or encourage Western powers to engage in third party mediation to resolve the Kashmir issue, Racine clarified that the U.S. had officially stated its unwillingness to provide mediation for the resolution of Kashmir issue. Thus it was not the Indians but the Americans who were not willing to interfere or provide mediation.

Answering a question regarding Indian's perception of Pakistan, Racine stated that a small segment of Indians viewed Pakistan in an extremely negative light. A larger segment though was neutral but turned negative when provoked by terrorist attacks in India by Pakistani terrorist groups. The civil society represented the segment which was interested in proactive dialogue. Overall though, there was a clear recognition by a sizeable majority of Indian people and decision makers that greater the instability within Pakistan, higher the security threat for its neighbors. So majority of Indians wanted Pakistan to be a stable country that was at peace with itself and internationally.

Ambassador Dennis Kux, Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, and author of *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies* (1992) and *The United States and Pakistan 1947 – 2000: Disenchanted Allies* (2001) was invited to deliver a talk on "Changing Dynamics of US–Pakistan Relations: Bad Marriage No Divorce" on November 15, 2011.



Kux opened his remarks by asserting that although US–Pakistan relations had been through many years of ups and downs and the dynamics of relations have changed drastically over time, still the basic factors remain coinciding interests in some domains, and interest and policy clash in others. Tracing the history of US–Pak relations, he started with the 1954 Mutual Defense Assistance agreement which provided military assistance to Pakistan for guarding itself against the communist threat. Baghdad Pact was signed the following year by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the UK at US's urging and promise of military and economic aid to the countries. In the Ayub – Eisenhower negotiations, Ayub had offered the services of Pakistani army to deter the spread of communism while agreeing not to use military aid against India. However, Pakistan had a concealed motivation to utilize the anticommunist agenda based American military aid to strengthen its army's capability against India, and as future events unfolded, Pakistan went against the non-use against India agreement. From 1954–1959, a total amount of \$503 million in military aid was provided on which the edifice of modern Pakistan Army was built.

He then identified and analyzed some events which resulted in the worsening of US–Pakistan relations. These

included Kennedy administration's support and emergency aid to India during the 1962 Sino-Indian war which upset Ayub, and the improvement of Pakistan China relations which irritated the US. The US-Pakistan relationship hit an all time low during the 1965 Pakistan-India war, when the US cut off military and economic aid to Pakistan. However, he argued that Pakistanis terming of 1971 war between India as "the great betrayal" was uncalled for because Nixon not just sided with Pakistan by declaring India as the aggressor but also did whatever was in his power to help Pakistan.

The 1980's witnessed a reversal of this trend, as the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the interest of the two began to converge although nuclear issue remained an eye sour for the US. Once the US was convinced that it had sufficient evidence that Pakistan was continuing to develop nuclear weapons, under the presidency of George H. W Bush, the Pressler Amendment was enacted limiting military and economic assistance to Pakistan. As a consequence, military aid including prior commitments was stopped abruptly holding up even the delivery of F16 fighter jets which Pakistan had already paid \$463 million for, while economic aid and other ongoing programs in the pipeline were continued. Kux asserted that this was a hasty amendment, not properly thought through and "a mistake on our part". This US attitude towards Pakistan could be explained by the end of the Cold War, which meant that Pakistan and Afghanistan were now off the US agenda.

Ambassador Kux then began his analysis of the current dynamics of US-Pakistan relations. He asserted that both countries shared a mutual interest in fighting terrorism. The disconnect however lay in the fact that Pakistan had not clearly declared its stance against or taken adequate measures to fight the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban operating from within Pakistan. His second concern was the negative Pakistani public opinion about the US. Though some progress had been made to improve it, still there was no significant change. Equally, he remarked that the US public opinion about Pakistan was also becoming hostile. He pointed out that the Heritage foundation, a US think tank and policy institute had recently proposed that the US completely cut off aid to Pakistan and some congressmen also supported the idea of curtailing aid to Pakistan. In this regard, the Kerry

Lugar Berman Bill was designed to impress upon Pakistan that the US was genuinely interested in Pakistan's welfare and prosperity, and did not want a mere transactional relationship. With this bill, the previous military to civilian aid ratio of roughly 2:1 had changed to 1:2, and should expectedly lead to improved public opinion of the US in the long-term.

“ With Kerry Lugar Berman Bill, the previous military to civilian aid ratio of roughly 2:1 had changed to 1:2 ”

In conclusion, Kux stated that both countries needed each other though for very different reasons. US needed Pakistan in the short term to keep supplies going to Afghanistan as other alternatives were too expensive. It also needed Pakistan in order to exit properly from, and restore and sustain peace in Afghanistan else billions of dollars spent and American lives sacrificed would be rendered worthless. Additionally US wanted to ensure the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons because if terrorists got a hold of them, it would be disastrous for Pakistan, US as well as the rest of the world. Pakistan on the other hand needed US for economic aid, food support, and other development and humanitarian assistance. Pakistan's military also required US support for fighting terrorism. Thus both countries needed each other and their interest would further converge as Pakistan became a stable democratic state.

The talk was followed by a question answer session. In response to questions regarding the nature of Pakistan – US relationship: did US dominated and dictated its terms? Were the countries' policy alignment on the "War on Terror" the pivotal issue impacting Pakistan's public opinion as in spite of extensive military and development aid, the public opinion in Pakistan was still largely against the US? Kux argued that the US did not properly define its terms of engagement with Pakistan after 9/11. While the US was paying the price it had negotiated and agreed with Pakistan, the US's statement that it would pay for the war cost of Pakistan wrongly implied that the US was hiring Pakistan to fight America's war. The US paid for Pakistani airfields it used and any Pakistanis employed to fight against the Afghan Taliban while the cost of war waged

by Pakistani Taliban against the Pakistani state was Pakistan's own responsibility. He stated that it was a mistake to view two countries as enemies or friends as countries pursued their national interests. The post 9/11, 17th of September Musharraf speech had clearly spelt out why it was necessary for Pakistan to join hands with the US in the "War on Terror". Musharraf had stated that Pakistan's economy was weak and could collapse, its nuclear assets were in danger, and if Pakistan didn't join hands, India would. So it was in Pakistan's national interest to align itself with US counterterrorism efforts as 9/11 was much larger in scale than the 1979 burning down of American embassy in Islamabad where four Americans had died and almost 137 injured. Regarding public opinion, he stated that one of Holbrooke's goals was to change Pakistan's public opinion through a beefed up public diplomacy program. The Kerry Lugar bill was a step in the right direction, was expected to continue and its programs including the Fulbright scholarship program, which was the largest in the world would definitely reap results in the long-term.

Kux further said that the US was no longer in a position to dictate as it had a weakened economic position and was going through a severe financial crisis. Even though the US spent more than any other country on the military, it had not been successful in overpowering the Taliban in Afghanistan. Though the US and Pakistani leadership now had a better understanding of each other's interests after a decade of active interaction and engagement, they still needed to figure out the best way to deal with each other.

“ From 1954-1959, a total amount of \$503 million in military aid was provided on which the edifice of modern Pakistan Army was built. ”

In response to a comment about US-India friendship, Kux outlined the reasons that led to improved relations: one, the end of the Cold War led to changed dynamics as US was no longer concerned with Russia being the main arms supplier to India; two, the Indo-American community was one of the most successful and wealthy communities in the US and had served as a bridge between US and India leading to the development and growth of business relations between the countries. Additionally, US's support for

India's position in the Pakistan provoked Kargil war had been interpreted by the Indian foreign office and strategic community as a change in America's attitude. However, he argued that the India-US civil nuclear agreement was a "terrible deal" as Indians had yet to come up with a liability law that was satisfactory to American companies. Overall, US wanted to establish good relations with both sides.



Answering a question, why the US had not played a role to solve the Kashmir dispute despite its success in resolving water issues through the Indus Water Treaty, Kux replied that the nature of the problem was different as water issue was physical and vital while Kashmir issue was existential and emotional. The Indus water treaty had also taken seven long years of negotiation with World Bank playing a key role. While the US had initially tried to solve the Kashmir dispute without success, it had realized by 1962 that unless both parties were willing, third party interference in negotiation would not be productive. Still, the US had time and again tried to push both India and Pakistan to have bilateral negotiations on the issue.

:Mr. Arif Hasan, a leading commentator on urbanization and urban planning in Pakistan and author of *Planning and Development Options for Karachi* (2013) and *The Scale and Causes of Urban Change in Pakistan* (2006) was invited to deliver a talk on “Public Policies for an Urban Pakistan” at the CPPG on the 9th of March 2012.



Hasan opened his talk by describing the process of urbanization in Pakistan. He stated that the areas that constitute today's Pakistan had a population of 28 million, 14.2 % of which was urban in 1941. A decade later, population had risen to 33 million with 18% urban and by 1998, 32.5% of the 130 million population was urban. However, he stated that the above numbers were not comparable as prior to 1981; Pakistan had followed the old colonial definition of “urban”, which was determined by three elements: settlement size, population density and the level of employment ratio between agriculture and non-agriculture professions. This definition underwent change in 1981, whereby a settlement could be classified as “urban” only if it had an urban governance structure leading to the classification of peri-urban areas as rural. Thus if the older definition was followed, Pakistan would be more than 50% urban today.

Hasan then delved into the impact of various waves of migration on urban demography. In 1947, 6.5 million people migrated from India to Pakistan while 4.7 million migrated the other way leading to a 6.3% increase in Pakistan's population within a few months. 82% of these migrants settled in the Punjab with a 90-200% population increase in Punjab's towns in a short period of one year. In Sindh, only Karachi and Hyderabad increased in size by 150% while in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and many parts of Sindh, there was de-urbanization because the

leaving Hindus were not replaced by anyone. Overall, the 1951 census indicated that 48% of the urban population of Pakistan had originated in India, which was a colossal change but its repercussions were not adequately recognized or dealt with. The sociological impact of the 1947 migration was that the local self governance practiced through clans weakened considerably while increasing the upward mobility of the migrant population since it had been freed from its roots. Though in physical terms, houses in which one rich Hindu or Sikh family had lived now accommodated seven to eight poor Muslim families resulting in rapid degeneration of the housing stock. Migration had played a significant role in shaping the urban centers of Pakistan. He elaborated this by illustrating from the examples of Kashmir, Thar and Afghan migrations. Hasan remarked that the Kashmir migration was meaningful because of its size and the Thar migration as it changed the demography and sociology of the Thar region. Elaborating on the impact of the Afghan migration, Hasan stated that while the 1972 census indicated growth of Peshawar to be 1.95%, the 1994 projections based on the 1981 census indicate 9% annual growth owing mainly to the Afghan migration, which dropped to 3.3% in 1998. In the case of Karachi, the 1998 census showed that the city had 1.2 million migrants, out of which Afghan migrants had an overwhelming presence, numbering 600,000 Afghans.

The Green Revolution was another important aspect that fuelled migration transferring urban based capital inputs along with a demand for drivers, mechanics, electricians and the like to rural areas, thus causing urban to rural migration. However, as the Green Revolution generated a massive economic surplus in Punjab during the 1960's, its rural areas became a market for industrially manufactured goods changing the entire complexion of rural society which in turn created the push factor for rural to urban migration. The same revolution reached Sindh and NWFP at a later stage. The 1970s were instead categorized by what Hasan called the “Suzuki Revolution” due to government's initiation of loans to purchase Suzukis. Thus the position of Agriculture Market (*mundi*) towns changed, a lot of them disappeared while others expanded speeding up the urbanization process while creating a close link between rural credit providers and the transportation network.

These factors collectively changed the dynamics of migration towards larger cities while small towns suffered immensely because the elite of these towns had emigrated leading to a loss of political importance. While in 1981, 38% of the country's population lived in cities of over 1 million, this figure had increased to 50% in 1998 and the projections for the next 10 years suggested a major decline in the number of small cities. To further elaborate, Hasan indicated that out of the 10.8 million migrants identified in the 1998 census, 64% went to urban areas and a staggering 24% went abroad. This migration to urban areas comprised 13% who went to Karachi alone while a total of 25% went to Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi collectively. Currently the yearly migration figures stand at 3.2 million of which Karachi alone receives 360,000 migrants yearly. Initially, migration to Karachi took place from areas where skills were available leading to a large migration of skilled workers from Punjab including motor mechanics, electricians, plumbers, carpenters and the like. Then in the second phase, migration took place from areas where feudal control was weak and resources were scarce such as the tribal areas. However, today migration to Karachi was largely from the Saraiki and Sindhi areas.

“ Currently the yearly migration figures stand at 3.2 million of which Karachi alone receives 360,000 migrants yearly. ”

Implications of Migration

Hasan then focused on the implications of migration on urban areas including character, population density, sociological changes, conflict, land availability, employment, education and transport to highlight the need for a comprehensive policy framework. He began with the issue of density stating that towns which had government land around them were expanding as low income settlements emerged around them while those without were increasing in density to the extent that living was becoming unbearable. All old low income settlements in Pakistan today were densifying because the people living there did not have the option of making their own home. This meant that 6-10 persons were living in one room with the implication that the father who was the main bread earner did not return home and slept somewhere outside

the house; young couples seldom had a room of their own; and the mother preferred that children spend more time outside the house thus adversely impacting the family fabric and structure. Another issue was the settling of labor away from their place of work forcing the father to travel long distances everyday to get to his place of work incurring extra expense or sleeping at his work place. Consequently women in the household were unable to work, access to health or education centers became difficult and recreation impossible. He specifically gave the example of the Faisalabad-Chiniot corridor which represented numerous similar corridors emerging in the country. The villages within this corridor functioned as mere dormitories where people slept to go to work in the cities. Agriculture labor was not available in this entire belt gradually leading population from other villages to settle here.

The issue of density was linked to land availability. There was no land formally available for low-income settlements, for wholesale warehousing, and for transport related activities. Exemplifying Lahore, Hasan stated that since there was no land available for cargo and transport terminals, they had been developed in an ad hoc manner within the heritage areas of the city where they were originally located. Though the state had large land holdings, these were hoarded mainly for speculation and for elite and middleclass housing. In Karachi, despite the presence of 2,000 hectares of land within the city, the poorer sections of the population had been settled 30 kilometers away while the elite acquired such land through coercion, bribes, influence, and often illegally. Thus, land policy and planning had an inbuilt anti-poor, pro-speculation elite bias which became clearer through land use statistics. Of the total land in Karachi, 37% was residential. 27% of the land was formally developed while the 8% that was informally developed accommodated 62% of the city's population. While 80% of Karachiites lived on 120 sq yards plots or less, only 2% who lived on plots of 400-2000 sq yards occupied 21% of the total area. The unmet low-income housing demands led to informal settlements either in kachi abadis or through informal subdivision of agriculture land which often encroached on ecologically sensitive areas causing flooding.

The issues of urban transport were a byproduct of the absence of public transport. The country was being taken over by motorcycles as it was the cheapest form of trans-

port. The figures from Karachi were astounding as the number of motorbikes had risen from 450,000 in 1990, to 500,000 in 2004, to over a million in 2010. In a survey conducted of men and women at bus stops, 86% men said that they wanted to buy a motorbike while 56% women said the same if they could get permission. Thus an innovative and sustainable public transport policy was key to the resolution of transportation issues.

“...small towns suffered immensely because the elite of these towns had emigrated leading to a loss of political importance.”

Urban Economy and Employment

In discussing urban economy and employment, Hasan mentioned that the share of urban informal employment in Pakistan had increased from 67% (2003-04) to 70% (2006-07). Although local commerce was the main supplier of employment, it lacked infrastructure, business credit, security of tenure, health and education benefits, and housing. He further added that 72% of Karachi's population was employed in the informal sector but there were no bylaws covering it and this whole population had to survive on their own without any support system. Thus the garbage recycling industry which was one of the largest industries in the informal sector with Lahore, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Karachi and Hyderabad as its major centers, while providing employment to an estimated million plus people directly or indirectly not just lacked state support but was one of the most persecuted industries. Further arguing that foreign direct investment (FDI) had become essential for economic growth in the present era, Hasan argued that Pakistan lacked all three requirements needed to attract FDI including security, infrastructure and most importantly skills. There was a dearth of skills because of a lack of polytechnics and vocational schools. While an increasing number of universities were being set up, there were hardly any institutes providing technical skills with the result that Pakistan had more doctors than paramedics, more engineers than trained technicians, more textile engineers than people who could manage the shop floor.

Youth and Social Change

Hasan then delved into the transforming sociological patterns in the country as migrations brought in new

ideas, concepts and methods of family relations to the rural and urban areas of Pakistan. Exemplified by trends in Karachi as indicated by the table below, he suggested that this was the first time in history that the city had an overwhelming majority of unmarried adolescents which was enough to entirely change family structures as well as gender relations. An evidence of the changing gender relations and marriage patterns was that while in 1992, 10-15 court marriage applications were made daily; by 2006 the number had reached to 200 applications per day which were mostly from rural Sindh. A reason for this emerging marriage pattern in the city was that the clan based marriage settlement system had all but finished.

Figure: Youth of Age Group 15-24 in Karachi

	Married		Literate	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1981	13%	38%	66.7%	62.3%
2012	6%	20%	>80%	82%

Linking the changing urban dynamics to conflict, Hasan stated that by 1977 Pakistan's urban areas were on the verge of a serious conflict as the old colonial concept of governance was becoming ineffective with the emergence of a new indigenous middleclass. While many other Asian countries were also going through a similar conflict, they were able to resolve it through negotiations, political discussion and discourse. However, dialogue and political negotiations stalled in Pakistan due to Zia-ul-Haq's military regime. Perceptively analyzing the impact of the Zia Regime on Pakistani society, Hasan specifically highlighted the banning of extracurricular activities in public universities, closing down of places of public performances in an attempt to shut off all entertainment, and elimination of subjects like international history and geography from school curriculums. The outcome was that Pakistan stopped creating an indigenous educated leadership, the role universities previously played in politics and culture came to an end and lastly the function of the city to bring together various cultures and peoples to interact in a shared public space instead got splashed with barriers. This period instead produced a generation that suffered from megalomania, paranoia and narcissism and the entire society's debate came to be dominated around these three aspects as a whole generation had lost the capacity of rationality.

Hasan concluded the talk with few policy prescriptions and suggestions. In terms of land use, he suggested that there was a need to conserve land through high-density and mixed housing. Additionally, creating multiclass public spaces was the need of the hour as a city divided would make it a place of violence. However, he argued that suggested prescriptions were dependent on the promotion of new societal values as a conflict existed between conventional values and new behavioral pattern which posed a serious hindrance to society's advancement. When new behavioral patterns emerged, it became necessary to also formulate and inculcate new societal values to move forward. Lastly discussing the issue of planning, he stated that according to current trends in Karachi and Lahore, planning was being replaced by projects. He emphasized four basic principles for project implementation: one, to respect ecology of regions where the city was located; two, to promote land use on the basis of environment and sociological considerations and not on the basis of land value alone; three, to support the interests of the majority population; and four, to protect the tangible and intangible cultural heritage of communities that live in the city.

“ There was no land formally available for low-income settlements, for wholesale warehousing, and for transport related activities. ”

The talk evoked a number of questions among the participants. Answering a question to further elaborate why family structures in Pakistan had changed, Hasan outlined reasons for the disintegration of extended family system underlying the point that the traditional patriarchal structure did not strictly hold anymore. While previously there was a sole earning member and the whole family was subservient to him, now with an increase in the number of earning members, the authority was instead contested. Another reason was that the women of poor families saw better opportunities in a nuclear family system while the joint family system restricted their choice to work and education. Thus a greater number of unmarried adolescents who wanted more independence were inclined to break away from the joint family system.

In reply to a question regarding increasing violence in

Karachi, he suggested that the main reason behind this ethnic violence was dysfunctional government institutions leading people to turn to their respective ethnic and clan organizations thus accentuating ethnic divisions. He further emphasized the need for quality education through government institutions suggesting that the diffusion of conflict in the developed world had come through sound universal education by government institutions as without quality education it was difficult to promote the values of peace and harmony in a society. Pakistan had instead gone the other way as the state education system was consistently deteriorating while the private sector system was producing the new elite. With these parallel education systems, in 30 years Pakistan would have a generation in which there would be two classes at war with each other.

“ There was a dearth of skills because of a lack of polytechnics and vocational schools ... Pakistan had more doctors than paramedics, more engineers than trained technicians, more textile engineers than people who could manage the shop floor. ”

Responding to a comment about urban mis-planning leading to unhindered expansion of cities on prime agricultural lands, Hasan articulated four policy prescriptions to counter it: one, a strategy to control current speculative development; two, convert low density developments to higher density; three, create new towns and set a cap on city size as the continual expansion of existing towns was unsustainable and detrimental; and lastly, devise a policy for urban agriculture. However, he argued that these prescriptions required sound institutions for proper implementation, which was not possible without massive public sector reforms as simple tampering of the old colonial system only made institutions less functional. He instead argued for a participatory decision-making system in Pakistan akin to participatory democracy born out of the long struggle of political parties in Latin America rather than the local government system where Nazims were given excessive undue authority making the system exploitative. He termed the system's embedded strong anti-poor bias, and lack of accountability and transparency as the main cause behind the loss of large chunks of

land to urban development.

“Zia's period instead produced a generation that suffered from megalomania, paranoia and narcissism and the entire society's debate came to be dominated around these three aspects as a whole generation had lost the capacity of rationality.”

Answering a question about the role of politics in planning with reference to *Kachi Abadi* regulations, Hasan pointed out that most urban planning decisions in Pakistan were political rather than administrative or planning decisions. Although the decisions were backed by law, the effectiveness depended on the procedures, rules and regulations which could potentially distort the law. Thus it was important to design appropriate regulations in line with the law to make the law both effective and productive. Discussing the larger issue of provision of low-cost housing, he asserted that it could either be done through the market system, the state or public private partnership. However, the basic issue was financial as access to credit was difficult and interest rates on loans too high for a poor man. Thus, a state subsidy was needed for either option.

:Francis Robinson, Sultan of Oman Fellow, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, and Professor of History of South Asia, Royal Holloway, University of London was invited to deliver a talk on the “Crisis of Authority, Crisis of Islam” at the CPPG on Thursday April 21, 2011.

Dr. Robinson opened his remarks by stating his thesis that there had been a growing crisis of Islamic authority in the past 200 years set in motion by European conquests of the Muslim world between 1800 and 1920. This crises had affected all aspects of Muslim society including the modes of wielding power, the system of justice, culture, values, literature and most importantly religious authority. From the outset, Islamic civilization was fashioned primarily through God's revelation, the Quran to humankind through Prophet Muhammad. However, the process of interpretation had undergone massive transformation in the past 200 years such that authority of much of the past scholarship had been rejected while that of the traditional interpreters, the Ulema had been marginalized. Instead individual conscience and interpretation had gained significance leading to a crisis of authority as no one knew any longer of who spoke for Islam.

“Till 1800, religious authority, the capacity to produce authoritative interpretation and the permission to transmit great scholarly works of the past lay with the *Ulema*.”

Elaborating his argument, he began with the establishment and sustenance of authority in the Muslim world. The process began with the emergence of Muhammad, a charismatic prophet, and his successful assertion of authority in the Arab world. Quran was explicit about how Muhammad's role as a messenger translated the omnipotence of Allah into the comprehensive authority of Muhammad. After Muhammad's death, the succession to authority was bitterly contested as numerous groups differed over the method of achieving authoritative understanding of the revelation. Eventually a majority Sunni consensus emerged under the Abassid caliphate whereby religious authority came to be routinized in the role of *Ulema*, the learned men. The *Ulema* transmitted the essence of knowledge of the Quran and Hadith across generations through the

transmission of skills to future *Ulema* such as Arabic grammar and syntax, jurisprudence and rhetoric to make this knowledge socially useful in the form of law. However, they did not retain an independent sphere of authority as the ruler always tried to subordinate their authority to his own purposes. Still, the *Ulema* were at the heart of shaping and sustaining Muslim society.

The Shia, the party of Muhammad's son in law Ali who contested the leadership of the Muslim community with the first three elected Caliphs, came to argue that *Iraqam*, the divine light which had blessed Muhammad, had flowed down through Ali and his bloodline making them Imams (leaders) of the Shia community. The transmitted comprehensive authority persisted in Shii Imams till the disappearance of the 12th Imam in 874 AD. This created the possibility of continued charisma in the form of representatives or reincarnations of the hidden Imam leading to greater flexibility in their jurisprudential tradition as compared to the Sunnis, as was demonstrated in the years of the Iranian revolution when Ayatullah Khomeini came to be called Imam Khomeini.

The authorities of interpretation were sustained among the Shia and Sunni *Ulema* till the 19th century through an oral tradition as the Prophet had transmitted God's messages to his followers and when they were written down a few years after this death, it was only as an aid to memory and oral transmission. The *Ulema* followed a process of oral transmission to transfer knowledge to their students and once a student had successfully memorized the knowledge, they would be given permission (an "Ijaza") to publish or transmit this knowledge. This authority of the orally transmitted Quran became evident when the Egyptian standard edition in 1920s was produced not from a study of variant manuscript versions but from a study of fourteen different traditions of recitation. Thus, the best way of getting to the truth, the most authoritative understanding of text was to listen to the author himself. So, Muslim scholars constantly traveled through the Islamic world till they could receive authoritative transmission of knowledge. When they could not get knowledge from the author himself, they strove to get it from a scholar whose chain of transmission from the original author (*Isnaat*) was considered most reliable. It was this preference which led to *Ulema's* rejection of print for centuries because print undermined both the authority

of person to person transmission as well as the *Ulema's* monopoly of interpretation of religious knowledge.

Till 1800, religious authority, the capacity to produce authoritative interpretation and the permission to transmit great scholarly works of the past lay with the *Ulema*. However over the past 200 years, this system for the authoritative transmission of Islamic knowledge and its authoritative interpretation had broken down and increasingly each individual Muslim had come to assume responsibility for interpretation. Thus scholarly authority had become fragmented, old hierarchies had flattened and old interpreted disciplines sidelined. All kinds of new interpreters of the faith had come forward and new interpretations promulgated.

“ ... deeply felt loss of power precipitated a crisis of authority because it was understood as a Muslim failure, the failure of the *Ulema* and of them not being good enough Muslims. ”

Robinson then proceeded to analyze the reasons for this change. The first source of this change was the Western conquest of the Muslim world between 1800 and 1920. For about 1200 years Islam was synonymous with power but by the 19th-20th century however, the Islamic world system was overwhelmed by Europe. The Indian subcontinent, home to nearly a third of the world's Muslims was a case in point. Although India had enjoyed industrial and economic progress, the British policy showed an utter contempt for Indian learning, which also included sources of Muslim civilization. Grants made by Muslim rulers to support the scholarship and teaching of *Ulema* were abolished. Instead, new forms of knowledge had to be mastered to succeed in the world of Western dominance. Thus, able Indian Muslims went less to the great Muslim madrassas of Arabia and Egypt and more to London, Paris, Oxford or Cambridge. Power seeped away from the old Muslim heartlands of Delhi and Lucknow to the new European cities of the coast.

The outcome was a pervading sorrow of the passing of Muslim greatness. The psychological response to this loss of power of the Muslim civilization led to the expression

of anger in the Khilafat movement when the Ottoman Empire was dismembered almost a century before the Salman Rushdie or the cartoon crises. This deeply felt loss of power precipitated a crisis of authority because it was understood as a Muslim failure, the failure of the *Ulema* and of them not being good enough Muslims. The crisis of authority was further exacerbated by the responses of *Ulema* and other Muslims as they grappled with the changed situation. Firstly, a number of *Ulema* began to shred the old basis of authority by rejecting much of past scholarship. Shah Waliullah, and later Sir Syed Ahmed Khan were among notable scholars who rejected classical scholarship. By mid 20th century, groups of Indian Muslims had become increasingly selective about where to derive authority from. Secondly, in response to missionary activity and Western secular system of education in the 19th century, the *Ulema* began to use print to translate the Quran, Hadith and classical scholarship into vernacular languages along with expanding the Madrassa system to build a constituency in Muslim society. Thus attacking the heart of authority, the oral person to person transmission. Thirdly, the reforming *Ulema* began to develop what some have called a "Protestant or Willed Islam", attacking all ideas of intercession such as shrines and even Sufism, endeavored to develop and inform the individual human conscience as the force to fashion a Muslim society in the absence of Islamic political power. This put new emphasis on personal engagement with text in languages that people could understand, and printed for wide availability to cater for increased literacy. Print played its role in making text widely available which was combined with the growth in literacy.

“... individual conscience and interpretation had gained significance leading to a crisis of authority as no one knew any longer of who spoke for Islam.”

As consequences, emerged lay interpreters who frequently drew inspiration from West and Muslims who felt empowered by a personal sense of responsibility to make God's revelation live on earth. These were modern Muslims as envisaged by Muhammad Iqbal, the leading 20th century Muslim philosopher. His idea of man as God's caliph or

successor on earth was taken up by reformers, *Ulema* and others across the Muslim world. Thus, by mid twentieth century, the authority of *Ulema* was fragmented and less central to the working of Muslim society. Instead, a new type of Muslim began to emerge who might note what the *Ulema* or the Islamist said but would engage with the text personally, form own conclusions and pursue own conscience.

“...*Ulema* had become just one among the many voices clamoring to be heard and the Muslim world had returned to the interpretative anarchy that marked its initial years.”

Robinson then articulated that several developments had further led to the fragmentation of religious authority in the second half of the 20th century. First, as the newly independent Muslim states (eg. Pakistan, Indonesia & others) got engaged in the Cold War and then with global capitalism, ordinary Muslims understood their elites' deep engagement with political and economic interests of the outside forces. As the *Ulema* were paid functionaries in many Muslim states, their authority suffered as it was exercised within the context of Western domination. Second, the growth of mass education and literacy stimulated the mass development of print media so the context in which authority operated became very different from that of 50 years ago. Third, the growth of new media including audio and video cassettes, CDs, television and the internet democratized knowledge. Lastly, transnational movements of people also undermined authority.

Thus now, the *Ulema* had become just one among the many voices clamoring to be heard and the Muslim world had returned to the interpretative anarchy that marked its initial years leading to new problems as well as encouraging possibilities. One problematic outcome was the lack of authoritative religious leadership to counter those who wanted to serve their faith through extreme violence and terror. While encouraging was that the relative opening of space had and would lead to new interpretations, which may in time have authority. Elaborating, he gave examples of Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Professor of law at UCLA, who had produced powerful arguments for democracy,

pluralism and gender equality from within the Islamic intellectual jurisprudential tradition, and Amina Wadud, an African American Islamic scholar, who had led a mixed prayer congregation in 2005 and was part of a movement of women scholars to unpick and shred the traditional patriarchal interpretation of Quran.

In conclusion, he dwelled on whether this crisis of religious authority translated into a crisis of Islam. He argued that although the crisis allowed some interpretations which were against the spirit of the faith, still it may be the makings of modern Islam and Muslim societies as it empowered millions of Muslims as individual believers, trustees, successors and caliphs of God to engage with the text and exercise their consciences. He emphasized that an understanding of this crisis provided insight into the problems of contemporary Muslim world and also offered hope for the future as out of this religious change, there lay prospects for future social and political developments.

The talk was followed by a question answer session. Responding to a question regarding Muslim rulers' use of *Ulema* for political purposes, he said that it started very early on and both in Baghdad and Damascus, the state took enormous interest in engaging with the *Ulema*. But throughout Muslim history, there had been tensions between the rulers and the *Ulema*, who in theory acknowledged only the authority of God. He stated that a great change had taken place in the relationship between an individual and the sovereign God, as opposed to the relationship between a state and the sovereign God.

:Kaveri Qureshi, John Fell Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Oxford, was invited to deliver a talk on "Punjabi Soldiers in the World Wars: Militarization and Diasporic Citizenship" at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance on Thursday May 11, 2011.



Dr. Qureshi began with a brief overview that her talk would discuss how memorialization of the history of troop deployment from Punjab in the two World Wars was used in contestations of British citizenship by the Punjabi diaspora within the context of "War on Terror", British society's innate tendencies towards militarism and government multiculturalism.

Her ethnographic analysis drew upon three cultural theories. Penina Verdne's idea of "multiculturalism in history" – the exceptional cultural clashes which seemed to be irresolvable and remained in the community as bitter sentiments, explored the foundational features of transition in British multiculturalism in the last decade since the 9/11 attacks. The argument was that while events such as the Satanic Verses controversy in the 1980's and Danish cartoons had been sources of Muslim – British conflict, the post 9/11 situation marked the peak of these clashes with the emergence of Muslims as a suspect citizen in Britain, thus resulting in a foundational change in British multiculturalism. Analyzing multiculturalism in times of war, Paul Gilroy had observed that Britain's involvement in the "War on Terror" created a dilemma that the national enemy turned out to be the country's homegrown terrorists, who were the descendants of the postwar commonwealth immigrants. This discovery had led to a search

for the definition of a core national identity, and to the emergence of citizenship ceremonies and citizenship tests. Similarly, anthropologist Ron Geaves argued that British citizenship had become increasingly militarized and racialized with military service becoming the index of true British citizenship. This was held as a citizenship yardstick for the British ethnic minorities.

Explaining the history and memorialization of troop deployment, Dr. Qureshi stated that deployment of Commonwealth troops in the army had a long history and a significant part of that history was the British-Indian army formed in 1858. At that time, the Punjabis had captured British attention as a loyal martial race because of their presumed innate militarism and lack of overt support to the rebels in 1857. The result was Punjabization of the British Indian army, evident from their numbers which increased from 150,000 Punjabi soldiers at the start of World War I to half a million by the end of World War II. She then quoted from Abdullah Husain's book, *The Weary Generations* which explained how Indian troops were co-opted to fight an enemy with whom they had no real enmity. She read passages providing a vivid description of the process of coercion of young Punjabi men by a feudal lord to enlist as soldiers for World War I, and of the racial differences among soldiers in the British-Indian army alongside their shared fate on the battlefield. The two world wars and military sacrifices of soldiers got memorialized on Remembrance/Poppy Day, the 11th of November in Britain. The day commemorated soldiers from both Britain and the Commonwealth who lost their lives in the two world wars as veterans. Royal British Legion and dignitaries came together at war memorials inscribed with names of soldiers from the city who fought in the wars.

“... government multiculturalism was playing a part in summoning minorities in Britain to form themselves in accordance with the terms of militarized citizenship”

She pointed out that whilst Punjabi Muslims (Pakistani) and Sikh families in Britain both shared the same military history, there were discrepancies in the extent of their organization to promote this history to gain space for the

particular formulation of British citizenship on the terms of militarization. Among Punjabi Sikhs, there had been active campaigning for recognition of contributions by Sikhs to British nationhood at the community level. For instance in Birmingham, Sikhs amassed for Remembrance Day ceremony to commemorate Indian soldiers, who gave their lives in the wars. They had also engaged in debates urging the parliament to introduce changes in the curriculum to redress the neglect of Anglo-Sikh history. Sikh communities had built on the concept of militarized citizenship in construction of Sikh as a model minority. The pinnacle of this organized effort could be seen in the form of a BBC documentary titled “Remembrance of Sikh story” whose objective was to promote the story of Sikhs who had fought in the two world wars. The documentary traced the history of 3 million Indians who had fought out of which 1 million were Sikhs, through interviews of veterans and their descendants. Additionally, the Sikh community organizations and Gurdwaras (Temples) had been promoting recruitment pamphlets for the British army.

The British Muslims on the other hand, displayed a complete lack of interest in joining the British army, which was held up against them as presumed failure to integrate instead of it being seen as a legitimate act of conscientious objection to British campaigns in the era of new imperialism. While the Sikh Diaspora could be seen mobilizing in the context of militarized citizenship, the Pakistani Muslims in Britain, similarly typecasted as a martial race were also making similar efforts of promoting a positive and loyal image of the community but on a much smaller scale. She gave the example of two conference papers. One, a 1988 conference held at Oxford University, retired brigadier and historian Nur Hussain presented a paper titled “The Role of Muslim Martial Races of today's Pakistan in the British Indian army in World War II” which presented a case for militarized citizenship for the Punjabi Muslims through British military service. Noteworthy was that the 380,000 Punjabi Muslims constituted more than a quarter of the Indian army by the end of the war against 160,000 Sikh, 109,000 Gurkhas and 274,000 other Muslim groups. Two, Jahan Mahmood presented a paper titled “Britain's Pakistani communities and their contribution to the Italian campaign in World War II” at a conference in Oxford University after 9/11. His paper highlighted the marginalization of Muslims, and the need for community cohesion to restore a sense of identity and self-esteem

among young British Muslims. But in comparison to the Sikh community, there was a curious lack of political mileage that Muslim organizations had made of this British military history. Militarized citizenship was not taking root in the Muslim diaspora because the concept of militarized citizenship in Britain was at odds with the political subjectivity of Pakistani Muslims. Elaborating, she narrated the story of a young British Pakistani Muslim who was penalized by the school for being too political after he arranged a protest against occupation of Gaza.

“ ... Punjabization of the British Indian army, evident from their numbers which increased from 150,000 Punjabi soldiers at the start of World War I to half a million by the end of World War II. ”

In conclusion Dr. Qureshi stated that government multiculturalism was playing a part in summoning minorities in Britain to form themselves in accordance with the terms of militarized citizenship coalescing in Britain in the context of the “War on Terror” and the new imperialism. The various chords of the Punjabi Diaspora were coming apart and becoming increasingly disharmonious. While the Sikhs were reconfiguring themselves as loyal subjects to position them as model citizens, Muslims were being portrayed as suspect citizens and the Muslim public sphere was being criticized for either being invisible or intransigent.

The talk was followed by a question answer session. Responding to a comment that Sikhs and Muslim diaspora through their respective political stance were actually demonstrating allegiance to their nation states (implying India & Pakistan), she disagreed suggesting that the complexity of diaspora was that it belonged to more than one state. A Pakistani British Muslim had multiple allegiances: to the state of Britain, Pakistan, the Muslim Ummah & possibly others. But in Britain, the allegiance of British Muslims to the global Ummah was seen as illegitimate and their solidarity through conscientious objection against the war in Afghanistan or Iraq as anti-national.

In response to a question regarding similarity of culture and values among Punjabi diaspora, and the role of

popular culture, she said that although there were many sources of commonalities as well as a sense of conviviality among Punjabis historically, still there was both a political history of solidarity as well difference between Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims. Hence the extent to which Punjabi culture provided a common resource should not be overstated as Punjabi language dialects were very different and differences in dress were also quite prominent. Similarly, while there existed a shared flamboyance of popular culture with regards to weddings and music among both communities, a pure and exclusion trend of sobriety and purism associated with religious tradition was also present. In reality, despite the commonalities, religious differences had become increasingly important over the last 20 years partly through state encouragement and partly through fallout of non-faith based collective identities. The British State's legislation to recognize people on the basis of faith had led to both Muslim and Sikh schools obtaining state funding. The people had been encouraged partly by the government and partly by their own multicultural history to organize themselves in terms of faith, thus resulting in religious divisions becoming more salient.


“ The people had been encouraged partly by the government and partly by their own multicultural history to organize themselves in terms of faith, thus resulting in religious divisions becoming more salient. ”

Answering a question regarding the reasons for British Muslims not integrating, she disagreed and stated that British Muslims had made genuine and considerable efforts to integrate which should be recognized and appreciated. Further, it was important for the state to take objections of British Muslims to the new imperialism and perceived illegitimate wars that Britain was engaged in seriously as this was the underlying reason for the unpopularity of army among British Muslims. She argued that colonial history and commonwealth wars should be presented without creating religious categories. Thus, instead of producing a documentary which focused only on Sikh war heroes, presented history should be inclusive recognizing the contributions and sacrifices of all religious communities.

Urdu Works of Dr. Charles W. Forman

By Tahir Masood

Professor of Urdu, Forman Christian College (A Chartered University)



Dr. Charles W. Forman (1821-1894), founder of Rang Mahal Mission School and The Mission College later named Forman Christian College after him, was a great educationist and linguist. Since the year 1849, when British annexed Punjab he spent a large part of his time in educational work. He had been associated with the work of the Education Department from the time of its formation in 1856 and had served on many educational committees, besides being a member of the Senate of the Punjab University College (1870) and Punjab University (1882) until his death in 1894. He had been greatly distinguished as "Most Experienced Teacher in Punjab".

In the beginning of January, 1848, Dr. Charles W. Forman reached Calcutta (India). He stayed there a few months and then came to Agra, where he developed interest in native languages and obtained primary knowledge therein. His next destination was newly annexed territory of Punjab. Dr. Forman reached Lahore on 21st November 1849 accompanied by Rev. John Newton (who afterwards became his father-in-law). They established a small Mission School on 19th December 1849, which was located outside Bhatti Gate, Lahore. Although it was an English medium school, yet Dr. Forman did not ignore the importance of Eastern languages and learnings. He was acquainted with numerous languages like Arabic, Sanskrit, Persian, Hindi, Punjabi and Urdu. He had been a great admirer of Urdu language and literature.

Molvi Noor Ahmad Chishti, an eminent historian was known as an expert in teaching of Persian, Punjabi and Urdu languages to civil and military officers and the ruling elite who came to India in those days. He charged Rs. 20 per mensem as tuition fee and devoted one hour daily to each student. About two thousand foreigners had learnt different native languages from him until his death in 1867. Dr. Charles W. Forman was also a student of Molvi Noor Ahmad Chishti. He got full command in a very short span of time. Keeping in view his command and experience in Urdu, the Punjab Government appointed him as a senior member of "Text Book Committee on Urdu Books" in 1873. Dr. Forman wrote a large number of books in Urdu language, which is a clear proof of his love and devotion for Urdu language.

During my M. Phil / Ph.D. research work in various libraries and archives, I came across a large number of published writings of Dr. Charles W. Forman which were written during his 45 years residence in Punjab. Most of his published writings are in Urdu Language on social and religious subjects and his Arabic language writings comprised of narration of different chapters of the Holy Quran. He has further highlighted educational matters in his Hindi writings and his love for Sanskrit poetry could be seen in his Hindi translation work. I have confined myself here only to the works done by him in Urdu language as listed below but cannot claim that it is a complete list as a number of his works are yet to be traced out.

1. Zikar-i-Istifan or Description of Stephan, 1867
2. Iltimas or Petition, 1868
3. Rah-i-Salamat or the Path of Peace, 1868
4. Ummaid-i-Janat or Hope of the Heaven, 1868
5. Sahargah dar Inglstan or The day dawn in England, 1868
6. Kashif-i-Jurm-i-Adam or The fall of Adam, 1870
7. Palus ka Qissa or The Account of Paul, 1870
8. Ahwal-i-Masih or Events of Christ's life, 1874
9. Iliya ka Qissa or The story of Prophet Elijah, 1875
10. Qissa-i-Mar-i-Biranji or The Brazen Serpent, 1875

11. Risala-i-Bayan-i-Farqalit or The Paraclet explained, 1875
12. Risal-i-Wafat-i-Masih or The death of Christ, 1875
13. Tuhfa-tul-Musalihin or The good news for the media-tors, 1875
14. Qissa-i-Tufan or The story of a disaster, 1875
15. Sawal-o-Jawab or Questions and Answers, 1875
16. Tegh-o-Sipar Iswi or The Christian sword and shield (3 parts), 1875
17. Risala-i-Tahrif or Journal written in reply to the charges made against Christians that their holy books are corrupted, 1876
18. Qissa-i-Qarzdar or The story of a debtor, 1877
19. Tariq-i-Tahqiq or The methods of research, 1877

- A version of this article appeared in The Nation

Visitors and Activities

July 19, 2012

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Dr. Nukhbah Taj Langah and Dr. Saadia Toor on [Pakistan: Identity, Ethnicity and Prospects of Seraiki Suba](#).

July 25, 2012

The CPPG organized a seminar with Majed Akhtar on [Hydro politics of the Indus Waters Treaty: Baglihar and Beyond](#).

October 8, 2012

The CPPG arranged a seminar with His Excellency Philippe Thiebaud, Ambassador of France to Pakistan on [The Tradition and Practice of French Public Services](#).

November 1, 2012

The CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Michael W. Gray, Professor Sajjad Naseer and Dr. Saeed Shafqat on [US Presidential Elections 2012 and Promise of Policy Change](#).

November 2, 2012

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Salman Khalid and Sec. Mohammad Jahanzeb Khan, Secretary Energy on [Power Politics in Pakistan: Past Mistakes and the Way forward for Energy Security](#).

November 28, 2012

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Fouad Bajwa, Consultant UNCTAD IER 2012 on [UNCTAD's Information Economy Report 2012: The Software Industry and Developing Countries](#) followed by a roundtable on [ICT & Internet Policy](#).

December 19, 2012

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Ahmert Bilal Soofi, advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and Dr. Manzar Abbas Zaidi, advisor to the British High Commission on [Balancing Counter Terrorism Legislation and Civil Liberties](#).

December 20th, 2012

The CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Mark Carroll, Expert Representative of Lahore Forensic Science Authority and Expert Representative Cyber Crimes, Government of Pakistan on [Cyber Crime, Pakistan and Future Scenario](#).

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