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For the past few years, CPPG has been actively engaging scholars visiting Pakistan and South Asia. On occasions, we have made concerted effort to facilitate those who desire to have a better understanding of our country or have particular interest in its history, politics and culture. Two such scholars are Dr. Adam Webb, Resident Associate Professor of Political Science at the Johns Hopkins Nanjing Centre, China and Dr. Francis Robinson, Sultan of Oman Fellow, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, University of Oxford, who have both visited our Centre more than once and each time the themes they have chosen for their discourse have roused stimulating discussion. We remain deeply appreciative of these scholars for accepting our invitation. Simultaneously, we have encouraged and invited doctoral candidates and emerging scholars in social sciences and humanities to share their research in the CPPG Seminar Series. This spirit of academic engagement, deliberation and knowledge sharing has helped CPPG emerge as a platform and venue of choice for academic and policy conversation. [Cont. page 23](#)

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CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
AND GOVERNANCE

:Dr. Adam K. Webb, Resident Associate Professor of Political Science at the Johns Hopkins Nanjing Centre, China and former Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences was invited to deliver a talk on "Global Growth to 2050: Demographic Trends and the New World Order" at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance on Jan 16, 2013.



Webb opened his talk by stating that although predicting future political trends was a challenging task due to the uncertain nature of political events, still certain long-term trends were obvious enough to make political projections. Unlike many forecasts that envisioned transition from Western to Chinese hegemony, Webb presented a third scenario based on political demography, which would change the world in unprecedented ways.

One obvious trend was the relative decline of the power of the West in the last century that included both economic and demographic factors. The economic trend depicted that the combined share of the Western world broadly represented by the US and EU, in global GDP had declined from 60% in 1913 to 48% today. Economic projections further showed a steady decline in the coming decades to 34% in 2020 and 21% in 2050. This largely reflected that as poorer regions of the world began to catch up economically, there would be a rough evening out of living standards across the world. The demographic aspect was equally striking as the share of West in world's population that was about 1/3rd in 1913 was predicted to decline to 1/10th in 2050. So the economic and demographic decline of the West was a fairly obvious long-term trend.

The rise of China had analysts forecasting that the Chi-

nese economy was expected to surpass the US, and could make up as much as 30% of the world's GDP by 2050. Webb raised the question: how peaceful would this hegemonic transition be? He went on to describe a number of possibilities: first, a peaceful transition of world leadership from US to China and eventual peaceful cooperation between the two nations to shape the world economy; second, a violent confrontation by the year 2030 as suggested by some strategic thinkers. However, the aforementioned scenario was too simplistic considering that a large number of other powers were rising as well. These included the emerging countries of BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. A broader classification of emerging E7 economies included the BRICS economies, and Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey. The shift of the influential world economies towards these emerging powers was very striking. So within the G20 block that included majority of the industrialized and developing economies, the economic share of the industrialized G7 countries would drop from 72% to 41% while that of the five developing countries China, Russia, India and Brazil and Mexico would rise from 20% today to 51% in 2050. Thus major developing economies would have the largest share of the global economy.

He suggested that each of the future possibilities included the rise of China or BRICS or E7, which led him and others to a few conclusions: first, that the West would steadily lose bargaining power vis-à-vis one or several competitors; second, that this power shift would happen in the same terrain as great power real politic assuming that rising countries would pursue a conventional policy of national self-interest, while their political and economic weight would determine winners and losers, ruling out any form of political alignment; third, that centrality of China's rise would lead to a regression of West led globalization and a reemergence of emphasis on national sovereignty. The three main predictions made by observers in this regard were a natural hegemonic transition from US to China, a multipolar version of real politic and a return to hard-shell national sovereignty.

However, he made a case to argue that none of these (three) images of the future were likely to be true as there was going to be more room for multilateral cooperation, cosmopolitanism and reform of the world system, while the global demographic change would also shift the

global power balance in a number of ways. The center of gravity of world population had shifted steadily towards the South, away from the West as well as from China. Population patterns of 2010 and 2050 showed that the combined share of the West and China shrank dramatically. For example, the labor force of Sub-Saharan Africa in 2050 would be larger than that of China as Chinese population control measures had resulted in Chinese demographic projection similar to that of Europe and Japan by 2050. Global influence depended on demography as well as economic growth while demographic trends were easier to predict than growth and development. Thus, greater number of poor people in the global South was not necessarily to its advantage, however economic growth of the South would increase faster over the same period for three reasons.

“ ... economic and demographic decline of the West was a fairly obvious long-term trend. ”

First, Western economies' long-term growth had averaged around 1% a year over the last several decades and there was no indication that it would pick up in the near future. The global financial crisis had been one of the reasons for it. Second, it was unlikely that Chinese economic growth would continue at the same fast pace as in the last three decades. China was now entering the middle income track primarily due to barriers to innovation, demographic pressures of a shrinking labor force, internal institutional obstacles to growth, corruption, lack of rule of law and political reform issues. These factors prevented China from progressing from a middle income economy to an advanced innovation based economy. Third, on average poorer countries tended to grow faster as their basic economic and demographic realities favored a higher rate of long-term growth (higher return to capital and a more hospitable environment for investment). Thus combining both economic and demographic prospects, one could expect that the global South's share of the world economy would increase markedly between now and 2050. The next 10 countries in population size after China, India and US were Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Mexico etc., which each had about 2-3% of world's population individually. Although, this placed them in a league of lower global influence on their own as com-

pared to China, West or others with at least 1/10th of the global economy, still demographic trends suggested an increase in their share of global power. This did not imply world dominance by Latin America, Africa, Middle East and South Asia, but that their relative influence would be greater than it had been at any time in the modern era.

Webb then explored what a southward shift of global influence would mean. He stated that the character of each state and society shaped its foreign policy as apart from a country's size and regime type, internal attributes as well as cultural contours of a society influenced its international relations. Thus, the nature of societies of the global South had to be understood. He suggested multilateralism, internal diversity and cosmopolitan potential as three important characteristics of the majority of these societies that would have significant global implications.

The first would be arise in multilateralism. Small and middle income powers were classic multilateralists; for example, Canada, Sweden, Spain had been active in multilateral cooperation with global influence. This was also increasingly true for countries like Brazil and South Africa. Both countries took a leading role in regional associations and engaged in mutual intercontinental dialogue. Elaborating further, he explained that a number of enduring rule based frameworks were emerging in many regions, based loosely on the European Union model. In South America, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) was consciously modeled on the EU and was focusing on open trade, common currency, freedom of movement across borders, and democratically elected super-national institutions. In the case of Africa, the African Union had taken an active role in supporting interventions in Somalia and Mali. It had also created a Peace and Security Council, which could issue binding decisions on member states. These regional experiments suggested an increasing openness to multilateralism among small and medium powers than was the case a decade or two earlier.

The second important characteristic of countries in the global South was diversity that disrupted any exaggerated themes about nationhood. While in the classic nation state model, there was one nation, one people, one culture, one state, but this did not apply to most southern countries. In Latin America, the colonial patterns of settlement and intermarriages had created what was called the

"cosmic race"— a mixed population of European, indigenous and African ancestry. These diversities were built into the texture of these societies showing that culture and polity need not dovetail. Such diversity was at odds with historic European nationalism, and the relentless civil assimilation in the US that eroded multiple identities to merge them into one. Similarly, the concept of Chinese nationalism had also tried to somehow encompass the wide-ranging diversity and multi-ethnicity of the society. Thus, if the global South influenced the mainstream global public opinion then older forced models of nationhood would seem an oddity on the global stage.

“ The center of gravity of world population had shifted steadily towards the South, away from the West as well as from China. ”

Lastly, he suggested that countries of the global South were deeply predisposed to cosmopolitanism*. World values survey showed that there was a high level of cosmopolitan sentiment among the people of Africa and Latin America. A startling statistic showed that out of the poorest section of Brazil, a quarter identified with the world as a whole. The Arab Spring had also spread in large part because of this cross border consciousness. Such trends showed transnational identity and activism. Contrasting this with expected power centers of the world, places like US, UK, China, Japan and Korea, where one expected a higher level of global consciousness, instead faced significant obstacles to being genuinely cosmopolitan. For instance, China relentlessly used the official media and the education system to socialize its citizens in what it called "unique national conditions".

Based on the above articulation, Webb argued that rise of the South would transform our mental landscape, and the greater its influence, the more it will disrupt the racialized world view of the last two centuries. Instead, it would influence the phenomenon of "brown racism", the racism displayed by Asians towards those of relatively darker skin. Moreover, it would mix and blur identities creating a more accepting attitude towards racial heterogeneity. Elaborating, he stated that current trends in global migration suggested two key directions. First was the northward

migration, i.e. migration to the US and Europe, which was creating a South within the North. Statistics showed that by 2050, the American population would be majority non-whites and the EU would be 20% Muslim. The second category was South to South migration, particularly within each region. Cross border migration within Latin America, Africa and the Middle East had picked up in the recent years. This global rebalancing may lead to a proliferation of South-South ties.

Further, he stated that the meaning of globalization was context and country specific. Most of globalization had been centered in the US, Europe and Japan, if assessed through flight routes and international telephone traffic. However with the rise of the Southern countries and strengthening of South-South ties, the meaning and implications of globalization would transform. A manifestation of this change was the Chinese investment and economic engagement with Africa and else where in the global South. Although, the nature of current engagement was elite based state to state economic ties, still in the long-term, these ties were expected to diversify across various regions and one that encapsulated civil society and more diverse people to people networks. Thus, a multi-track diplomacy was needed as opposed to purely state to state diplomacy, which was not sustainable in an era of increasingly assertive publics, exemplified particularly by the Arab Spring.

He then explored the subject of ideology and argued that the southward rebalancing would fundamentally challenge the contours of liberal modernity as most Southern societies were highly religious as compared to Europe, Russia, Japan and China and relatively more than even the US. Similarly, there was also a high degree of political salience of religion in the global South. Thus, these demographic trends as well as higher birthrates of religious versus secular populations would result in increasing the weight of religion in coming decades. Among religions, Christian and Islamic populations combined had a clear majority and were largely concentrated in the global South. While Christianity's center of gravity had shifted southward to Latin America and Africa compared to Northern Europe in the recent decade, Islam was gaining new converts in Sub-Saharan Africa while population growth rates of existing Muslim countries was very high.

Both these religions were avowedly universalistic, spoke to humanity at large across cultural and geographic boundaries and provided a moral language on issues like social justice, ethics, and political legitimacy. Will a growing youth bulge, a larger labor force and widespread poverty, there would be an intense demand for reform and social justice. Thus, religions gaining ground could result in the erosion of the primacy of the nation state.

“... combining both economic and demographic prospects, one could expect that the global South’s share of the world economy would increase markedly between now and 2050.”



Lastly, Webb discussed the various policy options for countries during this transition period. He argued that the foreign policy of Southern governments would adapt and transform based on three factors: one, Southern public opinion was likely to become more assertive and globally aware; two, a growing concern and interest in inter-regional affairs which may transform regional transnationalism into global transnationalism; three, awareness of the growing importance of transnational networks as many Southern state movements were rising to power based on their support. He argued that EU and India would potentially have a decisive balancing role. EU could slow down broadening of global participation by defining its political and economic interests narrowly or it could expand the logic of transnational integration to shape new global structures. Similarly India could pursue a unilateralist rise in power along the same lines as China, or pursue more multilateral foreign policy to engage with other rising global centers. China would face a fundamental choice between openness and multiculturalism vs economic stagnation, as its technocratic authoritarianism had little resonance with mobilized publics in any society. She would require a democratic transition and tempering of hegemonic aspirations to develop soft power as its shrinking labor force required importation of labor from other countries. In conclusion, he reiterated that a simple shift from Western to Chinese hegemony was unlikely. Instead, he predicted that a third force, the global South may emerge to be more powerful than either of the two main powers.

The talk was followed by a lively question and answer session. In reply to a question regarding India’s inclination towards unilateralism, and whether Pakistan’s emergence as a highly populous country in 2050 would affect South Asia’s geopolitical balance, he asserted that there were polarized thinking currents within India. While Hindu nationalists had an insular and exceptional view of Indian national identity leading to a unilateralist view of international politics, others viewed India as part of the global South and thus potentially influential on the global stage by forming alliances with other Southern countries. He stated that while population would not affect South Asia’s geopolitical balance, for Pakistan to guarantee its freedom of action and interests, a multilateralist approach was required that diversified its ties beyond the two major powers, China and US.

In response to a question regarding the importance of human capital in comparison with population and the role it would play in global influence, he asserted that education levels would be important in either multiplying or hampering the influence of increasing populations. However, in terms of greater political engagement, influence and activism, the minimum threshold of education levels required was not that high. A fairly literate population that could engage and articulate through some sort of communication technology could network politically on a large scale. Rapid technological development leading to increased access across social and geographical barriers, enabled populations to assert themselves in unprecedented ways.

In response to a question relating to a potential conflict over official language and religion in the global South, he accepted a current lack of practical economic motivation of learning a foreign language other than English, however with increasing South to South ties, demand for diversifying language competencies would increase. Discussing religion, he articulated that there were two ways of looking at religion. One, as a marker of identity that distinguished from other groups and second as a basis for common ground, which could potentially play a unifying force and provide an incentive for forming alliances.

Dr. Saadia Toor, Associate Professor of Sociology, College of Staten Island, The City University of New York and author of *The State of Islam: Culture and Cold War Politics in Pakistan*, and Dr. Nukhbah Langah, Head of the English Department, Forman Christian College and author of *Poetry as Resistance: Islam and Ethnicity in Post-Colonial Pakistan*, were invited by the CPPG to deliver a talk on "Pakistan: Identity, Ethnicity and Prospects of Seraiki Suba" on July 19, 2012.



Dr. Saadia Toor opened the talk with a discourse on salient points of her book, which explored how culture and politics had played out in Pakistan from 1947 onwards and the ways in which poetry, language and literature had molded the norms and values in Pakistan. She initially discussed the national language controversy of Urdu and Bengali, and argued that the language issue was underpinned by the desire of the Punjabi and Mahajir elite to concentrate power in their own hands rather than share it with other groups. East Bengal, despite comprising 51% of the country's population, could not get its demands addressed by the Punjabi and Mahajir ruling elite of the time. It depicted a case of a majority population being completely dominated by a minority in power, and was a key factor in the clash of cultures in the new nation state. The national language movement that arose as a result of political and cultural repression eventually culminated in the secession of East Pakistan. The 1952 Bengali martyrs were now commemorated yearly by the UN on February 21, the Mother Language Day.

Expanding on her argument, she suggested that language was generally viewed as significant primarily due to its emotional resonance for a particular community. However it must be recognized that language movements were

resistance movements against various kinds of discrimination. What eventually became the national language of Pakistan had major consequences in matters of government jobs and distribution of resources. With Urdu as the national language, the major share of the resources was directed towards West Pakistan. Thus, many language movements were a result of the exclusionist agenda & policies of the state, which ensured that certain ethnicities and communities were barred from polity, institutions, and power structure. This also held true for the Seraiki language movement in contemporary Punjab.

She further explored the deeply entrenched relationship between literature and politics, particularly in South Asia, which emerged in the context of politicization of nationalities and ethnicities, and thus associated languages. Tracing the Bengali language movement, she narrated that right after partition, literature became politicized in the standoff between the Progressive Writers Association (PWA) and its liberal detractors. The progressive writers were categorized as too didactic and explicitly political, and thus unable to uphold poetic standards. The PWA was the locus of critique of the Pakistani nation state in West Pakistan while East Bengal was seen as challenging the very idea of Pakistani nationalism through poetry, journalism, and debates. There was a constant critique of state's discrimination against East Pakistan, undemocratic policies in West Pakistan, and on its increasingly cozy relations with the US in the Cold War. Furthermore, mainstream intellectual debate supported by liberal intellectuals was constructed by arguing that East Bengal writers were politically motivated, agents of a foreign power, and their poetry didactic and substandard, which gave the state impunity to take legal action against these poets. The state reacted by jailing poets, and banning poetry recitals to shut down the political space, discourse and imaginary that these writers and journalists had created.

“... the Cold War project attempted to further a politicized and radicalized version of Islam to counter communism across the world.”

Then Toor moved on to make a critical appraisal of the political and cultural underpinnings of Ayub Khan's development project. One of the distributional outcomes of the

project was an exacerbation of already existing economic inequalities and income disparities within West Pakistan as well as between West and East Pakistan, which gave more steam to the grievances of East Bengalis. She contended that Ayub Khan's development project was deeply interlinked with the Cold War and stemmed from the need of the American government to ensure that newly independent post-colonial countries were guarded from Soviet influence. As anti-colonial nationalist movements were orienting themselves ideologically and politically towards the Soviet Union, American social scientists created the development project as a counter measure. Additionally, as part of the Cold War project, US supported dictatorships across the world because the actual aspirations of the people of these countries were not aligned with US interests. This led to the creation of an anti-democratic and anti-socialist narrative during Ayub's regime. That democracy did not suit the Pakistani people and socialism was an imported anti-Islamic ideology.

“ Bengali language and culture were portrayed as not being Muslim enough, and too inspired by Hinduism. ”

While the left wing intellectuals tried to indigenize socialist ideas and endeavored to counter the Cold War discourse that focused on communists being anti-Islam, the Cold War project attempted to further a politicized and radicalized version of Islam to counter communism across the world. She stressed that while most people believed that the Afghan war marked the beginning of politicized Islam, actually Islam had been used in opportunistic ways much earlier in the 1950s under Ayub Khan's regime. While he set up a Ministry of Religious Affairs that tried to produce a modernist version of Islam, he also kept a backdoor open to Maulana Maudoodi and the Jamaat-i-Islami. It might seem contradictory that he had sent Maudoodi to jail, but when push came to shove, the state was more inclined towards the Jamaat and religious right than to concede to the left, which had demanded democratic rights and the abolishment of One-Unit.

Proceeding to the Bhutto and Zia era, Toor argued that the deep connection between culture, religion and politics remained relevant in the political landscape. Both leaders entrenched Islam into Pakistani national identity through

different means. For example, she suggested that economic migration of labor to Gulf countries resulted in adverse political and cultural influence on Pakistan. Zia even attempted to erase any form of shared syncretic Indian identity, an Indo-Pakistani cultural identity, and the Indo-Persian tradition to suppress indigenous ethnic expression. However, it was the 1990s that saw political consolidation of the Zia era with the emergence of new political leaders and entities like Nawaz Sharif and the MQM and their influence on the prevalent political configuration and culture. During the 1990's, Islam became so much a part of national discourse that it obscured all other angles and dimensions. As a case study of that problem, she looked at the issue of honor killings particularly karo-kari and the use of Islam as a means to create confusion by opportunists. In most debates on Honour Killing, the issue of Islam magically disappeared and such issues were explained by culture and tradition which then tended to serve as proxies for Islam. Thus, despite the official enshrinement of Islam by the state, it became problematic for the state to justify certain kinds of things.

Lastly, Toor reiterated that the language movement in East Pakistan was suppressed using Islamic ideology as a tool. Bengali language and culture were portrayed as not being Muslim enough, and too inspired by Hinduism. Their demand for certain rights for themselves was taken as undermining the nation state as the state followed a policy of explicit targeting of intellectuals, students and student leaders. She asserted that a similar pattern had emerged in the Baluchistan nationalist movement and the Seraiki language movement.

Dr. Nuqbah Langah, then began by describing the two sections of her book. The first part was theoretical and explored mysticism, connection between literature and politics, the fall of Dhaka and how it inspired ethno-linguistic movements while the second section analyzed the poetic works of eminent Seraiki writers.

Discussing the outline of her book, she said that research on linguistics and colonial policies had built a hierarchy of what was to be considered a language, dialect or vernacular, and this process of tagging languages had created a confusion that lasted well into the post-colonial era. Further, the linguistic survey of India had not mentioned the term Seraiki, so eventual coinage of the language

had to be understood. She, herself had used the term 'proto-Seraiki' to describe the collection of various Seraiki dialects- Bahawalpuri, Riyasti and Multani. She argued that the Bengali movement for a separate homeland in 1971 had inspired several ethno-linguistic movements in West Pakistan as several literary festivals with political undercurrents used to be held across southern Punjab back then. It was in one of these festivals in the back drop of the 1971 war, called Fareed festivals, after the poet Khawaja Ghulam Fareed that several common dialects of the region came together to be coined as Seraiki.

Discussing the poetry section of her book, she commented that literature, mysticism and politics were all concurrent themes in Seraiki poetry and many poets consciously, or unconsciously, resisted political and cultural pressures through their works. The reason for this was the use of certain terminology inspired by Khawaja Fareed such as Maanboli (mother language), Maandharti (motherland), Waseb(language, land and culture), Wakhra(distinction), Sunjhaan(identity consciousness and recognition) and Munjh(nostalgia), which allowed mysticism, poetry, literature and politics to become melded into one.

“... rather than being mutually exclusive, Punjabi & Seraiki identities should be seen as co-existing as Seraiki movement underscored the need for consolidating indigenous identities,”

Langah then delved into the works of a few Seraiki poets, she had studied for her book. The renowned nationalist poet, Safir Lashari whose anthems had become slogans for the Seraiki movement had been a military officer before becoming a political activist. She read and translated one of his poems whose subtle imagery depicted language as motherland. The poem presented a woman mourning at Khawaja Ghulam Fareed's grave who cried out that her children had deserted her, she had no home and no one recognized her. When the shrine's caretaker asked who she was? She replied, "I am Seraiki". The second poet, Aslam Ansari wrote both in Urdu and Seraiki. He invoked images of the Rohi Desert, Derawar Fort, desert symbolism and color to depict Waseb, with Multan as the locus of his

imagined Seraiki motherland. The third poet, Aslam Javaid, whose parents had migrated from India at partition was not accepted by many as an indigenous Seraiki poet. He talked about the physical and cultural differences between the native and the settler, drawing a yardstick for being a native despite him being viewed as a settler himself. Langah considered this creation of an 'other' and 'us', a common post-colonial exercise.

Discussing Seraiki language's significance for the Seraiki movement, she explained that one of the reasons Seraiki political and language movement began was because many Seraiki writers were being tagged as Punjabi and their work was being included in the anthologies of Punjabi poetry and literature. She also dispelled the common view that the construction of Seraiki identity was detrimental or damaging to the Punjabi identity as argued in the book, *Rethinking Punjab: The Construction of Seraiki Identity* by Hussain Ahmed Khan. Instead, she argued that rather than being mutually exclusive, both identities should be seen as co-existing as Seraiki movement underscored the need for consolidating indigenous identities, and thus a need to allow children to obtain education in their mother language.

The two book presentations were followed by a vibrant question and answer session. Answering a question regarding the connection between economic deprivation and language movements in relation to both the Bangla and Seraiki nationalist movements, Langah agreed that economic exclusion was in most cases the predominant reason for political language movements. She stated that in case of Bangladesh, the causation link was more obvious, whereas in Seraiki speaking region, the economic deprivation aspect had not been brought to the forefront. The reason was that the Bangla population was more politically aware having witnessed partition, whereas the Seraiki people only became politically conscious after the creation of Bangladesh. Additionally, the Bengali language had significant institutional academic support while Seraiki lacked it. She said that because politics and literature were intricately linked, an interdisciplinary analytical approach was needed. Toor added that the choice of language or any cultural marker as a symbol of resistance was not necessarily chosen by the people of the community because it could also become a symbol of their

inferiority.

Answering a question comparing increasing radicalization in southern Punjab and Seraiki nationalism in terms of capturing the disgruntled economically deprived, Langah stressed that the Seraiki nationalists did not have extremist tendencies as they were concerned with ethnic, regional and political issues rather than their religious identity. Toor further explained that Islamists had exploited class dynamics as many economically well-off land owning families tended to be Shia leading to a sectarian discourse. However, the analogies of nationalist movements in Pakistan indicated their secular nature, for example the Baloch nationalist movement continued to be secular while the state consciously promoted Islamist policies and politics to counter it. A similar situation may arise as the Seraiki nationalist movement gained momentum. She argued that Islam was constantly used by the state elite to undermine democratic demands, which necessitated building a unified identity comprising language and religion. For example, even when the government finally decided to incorporate Bangla as a second national language, it demanded that it be written in the Arabic script rather than its original script.

Mubbashir Rizvi, a doctoral candidate at the Department of Anthropology, University of Texas Austin was invited to deliver a talk on **"Jangal Vich Mangal (Joy in the Wilderness): Millennial Irrigation and the Colonial Infrastructure as Gift"** on 27th of June 2012.



Rizvi opened his remarks by asserting that Central Punjab was admired for its dominant status in the national life of Pakistan: its intensive commercial agriculture was supported by a reliable supply of water, and a good road and rail network that connected most villages to market towns. But this image of Punjab as the center of the nation and its agrarian heartland was jolted in the year 2000. When the Anjuman Mazareen-e-Punjab (AMP) movement successfully challenged the military's attempt to restructure vast agricultural estates by ending share cropping to institute private cash based contracts.

In his PhD thesis, Rizvi had used post-colonial theory and environmental anthropology to understand the vicissitudes of AMP, a peasant movement that was struggling to retain land rights over vast agricultural farms controlled by the Pakistan Army. In doing so, the movement had challenged the dominant narrative about Punjab while attempting to reconfigure the historical narratives about development. Furthermore, he drew attention to the presence of a large number of Christian tenants whose history had been glossed over in both Pakistani and Punjabi historiography.

Explaining the prehistory of the movement, he delved into the broader political and cultural significance of the network of roads, canals and trains between 1885-1947.

The British government had started an ambitious project of canal colonization during the above mentioned period due to which the irrigated area in Punjab increased from 3 million acres to over 14 million acres, while construction of modern villages and towns transformed the mobile and nomadic landscape. These projects of colonial modernity: canals, roads and trains were the artifacts of colonial power, and claimed to embody the redemptive aspects of colonial rule as the state narrative described deserts being transformed into gardens, while in reality many of these areas were already prosperous prior to the implementation of development projects. Further, he contended that these technologies had to be seen in the context of sociology, moral significance, and the symbolic economy and political debates that they came to embody. He referred to short stories on the history of canal colonies, in particular Ahmad Nadeem Qasmi's "Thal", which talked of the irrigation system and depicted how modern technologies were sometimes apprehended by the locals due to their negative impact on social, cultural life and value systems.

“Far from dissolving caste or pre-modern forms of association, the platform showed how colonial government relied on a paradoxical and productive relationship of change and preservation of these distinct identities.”

Although, the railway system, open irrigated fields and canal colonies anticipated a future in which caste hierarchies would be dissolved, and communal tribes reformed along with socioeconomic mobility for peasant laborers, still in reality these purposes were not achieved. At the railway platforms, the crowd ranged from peasants to Christian converts, and World War veterans. But, the railway platform came to mean very different thing to different people standing on that same platform. Far from dissolving caste or pre-modern forms of association, the platform showed how colonial government relied on a paradoxical and productive relationship of change and preservation of these distinct identities. The crowd's caste, religious identity, class and military service determined the different governmental programs that applied to them. This politics of recognition also worked through exclusions, emphasizing the singularity of a given population

from common law and therefore for protection. Thus, the regional, ethnic, tribal identity and caste differences persisted while the domain of citizenship remained extremely fragmented and constructed as the government dealt with different populations in uneven ways, even marking some communities as being un-fit for peasant cultivation.

“In the seemingly modern and democratic canal colonies that were seen as objects of modern agrarian life, intense religious violence was witnessed before partition.”

From the British perspective, road and canal projects were seen as a gift that would “transform Punjab”. Rizvi argued that it was instead an exchange rather than a gift, accompanied with the condition of modernity bound colonial subjection. It increased the intimacy between the colonial state and Punjab, such that the ruling central Punjab was still identified within the post-colonial context as the center. Modern infrastructure was used to guide the conduct of the state's subjects: agricultural production was dependent on the location of the canal; commerce was generated where the road was built; so it increased the control and domination of the state.

In the eyes of the colonial state, sub-spatial groups had to be ruled according to their own customary laws that had to be discovered, documented and formalized. The colonial state worked in two different ways: incorporation through markets and laws, while at the same time isolating and protecting certain attributes that were not seen as compatible with market principles. This showed a contradictory path of promising radical change and preservation, inclusion and exclusion. Despite the utopian rhetoric of the state with its promises to deliver a modern and orderly agrarian society, the canal project re-signified traditional identities as the hierarchies and traditions of Punjab were legally entrenched.

In canal colonies, people from diverse caste and religious backgrounds were brought together (Jatt, Sikh, Arain) and these colonies were seen as more democratic than other parts of Punjab, which had a more feudal structure. It was assumed that the technological projects of development

would dissolve caste differences, but in reality they intensified it. In the seemingly modern and democratic canal colonies that were seen as objects of modern agrarian life, intense religious violence was witnessed before partition. Rizvi thus concluded by saying that the perception of modern infrastructure and projects should be embedded in a cultural, historical and moral dimension.

In the second half of his presentation, Rizvi discussed the Okara movement and the archival analysis he had conducted for his research. He explored the history of the village Das (10) Chak. No road went to this village that made it seem remote and isolated. But this impression was deceptive as the village was connected to places as far as Belgium and London. It was also the first village in the history of Christian colonies that were set up in this area. More recently, Das Chak was the center of the first confrontation between tenant farmers and law enforcing authorities, and served as a catalyst for the movement.

Rizvi's research had revealed that many of the military farm villages were developed and constructed by the Christian missionaries. They had brought new converts into the wilderness before it had been irrigated. Many of these missionaries were Flemish and got funding from Belgium. But they were cut off from their Belgian support as war broke out in Europe. He then narrated the story of an indigenous inhabitant of the farms, Khushi Baba from the Das Chak village. Khushi Baba's brothers and father had died in the process of settling the village because they had to fight off wild animals. They had been promised that land would be given to them six years after it was settled. But the promises were not kept and thus many tenant farmers felt a sense of betrayal from the Church.

“... dissimilar communities engaged modernity very differently based on the ways the colonial state recognized them.”

In conclusion, Rizvi argued that Khushi Baba's narrative gave a sense of colonial modernity that was deeply compromising in terms of its promises of welfare and development, promises that came through colonial state and missionaries. Thus dissimilar communities engaged

modernity very differently based on the ways the colonial state recognized them.

The talk was followed by a question-answer session. Explaining the significance of archival analysis in his research, Rizvi stated that the political analysis that focused on tracking governmental processes through textual archival analysis and place based histories, gave a view of contentious effects of power. Ethnographic archival fieldwork could aid in understanding the populations and their problems and in rethinking the way in which projects of development and technology were viewed.

Responding to a question regarding the ownership of Okara military farms, he replied that they belonged to the Punjab government. The original land records showed that the ownership had moved from Catholic Church to the Punjab government. During World War I, the Punjab government leased the land to the British Army for 20 years. The lease ran out in 1942, so the army did not have ownership rights to this land now. Technically, the ownership belonged to the Punjab provincial government.

A question was raised regarding the differing relationships between community and land, of the indigenous people versus those that came after 1947. Whether the post 1947 settlers looked at land differently and how it impacted the movement? Rizvi replied that different villages had different histories for instance Okara had a history of missionaries. There were other military farms that had different populations, demography and communities. However, the way they saw the movement didn't vary that much. Many of the most prominent leaders of the movement were those that came after 1947. The history, background or size of land holding did not determine involvement in the movement.

:Dr. Francis Robinson, Sultan of Oman Fellow, Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies, University of Oxford was invited to the Centre for Public Policy and Governance to deliver a talk on "Global History from an Islamic Angle" on February 25, 2013.



Robinson began by asserting that there were important lessons to be learned from the study of Muslim world system, which preceded the Western system, and parts of which still continued to operate and expand beneath the sway of Western supremacy. The expansion of the Muslim world from the 8th to the 18th century was a global phenomenon that emerged in Arabia in the mid 7th century after the defeat of the Byzantine Empire, within a decade of the Prophet's death. Following Arabia, it expanded from North Africa to South Asia within 100 years and made cities of West Asia great trade and technology hubs. From 13th century onwards, the Muslim world continued to expand into West Africa, South and South East Asia, and till the 17th century, Muslim society was the most expansive and influential in the Afro-Asian region. It occupied the geographical pivot of history with China and Japan in the northeast and Europe in the northwest.

An outstanding feature of the Muslim world was its connectedness through long distance trade across land and sea. While China exported important innovations such as paper and gunpowder, it received a host of influences ranging from cartography, astronomy, medicine and new crops. Another powerful dimension of this connectedness was the teacher-pupil relationship of the Ulema and the master-disciple relationship of Sufis. As they studied the central message of Islam and needed skills to make this message socially useful, a key requirement was travel in search of knowledge. Respect for Islamic learning till

late 17th century was evident in the fact that the British Royal Society founded in 1661 had several cells of books in Arabic, which were collected in the first 10 years of its existence, and early fellows of the society made a point of learning Arabic. While Muslim world's influence decreased, Western dominance also had profound implications on the spread of the Muslim world. First was the continuing process of Islamization through deepening presence in Indonesia, and in East and West Africa. Second was the expansion as the Ahmadiya and the Nizari Ismaili sects took advantage of the British Empire to spread under its umbrella. Further, Muslims utilized the economic opportunities offered by the West to establish themselves in Western Europe, North and West America, the Caribbean, South Africa and Australia.

“ As they studied the central message of Islam and needed skills to make this message socially useful, a key requirement was travel in search of knowledge. ”

He stated that old forms of connectedness continued as Ulema and Sufis came to represent their societies against their elites who were being co-opted by the West, and these religiously based systems of connectedness were an important global story. Sufis came to have notable international followers, while the teacher-pupil relationship underpinned the spread of reformist activism. The India's Deoband School spread through-out Pakistan, particularly Western Pakistan. In the Northwest, it informed the early development of the Tali-ban, and in Iran and Baluchistan, it provided intellectual leadership to the Muslims from Central Asia. The same teacher-pupil relationship also underpinned the growing activism of the Shia of West Asia. Over time, new forms of connectedness overlaid older ones and trans-nationalist Islamic organizations emerged. Tableeghi Jamaat spread throughout the world; Muslims Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami and the like challenged Western elites for power, and many Muslim NGOs like International Institute of Islamic Thought and the Fethullah Gülen educational movement made a base in over 50 countries. Further, development of the press in the 19th century helped Muslims conceive of themselves in pan-Islamic terms, as a civilization, and this civilizational

(Ummah) consciousness of the ordinary Muslim has only enhanced with later technologies such as TV and internet. He claimed that Osama bin Laden was brilliantly successful in using these tools to reach out to the ordinary Muslim and to help turn the community of believers into a community of conscience.

“... development of the press in the 19th century helped Muslims conceive of themselves in pan-Islamic terms, as a civilization, ”

Robinson then stressed on the importance of studying connectedness of the Muslim world for a global historian and explored the three important features of connectedness and shared knowledge. The first was storytelling and sharing of fables, which was a feature of all world religions and still had wide ranging influence in both Muslim and Hindu societies. The great Muslim epics, epic of Prophet's relatives and friends, stories of the Mughal emperor Akbar, and of Muslims conquests had an impact on Islamic history, reaching its zenith with *One Thousand and One Nights*, whose full manuscript form first came to light in 13th century Syria. This extraordinary source of folk tales had been a stimulus of imagination both for the West and the East, and indicated how Arabs drew on the storytelling traditions of the people whose lands they conquered including the Greeks, Romans, Jews, and Persians etc. Although the global significance of folk literature was lost once it was co-opted for the nationalist purpose from the 19th century onwards, still the powerful impact it had on connectivity across the region and beyond could not be overstated.

The second feature was Astrology, an area of shared knowledge and experience which was significant for understanding Muslim societies up till the 19th century, and which it had common with other world societies like Central America, India, China and the Greeks. Muslims had preserved and developed classical learning of the subject, which penetrated deeply into the intellectual and political life of European Renaissance and remained a powerful influence until the 17th century Copernican revolution. Since then it had continued to exist and flourish in the Muslim lands while its significance reduced in Europe.

The third feature was the impact of production and consumption of major commodities. The great commodities of global history were those which had a substantial impact on societies that produced or consumed them including cotton, sugar, tobacco, coffee, opium and oil. Cotton had a deep-rooted connection with early Islamic world as the prophet Muhammad opposed luxurious apparel. Thus a distinct preference for cotton cloth over silk developed among the Muslims, which led to cotton cultivation in the Iranian plateau after its conquest by the Arabs and transformed Iran into a prosperous and culturally rich region. But 100 years of climate change that hit cotton crop brought rapid decline in prosperity leading the cultivating classes, rich merchants, poets and historians to leave Iran for other parts of the Muslim world. By the 16th century, cotton cloth was highly sought after in European markets and with Britain's trading empire in the 17th century, became a commodity of global importance. Britain first stimulated Indian production to provide cotton goods but by 19th century, production had shifted from handloom weavers of India to the machines of Britain while India remained a producer of raw cotton. Such was the centrality of cotton to the relationship between Britain and India that Gandhi made hand woven cotton cloth the symbol of Indian nationalist resistance to the British.

Discussing other major commodities, he stated that like cotton, sugar had also changed the face of human history. From its early mass production in 11th century Jordan valley, it was to influence the formation of colonies, the development of slavery and the composition of peoples. Coffee, which had emerged in 15th century Yemen became the top agricultural export of 12 countries. Tobacco had emerged as a major health hazard and was not accepted in either the Western or the Muslim world without challenge. Its consumption was falling in the developed and rising in developing world, a large proportion of which was Muslim. Opium was cultivated for medicinal purposes, drunk for pleasure, and used for recreation in China. Chinese consumption had led to a massive increase in opium production in India, and became the cause of Anglo-Chinese wars. Its current refined form, heroine had also influenced wars in South East Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. But nothing matched the production and consumption of oil and its impact on the world in general and the Islamic world in particular. Oil had dictated the

drawing of territorial boundaries, of lopsided economic development, of invasions and war and tended to favor dictatorial rule.

“ ... insistence on personal engagement with the scriptures, translation into vernacular languages and increased literacy had led to widespread self-interpretation such that no-one now knew who spoke for Islam. ”

Lastly, Robinson discussed the process of worldwide religious change terming it as the 'Protestant turn' in human piety. He suggested that though the tension between revelation and magical practices of mysticism lay deep in the Islamic past, the new Protestant understanding of Islam began with Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab and Shah Waliullah's teachings in the 18th century and spread throughout the Muslim world in the 19th and 20th century as it became subject to Western power. Key features of this Protestant turn were a new focus on the Quran and Hadith; translation of these texts from Arabic to the languages to allow a meaningful engagement with them; attack on all forms of magic, particularly the idea that there could be intercession of man on earth; and a stronger emphasis than before on the horrors of the Day of Judgment. The aim was for Muslims to function religiously in a world where they no longer held political power such that individual human conscience became the basis of and an active force in creating a Muslim society.

Discussing the outcome of this change, he particularly concentrated on the idea of man as an active agent on earth because of an emphasis on conscience, personal responsibility and self-instrumentality. Same ideas were prominent in the thought of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the founder of South Asia's Islamic modernist thought; Muhammad Ilyas, founder of the Tableeghi Jamaat; as well as the most influential Muslim thinkers of the 20th century, Muhammad Iqbal of British India and Ali Shariati of Iran. He argued that this reform undermined the old system of religious authority opening the way to self-interpretation of scriptures. Previously, religious authority rested with religious specialists who monopolized interpretation and passed it down. But insistence on personal engagement

with the scriptures, translation into vernacular languages and increased literacy had led to widespread self-interpretation such that no-one now knew who spoke for Islam.

Revolutionary economic and social change within Muslim societies had led to the formation of industrial, commercial and administrative classes. As Muslim elites had been co-opted to serve Western political and economic purposes, Ulema groups and Islamist parties had found support in these social formations. With support from middle and lower middle social strata, they were challenging the power in many Muslim societies today, as they had done successfully in Turkey and Indonesia, and were doing with increasing success amid the complexities of the Arab world.

In conclusion he said that in the 19th and 20th century, a similar shift and Protestant turn was also seen in other great religions of South Asia including Sikhism and Hinduism, a shift from social structure to the individual human being. This shift had mingled with worldwide social and economic change and was a global development. The protestant piety represented by the reform throughout the Muslim world was a profoundly modern phenomenon and now commonplace in modern scholarship. This widespread protestant turn of the 19th century had raised issues of origin and meaning.

The talk was followed by a question and answer session. A participant asked if there was a future possibly of liberal and democratic polity in the Muslim world? He replied by exemplifying Indonesia, Turkey and Egypt. In Indonesia, the religious parties led the transition from dictatorship to democracy. Turkey was effectively ruled by the military through controlled democracy. However, the religious party AKP was eventually victorious in holding an election, forming a government and facing up to the attempts of the military to dominate it. Turkey now operated as a liberal democracy. He observed that Egypt was more democratic now under Muslim Brotherhood than it was under Hosni Mubarak. This led him to assert that there was considerable progress towards democracy in many parts of the Muslim world.

In response to a query about a comparison between the Protestant turn in Islam with a similar trend in other reli-

gions, he responded that a move towards scriptural Islam and translation into vernacular for better understanding was similar to a shift witnessed in Christianity as well. The greater emphasis on the Day of Judgment, endeavoring to live life according to God's commands and observing rituals, was a new religious temperament common to Deobandi Islam and 17th Century Protestants in England and America.

“ ... development of the press in the 19th century helped Muslims conceive of themselves in pan-Islamic terms, as a civilization, ”

Replying to a question concerning the pupil-teacher relationship in Islam, he explained that the pupil needed to physically become the holder and transmitter of knowledge as knowledge became incarnate within him. Also the pupil had huge respect for the teacher whose knowledge was being passed. The Sufi murid had to turn into someone who was completely malleable at the hands of the pir. A pupil was given a whole series of tests for him to discover his humility and to become completely God focused.

In response to a question about the future of Islam compared to that of Christianity, he responded by saying that as a world faith, Islam and Muslim societies were in a much stronger position to move forward as a society of believers than Christianity. Christianity in Western Europe and North America was in a particularly weak state. It had institutional organizations that were both strength and a weakness, he remarked.

Replying to a question about why Muslim teaching was moving from being inclusive to exclusive, he articulated that it was the nature of almost all systems when they found themselves up against the wall; to exclude those who they felt weren't true believers. He emphasized that the process of trying to interpret and find the right form of ijtehad for the present day was essential. Sufism was the answer to modern sectarian world. It was by nature inclusive, a system based on the fact that there was one pearl of truth but different ways towards that. He postulated a sharper focus on spiritual learning, practice and devotion rather than mere textual knowledge.

:Majed Akhtar, PhD candidate in Geography at the University of Arizona was invited to deliver a talk on “Hydro politics of the Indus Waters Treaty: Baglihar and Beyond” at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance on July 25, 2012.



Akhtar began by making a bold and somewhat different statement that Indus Waters Treaty was a development document, oriented towards the most efficient and profitable development of the river. With a focus on sustainable development, it aimed to ensure that the project continued to be profitable in the long term. More importantly, it must be recognized that the treaty was not designed for the protection of downstream position of Pakistan, but rather towards finding the most economically efficient way of utilizing the river resource.

Elaborating on his perspective, Akhtar said that he had used World Bank archives to trace the history of negotiations leading to the signing of Indus Water Treaty, and proceeded to read out and analyze quotes from these archives to provide a historical context of the treaty. This analysis showed that the Indus water issue was treated as a business and engineering issue, rather than a political one. Pakistan's vulnerability due to its downstream position was overlooked and Pakistan's geopolitical fears suppressed. The negotiation process was carried out by experts who were considered neutral and apolitical. As most of the experts involved in drafting and negotiating the law were engineers and technicians, the talks amounted to technical deliberations while political concerns if any were kept aside.

He disagreed with the current stance of engineers on the treaty and Indus waters, which often argued that the treaty had been successful primarily because it was apolitical, and that Pakistan hadn't utilized the river's water resource efficiently because of lack of technical capabilities and engineering skill. Instead, he made a case that the apolitical nature of the treaty had left Pakistan's geopolitical downstream fears unaddressed. Through the Indus Basin Development Agreement (IDBA), the international community had amassed monetary funds to build two large dams, Mangla and Tarbela, as an attempt to engineer away Pakistan's downstream position. After these dams were built, it was said that Pakistan was no longer vulnerable in its downstream position as if downstream fears were supposed to be allayed by infrastructure and replacement works. However, this offering of technical solution to a social problem had left the underlying issue unresolved, to be dealt with another day.

Elucidating the Baglihar dam case, he explained that the Baglihar dam was located on the Chenab river; about a 100 miles east of the Pakistani border, at the same latitude as the Mangla reservoir. It was a run of the river project, a form of hydroelectric generation in which a limited amount of storage reservoir called Pondage or no water storage was required. The minimum storage reservoir served to regulate water flow and prevent power fluctuations due to irregular river flows. He then proceeded to carry out a socio-legal analysis which looked at the principles determining the decision concerning the construction of the dam. Pakistan had reservations regarding the construction of Baglihar barrage as it considered the project to be in violation of Indus Waters Treaty. Annexure D of the treaty delineated hydroelectric uses of the dam and paragraph 8 of Annexure D discussed setting up of new run of the river projects.

“... complaints lodged by Pakistan regarding the Baglihar dam decision were of size and spillways.”

Pakistan had submitted that India was in violation of certain provisions of the treaty. The two groups of complaints lodged by Pakistan regarding the Baglihar dam decision were of size and spillways: one, that the size of the Bagli-

har dam was too large; two, that the spillway should not be gated as a gated spillway would allow the dam owner to have undue control over the water, and additionally that the spillway was positioned too low which again gave greater amount of water control to the upstream party. He explained that a spillway was a structure used to control release of flows from a dam into downstream area. Spillways released floods so that the water did not overtop and damage the dam. Regarding the reservations, he suggested that the release of water should be an automatic process whereby as soon as the water exceeded a certain level, the surplus would flow into the spillway, while the second Pakistani reservation argued that the spillway should be positioned at a higher level. It was thus evident that Pakistan wanted to limit India's control over the waters as its reservations manifested typical downstream geopolitical concerns, the degree of control and uneven power relations. However, Pakistan was trying to make geopolitical claims under a treaty that was a technical development oriented treaty whose logic was efficient development of the river waters.

“Pakistan wanted to limit India's control over the waters as its reservations manifested typical downstream geopolitical concerns, the degree of control and uneven power relation.”

Akhtar then proceeded to discuss the policy conclusions drawn from his analysis. He contended that the internationalization of water issues was not an appropriate strategy for Pakistan for the resolution of its water disputes with India. He explained that international law could be defined as an etiquette between states as countries first needed to accept and agree to the law before being subjected to act according to it. The main principles in international water law were equitable utilization of water, territorial integrity and downstream protection. However, over the past half century, priority was given to development of river over downstream concerns. This trend was evident in the Indus Waters Treaty and the Baglihar decision. Thus, internationalizing the debate implied that Pakistan's geo-political downstream concerns would be left unaddressed. He also argued that the Baglihar

decision would be a precedent for future interpretation of Indus Waters Treaty and decision-making on Indo-Pak water issues.

He argued that the theoretical meaning of downstream needed to be rethought and reconsidered. Currently it was looked at merely as a physical phenomenon. However its interplay with politics and economics rendered it more as a multilayered and multi-dimensional term. It was pertinent to explore the nature of engagement between other upper and lower riparian states in the world like, Israel and Jordan, Egypt and Sudan, and Pakistan and Afghanistan. Therefore, we must historicize the term's semantics and implication in the political and economic context, and reconsider the role of downstream in international law. Issues of communities that were suffering due to their downstream position needed to be highlighted and brought to the forefront with a focus on human rights and environmental law. Downstream needed to be looked at in terms of inequality, not only between states but across social groups and individuals.

In conclusion, he reiterated that the Indus Waters Treaty favored capitalist development of the river and was geared towards profit-seeking, and increasing the measurable economic value of rivers and structures. Thus it is not in Pakistan's interest to internationalize its water disputes and expect a geopolitical solution from a technical and economically driven treaty.

“ Downstream needed to be looked at in terms of inequality, not only between states but across social groups and individuals. ”

Discussion followed in the question answer session. In response to a question regarding Pakistan's prospects for development in the Indus Waters Treaty, Akhtar stated that the Indus Basin Development Agreement (IBDA) was a development plan and a supplementary part of the treaty. It led to a large monetary influx into Pakistan, which was utilized to set up dams and to form the institution of WAPDA.

Replying to a comment on possible bilateral solution to

Indo-Pak water disputes, he said that traditionally India had endeavored to resolve water disputes bilaterally. Pakistan however had opted for mediation by a third party. He argued that Pakistan should choose to keep the issue bilateral as that was in Pakistan's long-term interest. Internationalization of the issue did not go in favor of Pakistan as the Indus Waters Treaty did not ensure Pakistan's downstream rights.

“ ...the internationalization of water issues was not an appropriate strategy for Pakistan for the resolution of its water disputes with India. ”

Replying to a question concerning whether there would be a need for Indus Waters Treaty, had the international development paradigm been in favor of small rather than large dams, he replied in the negative. He explained that the need for such a treaty arose because large-scale dams could threaten Pakistan's water security given its lower riparian position.

:Dr. Akmal Hussain, Distinguished Professor of Economics at Forman Christian College and Member Board of Governors, South Asia Centre for Policy Studies was invited to deliver a talk on “The Political Economy of Indus Waters” at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance on 21st February, 2013.



Dr. Hussain began his talk by highlighting that Pakistan was in a water stress situation. Over the years, the country had shifted from being a water surplus country to a water scarce country. The rate of decline in per capita water availability had accelerated after 1999, primarily due to reduced rainfall in Himachal Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir. The per capita water availability of the Indus Basin had declined from 5,100 cubic meters per person in 1962 to only 1,300 cubic meters per person in the year 2011. As the international estimate of minimum water requirement per person per year was 1,700 cubic meters, Pakistan’s water availability was alarmingly low in comparison. Furthermore, existing projections suggested that this water scarcity would intensify over time. The government and people must recognize that we were now in a serious water stress situation.

“ The government and people must recognize that we were now in a serious water stress situation. ”

He then proceeded to elaborate on important features of the gradual natural and climactic shifts, their transformations and implications. First, the river flows in Pakistan had declined across the 1960 to 2011 period, by ap-

proximately 16%, while the total annual river flow of the Indus basin had declined from 119 acre feet to 102 acre feet in the same period. Thus, per capita water availability had declined not merely due to population rise but also in absolute river water flows. Second, current data showed that monsoons had shifted from the West of the country to the East, in line with Climate Change experts’ predictions for South Asia that location and volume of rainfall would shift due to Global Warming. Since the rivers as well as most of the cultivated acreage were located in the West of the country, it would have major implications on the stability of agricultural production. Third, the scale and magnitude of glacial melt in the Himalayas was significantly higher than the average glacial melt in other parts of the world. In Pakistan historically, the glacial melt had been the highest in the month of August, which was in sync with periodic crop water requirements. However, the recent change in glacial melting pattern had resulted in greater melt during earlier months, and lesser melt in August resulting in the dearth of water for agricultural needs.

“ ... out of 100 million acre feet of river water, only 33 million acre feet reached the farm gate while the rest was lost. ”

He thus argued that increased variability and location change of monsoons, and shift in the temporal pattern of glacial melt had collectively resulted in increased inconsistency and instability in agricultural production, which was consistent with the data on Climate Change. The frequency of bad harvests had more than doubled over the past decade and productivity of the seeds had also been adversely effected. An implication for society was increased vulnerability of the marginal sections, as a bad harvest for marginal agriculture producers meant that they would become buyers of food and consequently indebted. Thus, these increased fluctuations in agricultural output had created a structural phenomenon of increased poverty.

Discussing water utilization in Pakistan, Hussain identified problems of low irrigation efficiency and low water-use efficiency. Elaborating the issue of low irrigation

efficiency of 33%, he explained that out of 100 million acre feet of river water, only 33 million acre feet reached the farm gate while the rest was lost. A similarly large proportion of water got wasted from farm gate to the root zone of the crop. Pakistan's water-use efficiency was also among the lowest in the world at \$3.34 of output per unit of water used. Pakistan was producing low value, water-intensive crops such as sugar cane and rice.

He then discussed implications of water scarcity for domestic policy and inter-state relations, and argued that since the Indus basin was shared by two countries and many provinces, a rational approach would be to cooperate and innovate to manage this crisis. He suggested three major policy options and remedial measures. First, greater irrigation and application efficiency through lining canals and planting trees along the canals; brick or concrete lining of water courses; using laser leveling technology to reduce water wastage on the farm; creating water channels on the farm; using drip irrigation to transport calibrated water precisely to the root zone of the crops. Second, to improve water use efficiency (output produced per water unit), it was necessary to change cropping patterns and devote a larger amount of crop acreage to high value added crops. For example, tunnel farming for vegetables could massively increase output value. Third, Pakistan's water allocation strategy needed to be rethought as it remained unchanged from what Britain was using in the 19th century leading to surplus water in some areas while leaving others water deficient. Estimation of water requirements for every command area on a zone wise basis needed to be carried out to achieve greater allocative efficiency in water distribution.

Discussing international dimension of the issue, he stated that Indus waters were a shared water resource and thus required joint water resource management. Indus Basin Treaty, the longest lasting and the biggest water management document of the world also suggested sharing of information and cooperation in water management. There was thus a need for reliable data on river flows on a daily and hourly basis, for which technology was available. He argued that this technology be adopted to improve cooperation, as the allegation that India was stealing our water, would either be proven or disproven. Further, both countries should pool resources for flood and drought

forecasting, managing water waste and tree plantation for flood prevention. Joint water shed management and planting trees in catchment areas could prevent flash floods by slowing down water flow in catchment areas as well as reduce siltation of dams.

Lastly discussing food security, he sounded an alarm bell stating that Pakistan's vulnerability to the devastation that Climate Change could cause to society and economy was greater than anywhere else in the world. An Inter-governmental Panel for Climate Change (IGPCC) report had listed South Asia, the most vulnerable region of the world as its agriculture was critically dependent on timely monsoons. 70% of Pakistan's rural population was food insecure, lived on the margins, and thus a bad harvest would result in rising poverty. Another Global Warming induced consequence was reduced seed productivity due to rising temperatures. Further, the presence of industrial waste, lead and arsenic in the Pakistani and Indian rivers, and polluted water percolating ground water, was creating health hazards by contaminating food.

In conclusion, he stated that the government needed to recognize that Pakistan had shifted from water surplus to a water scarce situation. Given this water crisis, it needed to undertake policies that would improve our irrigation, water use, allocation and distributive efficiencies. Additionally, Pakistan needed to arrive at a rational arrangement with India for the measurement of water flows, on digitizing rivers, improving soil chemistry, waste water management, and on how to acquire and develop heat resistant varieties of food grains. Cooperation was needed to survive, and institutional mechanisms both within and between countries needed to be a part of this strategy of survival.

A question and answer session followed. In answering a set of questions regarding political aspects of water sharing including interprovincial sharing of water, Indian willingness to engage with Pakistan for water management and lastly the role of Indus River System Authority (IRSA), he proposed multilevel policy options. First, the Council of Common Interest (CCI) must be cognizant of the fact that IRSA had failed to achieve its goals and it was CCI's responsibility to develop a consensus on inter-provincial cooperation with the involvement of provincial Planning

and Development departments. Second, broader sections of society from each province needed to be encouraged to join the debate, and large civil society organizations must be linked with provincial governments to come up with alternative consensus on water sharing, so that better options could be explored and discussed in the CCI. Finally, academics, economists, civil engineers, and scholars had to be engaged in the policy making process, in an institutionalized fashion. This implied building institutions for peaceful inter-provincial management as opposed to conflict. The same was needed to effectively negotiate and engage with India on water management issues.

“Cooperation was needed to survive, and institutional mechanisms both within and between countries was essential to be a part of this strategy of survival. ”

In response to a question concerning how to create incentives and mechanisms to encourage judicious use of water by individuals, he brought in economic principles of making rational choices under conditions of scarcity to argue for effective pricing to ensure optimal consumption. Pricing water could change people's behavior and reduce wastage of water. Installation of water meters to accurately measure water consumption and pricing the resource accordingly would ensure efficient utilization.

Responding to a question about governance in the US versus Pakistan, Hussain stated that in Pakistan, there was low level of acceptability regarding the role of academia in policy and governance. The government was mainly interested in quick fixes and short-term solutions rather than implementing long-term and evidence based strategies as suggested by academics.

Ambassador James Larocca, Director, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA), former U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait, 1997–2001 and Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge D'Affaires in Tel Aviv, 1993–1996, **Prof. John H. Gill**, a military historian and Associate Professor at NESA and **Zachary J. Meyer**, Forward Office Director, Bahrain were part of the NESA panel invited to deliver a talk on **“Middle East in Transition: An American Perspective”** at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance on February 16, 2012.

Ambassador Larocca began by saying that the Middle East was going through a period of extraordinary historical change, especially since the past one year. In order to fully comprehend and understand this process of change, he had visited several countries to gather first-hand knowledge about the changing conditions.

“... a process that would take many generations to play out, a revolution that would have many further developments before it settled. ”

He expressed that the terms 'Arab Spring', 'Arab Awakening' or 'Arab Uprising' were not fitting description for the situation. Instead he asserted that “Middle-Eastern Transition” was more apt as it was a process and not a single or series of events. It was a process that would take many generations to play out, a revolution that would have many further developments before it settled. As the French Revolution and the American Civil War experience demonstrated that it took many decades for countries to settle on a suitable form of government, following such events.

Describing inception of the transition, though many considered the self-immolation of a young Tunisian vegetable vendor after being refused a license as the spark, a lesser known fact was that since then a 100 Tunisians had set themselves on fire. What started then, was not completed with the overthrow of Ben Ali, it was only the beginning. A similar impression applied to all of the transitioning Middle-Eastern countries. People were against tyranny, inefficiency, corruption, and desired dignity, self-respect, freedom of speech and political participation. However,

the strategy and mechanism through which this could be achieved was not clear, and people still needed to decide and agree on the mode of governance. There was a lack of advanced higher education, academia, and research institutions in the Middle-East, and compared to South Asia, there were very few people studying Middle-East in the Middle-East.

Exemplifying Tunisia, he pointed out that the country had no history of a local government system. In contrast, the US had a strong system of local government for over a century before it became a country, and the public while satisfied with the performance of city, county and state governments, resented the central government. Similarly, Egypt had been centrally governed for over 30 years. But unlike Tunisia, Egypt's economic problems were direr. Most Egyptians were living on less than two dollars a day and the economy was at a risk of bankruptcy. He expected a fundamental change in Egypt predicting a coalition government of the Muslim Brotherhood, economic technocrats and the military.

The process of transition in each Middle-Eastern country was different, though the desire to overthrow imperial dictators and move towards a new ideology was a common thread. In the case of Libya, foreign intervention was necessary for a change to take place as in the absence of robust institutions, conflicts and divisions among the population had resulted in a highly unstable and volatile situation. While Libya was resource rich with a small population, Yemen was a resource poor country of similar population size. A distinguishing feature of Yemen was its rich civilization and a strong family culture. The robust social fabric and deeply embedded cultural values of cooperation, sharing and helpfulness was an enabling factor for communities to endure and survive the economic hardships of this transitory phase. Also, the presence of a cadre of technocrats could help the country to move forward.

In Syria, the majority was ruled by a minority dictatorship. Unlike the Libyan transformation, Syria experienced what he described a "genuine revolution". He expected the formation of a Sunni government while 50% of the population comprised of minorities including Christians and other Muslim sects. But, the Syrian situation was precarious and complex. Discussing Saudi Arabia, he stated that

King Abdullah had recognized the need for change, and had responded by increased expenditure on education and employment generation. He expected a peaceful process of change in Saudi Arabia. He added that Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt and Yemen were going through the transition during an unfavorable time due to the simultaneous onset of global economic crisis. Though they were proud people and not accustomed to accepting foreign aid, however the economic situation now necessitated it.

In conclusion, he elucidated possible solutions asserting that all solutions were regional and the Arab League had failed to resolve regional problems, particularly in Syria. Existing international institutions would also be unable to resolve today's problems. Though the UN could define codes of conduct, there was a dire need to reshape and develop regional institutions for conflict resolution.

The talk was followed by a question answer session. Replying to a question regarding prevalent religious extremism in the Middle East, he stated that specific solutions were required in each country. Democracy implied that minorities would have to pay a price for majority rule. With increased democracy, there was greater empowerment and freedom of expression, and aggression against minorities in such phases of transition was inevitable. Rise in violence and bloodshed would occur before a point of stability was reached.

In response to a comment on US foreign intervention in the Middle East, he stated that US intervention had been widely criticized and US assistance even rejected in some instances because of it carried an American flag. He stated that there were limits to what the US could do to resolve the situation.

In response to a question regarding the role of leadership in preventing violence, he gave the example of Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, change was occurring in a peaceful way owing to the wisdom of the leadership. King Abdullah had set up local municipal councils to facilitate resolution of problems, such as: housing, energy, water and education were being resolved in a peaceful manner. Though not being discussed in the local media, there was remarkable peaceful systematic change taking place in Saudi Arabia, he claimed.

Visitors and Activities

October 11, 2013

CPPG arranged a policy dialogue with Dr. Izza Rohman, Toaha Qureshi and Julia Indiaty Suryakusuma on **State, Religion and Democracy – An Indonesian Perspective** in collaboration with Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS).

November 20, 2013

CPPG organized a seminar on **Human Dignity and Religious Freedom in Islamic Thought** by Dr. Christian W. Troll.

November 13, 2013

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on **The Organizational Dynamics of Political Parties and Electoral Violence in Pakistan** with Dr. Mohammad Waseem.

November 21, 2013

CPPG organized a seminar on **Pakistan: Signposts of a Garrison State** by Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed.

December 12–13, 2013

CPPG in collaboration with the Embassy of France organized an international conference on **Social Change and Security Imperatives: Challenges for Leadership and Democratic Governance in Pakistan**.

January 13, 2014

CPPG in collaboration with CRSS arranged a policy dialogue with Dr. Mohammad Kamarulnizam bin Abdullah & Ms. Ruhana Harun on **State, Religion and Democracy – A Malaysian Perspective**.

February 6, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar on **China Soft Power: From Geo Politics to the Rise of Global Society** by Dr. Adam Webb.

February 18, 2014

CPPG organized a research report launch of **Informal Sector and Urban Policy** by Ms. Khalida Ahson and Mughess Tahir Bhalli.

February 20, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar on **Democracy and Public Ad-**

ministration in Pakistan by Dr. Amna Imam.

March 19, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar on **Marginality and the State: A Case Study of Jharkhand, India** by Dr. Roger Begrich.

March 27, 2014

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on **Federalism in Theory and Practice** with Mr. Tariq Mahmud.

April 1, 2014

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on **Human Rights in a Federal System** with Mr. I. A. Rehman and Mr. Asad Jamal.

April 2, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar on **Post 2014 Withdrawal of U.S. from Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan and Afghanistan** by Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum.

April 3, 2014

CPPG organized a two day training for **Promising Young Entrepreneurs** by Mr Haroon Rashid.

April 8, 2014

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on **Decentralization and Local Government** with Mr. Sarwar Bari.

April 8, 2014

CPPG organized a two day training for **Governance and Management of Urban Growth** by Dr. Imdad Hussain.

April 14, 2014

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on **18th Amendment: Implications for Provincial Autonomy & Governance** with Mr. Zafarullah Khan.

April 15–16, 2014

CPPG in collaboration with Church World Service, organized a policy dialogue on **Governance & Leadership** with Dr. Saeed Shafqat.

April 28, 2014

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on **The Baloch Question**

with Baloch students and community residing in Lahore.

April 29, 2014

CPPG organized a two day training on [Advance Research Methodology: A Qualitative Approach](#) by Dr. Sikandar Hayat.

May 23, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar on [Real Estate Markets in Lahore including Land Use, Building Control and Zoning in Lahore](#) with Dr. Sania Nazir.

May 28, 2014

CPPG organized a research report launch titled [Anti-Terror Laws, Policing and the Criminal Justice System: A Case Study of Anti-Terrorist Efforts in Punjab](#) by Ms. Rabia Chaudhry.

May 30, 2014

CPPG organized a research report launch titled [Reforming the Energy Sector of Pakistan: The Case of Punjab](#) by Mr. Shahram Rana & Mr. Muhammad Imran.

May 30, 2014

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on [Urbanization, Migration and Social Changes in Baluchistan: Issues and Policy Choices](#) with Dr. Saeed Shafqat.

June 10, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar on [Pakistan and Afghanistan: Future Perspectives on Bilateral relations, the Taliban and the impending U.S. Withdrawal](#) by Ambassador Riaz Mohammad Khan.

June 24, 2014

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on [Making Lahore a Trade Friendly City](#) with Dr. Imdad Hussain.

June 26, 2014

CPPG in collaboration with UNDP, hosted the discussion at the launch of 2nd issue of Development Advocate Pakistan, [Making Education Work: The Governance Conundrum](#).

[From the Director's Desk cont.](#)

We continue to struggle to put forth this debate of ideas and refreshing research in a timely manner but delay continues while we get closer to our target. Like our last Quarterly, this one also brings together the backlog of past two years, however, the issues and insights that our learned speakers provide continue to resonate, and that signifies the relevance and salience of scholarship.

Enjoy reading. We encourage you to critique and contribute towards the knowledge sharing spirit of CPPG.

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: **Dr. Salman Humayun**, Deputy Chief of Party, Education Sector Reform Assistance Program (ESRA).

: **Dr. Saba Gul Khattak**, former Executive Director SDPI specializes in comparative politics and state theory.

: **Dr. Anjum Khurshid** (MBBS, MPAFF), Assistant Professor and Director of the Health and Behavioural Risk Research Centre, University of Missouri.

: **Dr. Naushin Mahmood**, Senior Researcher at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) specializes in demography and population issues.

: **Javed Masud**, former Managing Director and CEO The Pakistan Credit Rating Agency Limited.

: **Dr. Jack Nagel**, Professor of Political Science, Business and Public Policy, Wharton, University of Pennsylvania.

: **Jean-Luc Racine**, Senior CNRS Fellow at the Center for South Asian Studies, School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Paris focuses on geopolitics of South Asia.

: **Babar Sattar**, LL.M, a Rhodes Scholar who writes on social, political and legal issues and runs a law firm AJURIS.

: **Dr. Shafqat Shehzad**, Associate Professor Comsat University, Islamabad and former Research Fellow at SDPI specializes in health economics.

: **Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua** is a security studies expert specializing in defense decision-making and civil-military relations in South Asia.