Conceptual and institutional asymmetries in human rights treaty implementation: European Union-Pakistan dynamics

Abstract

This paper investigates how treaty regimes effectively improve human rights conditions in repressive States, focusing on Pakistan’s commitments to United Nations-led human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and bilateral agreements like the European Union-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement and the 2019 Strategic Engagement Plan. Despite these formal commitments, meaningful progress remains limited, with Pakistan’s failure to uphold treaty obligations potentially threatening incentives like the European Union’s (EU)’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences status. The research explores how conceptual asymmetries – philosophical and normative divergences – and institutional asymmetries – structural and procedural mismatches – between the EU and Pakistan hinder the implementation of these treaties. Using a qualitative methodology combining critical content analysis and documentary analysis, the paper adopts a deductive approach to argue that the more repressive a State is (allegedly Pakistan), the more eager it is to ratify human rights

treaties for strategic benefits, yet it struggles with implementation due to deep- rooted asymmetries. Building on Oona A. Hathaway’s integrated theory of

international law, this paper advances the framework by highlighting how asymmetrical actor relationships in international law regimes can transform treaties into instruments of performative compliance rather than substantive change.